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A democratic system of government has become analogous with peace, economic
prosperity, and political stability (no coup d'etat). This observation generally holds true
for advanced liberal democracies, but not for those democracies and emerging
democracies in West Africa. Given the dismal condition of both economic prosperity and
political stability, it seems as if the liberal democratic model is unable to uphold
prosperity and stability in West Africa.
However, despite similarities in experience of the sixteen countries in the sub-
region, since attaining independence, only Senegal and Cape Verde remain relatively
prosperous, and more significantly, coup-less (no successful coups) and relatively stable.
Within this background the inquiry therefore becomes, despite similar experiences, what
explains the different outcome: the outcome of high level of political instability coupling
with low level of democratic consolidation indicative of the sub-region, against
considerable democratization and political stability in Senegal and Cape Verde? This
trajectory becomes perplexing enough to warrant further study, thus, the central purpose
of this dissertation.
In explaining this conundrum, the dissertation focuses on Senegal. It is this
study's position that the liberal democratic model cannot fully explain political
stability in Senegal. Therefore, the study suggests that what explains political
stability in Senegal is referred to in this study as the Democarassie model (the
Senegalese model of democracy). Despite the Democarassie model's grounding in
the liberal democratic tradition, the model acknowledges and accommodates
Senegal's unique reality. In the case of Senegal, this unique reality is referred to in
this study as "Establishments", all headed by "Customary Authorities." Together
these establishments and their customary authorities play an intricate role in
maintaining democracy and political stability. Considering the far reaching powers
and influence of the customary authorities over the demos, the Democarassie model
seems to exhibit the hallmarks of a flawed or pseudo-democracy. Nonetheless, the
Democarassie model promotes self-rule and self-determination, allowing citizens the
luxury to genuinely participate in choosing and holding their leaders accountable.
With an exploratory qualitative case study analysis, the study examines the
implications of the Democarassie model on political stability in Senegal. This
examination reveals the indispensable role of customary authorities in upholding a
unique democratic system that in turn upholds political stability in Senegal.
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Although the genesis of democracy traces back to the Athenian Greeks and the
Romans more than 2500 years ago, by the Enlightenment epoch spanning the 17th and
18th centuries, democratic systems began to flourish in earnest in modern Western
European countries. Even though Europeans fought wars amongst themselves, with the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, amongst other arrangements, Europeans decided to explore
peace and other engagements. As a result, part of the intra-European exchanges and
conflict resolutions included collaboration and the exploration of other means of solving
differences rather than making war against and amongst each other. This peaceful
resolution posture was also in line with the European Enlightenment ideals. Arguably, the
Enlightenment ideals and the Westphalia Treaty promoted peace and collaboration
underpins the liberal democratic tradition in Europe today. These democratic ideals were
further solidified in the West (Europe and the United States) by the American and French
Revolutions, both in the last quarter of the 18th century. Since then, that liberal
democratic framework has by and large helped foster both in-country and cross-border
political stability in Europe.
In the spirit of the "Peace of Westphalia" and the guarantees of liberal
democracy, Europe ushered in an unprecedented era of peace, prosperity, and political
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stability. Even though Europeans engaged in two total wars (World War I and World
War II) in the twentieth century, European liberal democracies generally avoided
collapsing; most particularly, by avoiding the coup d'etat experience over at-least a
century, they remain generally stable and prosperous. Such stability and prosperity
indicative of developed liberal democracies can be explained from different levels of
analyses, including but not limited to the international system, the global north/global
south dynamic, political and economic systems, level of development, and degree of
dependency; however, the fact remains that these developed liberal democracies remain
generally prosperous, politically stable, and coup-less.
Within this background and moving forward to the end of the last century
(twentieth), one observes a similar effect. Paralleling the surge of democracy following
the Enlightenment in Europe and following the fall of the Soviet Union and Marxism-
Leninism ideology, the 1990s also witnessed a surge in democracy resulting in the
triumph of the liberal democratic framework. This surge ushered in what Samuel
Huntington popularized as the "third wave" of democracy to many parts of the world
including developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. According to
Huntington, this third wave started on April 25, 1974 in Lisbon, Portugal with a coup that
unwittingly triggered a global democratic movement.1 The "third wave" of democracy
has come to be characterized with a global embrace of the liberal democratic model,
especially in the developing countries including countries in Africa. However, regardless
of this surge of democracy, given the state of economic stagnation and political instability
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman, Oklahoma: Oklahoma University Press, 1991), 3-4.
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manifested with the high frequency of coups d'etat and other forms of political
instability, one observes a major disconnect of the liberal democratic model from the
upholding and fostering of political stability and prosperity. As it is now evident,
following the "third wave," many African countries from Algeria to Zimbabwe consider
themselves democracies of sorts, and as a result, adopt the liberal democratic framework
or at minimum, operate under the liberal democratic tradition of holding elections.
However, besides a few bright spots and the promising few, these "third wave"
democracies, especially in Africa, unlike their developed democracy counterparts, are by
and large, unable to prosper economically, maintain political stability, and keep the threat
of the coup at bay.
Within this backdrop, with the liberal democratic model, prosperity, and political
instability in the West African sub region as the focus, an exception to the rule of the lack
of democratic consolidation and political instability is the country of Senegal. With the
absence of the coup as the main indicator of political stability in the West-African sub-
region, only Senegal and Cape Verde have been able to avoid the coup to so far remain
relatively prosperous, politically stable, and democratic. However, it is interesting to
point out that a second glance reveals that, even though Senegal is considered a
democracy, as already mentioned, the Western liberal democratic model, cannot fully
explain political stability in Senegal. Despite the fact that the Senegalese model of
democracy is grounded in the liberal democratic tradition, the Senegalese model of
democracy veers from the liberal democratic model by taking into consideration
Senegal's unique realities. As a result, the Senegalese model of democracy is arguably
not in total compliance with the liberal democratic model. However, albeit the liberal
democratic model and developed democracies, Senegal's unique model helps maintain
political stability in Senegal for over sixty years, despite the dismal political stability
record of this sub-region.
Even though one agrees that the "values" and "spirit" of democracy yields to
universality, it is argued that the uniqueness in realities, situations, and challenges faced
by individual nations must not only be considered but also accommodated within the
framework of the liberal democratic model; however, the current Western liberal
democratic model fails to do so. With Senegal as a case in point, it is suggested in this
study that the version of the liberal democratic model that helps maintain prosperity and
political stability in advanced democracies does not quite fit as neatly with unique
realities and exceptional situation(s) of developing democracies, therefore falling short in
upholding prosperity and political stability. Consequently, it is observed here that the
current Western liberal democratic model falls short in taking unique realities into
account. As a result, it is reiterated that the liberal democratic model falls short of
explaining political stability in Senegal and the few emerging democratic "bright spots"
in Africa. This is the dilemma the study seeks to address.
Given the current challenges to democracy and the political instability that closely
trails, governments around the world are waking up to a new reality. This reality partially
informs events such the Arab Spring, the proliferation of illiberal democracies, and
dictators ascending to power through democratic mechanisms. The logic of the
democratic model in the creation of economic prosperity is also currently being
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challenged by the performing Chinese "undemocratic" model. Countries around the
world from Egypt to Zimbabwe, Syria to Iraq, Ukraine and around Europe to Russia,
Thailand to Indonesia, and Argentina to Venezuela, countries around the world are
grappling with this reality. These currents of democratic challenges and political
instability (particularly political instability) are also very strong in West Africa. In this
milieu, the relationship between the liberal democratic model and political stability must
be revisited and further explored. This is worth further exploration especially at a time
when many countries in the sub-region including Guinea Bissau, Mali, and Nigeria are
facing mounting political stability challenges. In Mali, for example, the current situation
in 2014 is still fluid and unfolding, but remains daunting. Nigeria, another example, is
currently dealing with problems posed by Boko Haram in the context of terrorism and the
wider global war on terror that is escalating instability and show no signs of abating.
Considering the recent actions of groups such as Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb,
the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL), Al Nusra, Al Shabaab and many other terrorist groups,
these groups are posing significant challenges to stability in West Africa and around the
world. Also alarming is the stagnation, or even a general trend of democracy in retreat in
the sub-region. Given this catalogue of political stability challenges, if two countries in a
sub region of sixteen counties are able the beat the odds so far, to remain both democratic
and politically stable, these countries are worth studying.
In the backdrop of these events and in the interest of more profound
understanding of the relationship between democracy and political stability, the study
chooses to examine Senegal, one of the two countries that so far avoided the coup. One of
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the main reasons for choosing Senegal and not Cape Verde is that, as an independent
country, Senegal is older. Given significant similarities, if one could understand the
relationship between the democratization process and democracy in Senegal and its
implications on political stability, this deepens the understanding of the current state of
lackluster democratic consolidation and political instability manifested in the high
frequency of coups in the sub-region.
In earnest, the winds of independence started blowing over West Africa in the late
1950s. With the exception of Liberia (independent in 1847), starting with Ghana in 1957,
the circle of political independence for West Africa's sixteen states became complete
with Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau's attainment of independence from Portugal in 1975.
High hopes, bright future, high expectations, even "irrational exuberance"2, from
commoners and the elite alike, characterized the mood in West Africa during the wave of
independence in the early 1960s.
However, this era of hope was short-lived; by the mid-1960s, the reality of
political instability became clearly evident. Like a set of dominoes, starting with Togo in
1963, one after the other, all the West African countries with the exception of Senegal
and Cape Verde, eventually succumbed to political instability as manifested in the
frequent coups d'etat and other sources of instability prevalent in the sub-region. Such
sources of instability include but are not limited to secessions, irredentism, civil wars,
revolutions, riots, rebellions, strikes, religious conflicts, ethnic conflicts, uprisings,
demonstrations, liberation and wars of liberation, genocide, and politicides. Issaka K.
2 An emphasis on the exaggerated optimism that the attainment of independence and self-rule will
solve all problems and usher in a new era of peace, prosperity and self-determination.
Souare painted this picture well. According to Souare, "Since independence, the West
African sub-region has experienced numerous armed conflicts, including five full scale
civil wars, thirty-nine successful coups d'etat (and counting), three protracted separatist
rebellions, and numerous attempted coups."3 Even though, the sources of instability
abound (as mentioned above), because of its devastating effects on regime stability,
particularly when the coup is successful, this study considers the coup d'etat (also known
as pronunciamento, and. putsch, in some parts of the world) as the main indicator of
political instability. Even though, since the 1990s, the coup is abating across the globe
including West Africa however, the coup challenge is still menacing in West Africa.
Compared to the frequency of successful coups d'etat in both developed and developing
countries in Latin America and Asia, in a fifty year period between 1963 and 2013, Table
1.1 captures a high frequency of successful coups d'etat in West Africa.
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Because of the active currents of the coup activity in this sub-region, during the
course of this study, Table 1.1 had to be updated several times. This captures the
stubbornness of the coup problem in this sub-region. As noted in Table 1.1, led by Benin,
Mauritania and Nigeria registering six coups each (the highest number of coups by
country), the vast majority of West African states fell into what Paul Collier and Anke
Hoeffler refer to as the "coup trap."4 Collier and Hoeffler conceptualize a coup trap with
the argument that once a coup or civil war has occurred, further such events are much
more likely. "Since a coup legitimizes further coups, if legitimacy is the key barrier, then
4 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Coup Traps: Why does Africa have so many Coups d'etat?, "
Centerfor the Study ofAfrican Economies, Department ofEconomics, University ofOxford (2005),
accessed May 20, 2012, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/Coup-traps.pdf.
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we should observe 'coup traps'."5 In other words, once that innocence of a coup-less state
is lost, such innocence is most likely irretrievable.
Even though the sources and types of political instability abound as already
pointed out, considering a successful coup as literally the final frontier, the point of no
return, the coup is considered in this study as the main indicator of political instability. In
his classic definition of the coup d'etat in 1969, Edward Luttwak posits that "a coup
consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is
then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder."6 Some forty
years later, the coup exhibit similar characteristics. In 2006, Issaka K. Souare defined the
coup d'etat "as an illegal seizure of the highest level of power by a limited number of
military officers in a more or less violent or peaceful covert operation that does not
exceed a few days."7 The 2014 publication by Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey
Marshall defines the coup d'etat as follows:
[a] forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a
dissident/opposition faction within the country's ruling or political
elites that result in a substantial change in the executive leadership and
the policies of the prior regime although not necessarily in the nature of
regime authority or mode of governance.8
These three definitions reveal the general characteristics of the coup: At the least
three characteristics of the coup d'etat become evident: the nature of the takeover, the
5 Ibid., 3.
6 Edward Luttwak, Coup D 'etat: A Practical Handbook (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1969), 12.
7 Ibid., 29.
8 Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey Marshal, "Coup d'etat Events, 1946-2013
CODEBOOK," Centerfor Systemic Peace (March 2014): 1, accessed May 21, 2014,
http://www.svstemicpeace.org/inscr/CSPCoupsCodebook2013.pdf
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target, and the mode of operation. First, Luttwak refers to the takeover as an infiltration;
Souare calls the takeover an illegal seizure, and the Marshalls call the takeover a forceful
seizure. This indicates that the takeover in a coup is always extra-constitutional; it is
obviously outside the parameters of the law and aimed at displacing and replacing the
highest level of the regime. This brings us to the second characteristic of the coup d'etat:
the target. Luttwak refers to the target as the highest level of the regime: the critical
segment of the state apparatus, which Souare refers to as the president or prime minister,
and the Marshalls refer to as the executive authority. The question now becomes who
orchestrates such a takeover of the highest level of the regime. Answering this question
brings us to the third shared characteristic of the coup d'etat: the mode of operation. The
mode of operation tends to be swift, covert, and limited to few operatives (not initially
including the masses). Luttwak, Souare, and the Marshalls all highlight the importance
of the compact number of orchestrators and covertness of the coup operations. In other
words, unlike other types of political instability (secession, revolutions, civil war, etc.),
the collaborators of coups initially exclude the masses and keep plans, tactics, strategies,
and entire operations as covert as possible; mass support is only welcomed after the coup
unfolds.
With the high frequency of the coup and the authoritarian dictators that operated
within a framework of a one party state, in the early years into the first couple of decades
following independence, one could call into question the seriousness and genuineness of
democracy as a major part of the post-independence agenda. Some even contend that
democracy was never part of the post-independence agenda. Therefore, one can rightly
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argue that it has only been shy of a quarter century (1990s) since the liberal democratic
model became part of the African political affair calculus in earnest, as compared to
centuries of experience in developed liberal democracies; however, the fact remains that
liberal democracies reasonably expect prosperity, political stability and putting a tight lid
on the coup. This is by and large failing to hold true in many of today's emerging
democracies in West Africa. This trajectory of high frequency of the coup in the West
African region informs the fact that, by and large, the liberal democratic model falls short
of promoting political stability in the region. This trajectory is still manifest, especially at
a time when Mali has imploded and Senegal is showing signs of tilting towards the
malaise of instability that could have resulted in a coup, as manifested in the political
crises that almost eclipsed Senegal's February 26, 2012 presidential election. However,
like an oasis in the middle of the Sahara, the outcome of the 2012 election once again
reinforced Senegal's position as a democracy that is politically stable. Even though, the
pre-election crisis added to the ongoing challenges presented to Senegal as part the West
African sub-region reality, the 2012 election outcome adds to the impressive record of
election outcomes since 2000. Since 2000, the Senegalese people have been able to
navigate through three significant peaceful and democratic transitions of power from one
president to another. As a result, even though the issues of political stability,
democratization, and democracy in Senegal are the foci of the case study, Senegal in
relation to these issues must be introduced early on.
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Senegal on Political Stability, Democratization, and Democracy: A Brief
Introduction to the Case Study
Chapter five exclusively deals with the case study. However, considering the
importance of the case study, a brief introduction is in order. This introduction starts with
a recapitulation as follows: 1) The case is made that despite similar challenges and
solution between Senegal and other West African countries, Senegal is the only country
in West Africa (besides Cape Verde) that has thus far avoided a successful coup d'etat,
maintaining political stability. Based on this observation, it seems that Senegal managed
to beat the odds despite similar experiences. Therefore, the study finds it prudent to
explore the driver behind or the explanation for political stability in Senegal since the
study suggests that the liberal democratic model falls short of doing so. 2) With this
suggestion that the liberal democratic model cannot explain political stability in Senegal,
the study suggests that what explains the political stability in Senegal is the Senegalese
model of democracy-the Democarassie model. This proposition and the implications of
the Democarassie model on political stability becomes the main focus of the case study.
More precisely, the case study explores the Democarassie model and its implication on
political stability in Senegal.
In this perspective, the case study opens with an introduction followed with a
comparative analysis, which is seen as necessary in placing Senegal within its context in
West Africa on the democracy and political stability continuum. This comparative
analysis is followed with an introduction and an extensive discussion of the state of
political stability, the democratization process, and the state and model of democracy in
Senegal. With the research question in mind, the case study enters the realm of the
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Democarassie model. First, one examines the Democarassie model in the context of
West Africa's reality. Within this examination, the role and exchanges of establishments
and customary authority is examined to help determine the implications of Democarassie
model on political stability in Senegal. The crux of the contribution of the case study is
to examine and indicate the implications of the Democarassie model on political stability.
Building upon the concept of the Democarassie model and the important role of
various establishments and customary authorities, the study shows how the various
establishments all headed by a customary authority work in concert to uphold democratic
institutions and how such democracy in turn promotes political stability. One is not blind
to the fact that the first twenty years of independence witnessed a less-than democratic
Senegal, a one party regime led by the charismatic and generally appealing President
Senghor. However one can argue that democracy began to flourish and set deep roots
beginning in the early 1980s and in earnest following the 2000 elections. Over half a
century of relative political stability is worth noticing, especially given the history of
political volatility the West Africa region. This statement partly underscores the
significance of the study.
Even though the issues of political stability, democratization, and democracy in
Senegal will be dealt with in great detail in the case study (Chapter Five), a brief
introduction of Senegal is necessary early in the study. Senegal is one of the sixteen
countries that make up the West Africa sub-region. The history of Senegal spans
millennia; however, for the purpose of examining the Western concept of liberal
democracy and its implications on political stability in Senegal today, it makes sense to
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focus on the political history of Senegal after 1445. According to Michael Crowder, the
year 1445 witnessed the first European penetration into Senegal through the River
Senegal. After the founding of St. Louis by Caullier in 1659, the seventeenth and most
part of the eighteenth century witnessed the building of numerous forts that over time
blossomed into prosperous towns.9 By 1854, Senegal was under the rule of France, and
as a result of its assimilation policy was well on its way to becoming part of the French
Republic. By 1865, citizens of St. Louis and Goree-Dakar became French citizens,10 and
by 1914, Blaise Diagne had become the first black Senegalese French Chamber of
Deputies representative." Senegal remained a colony of France until independence in
1960.
Given Senegal's unique location, favorable climate, and privileged position in
French colonial assimilation policy, Senegalese especially from the Quartre Commun
were allowed to participate in the French political system decades before independence,
as early as the late nineteenth century. Alongside French assimilation policy, Senegal's
national and local politics was known to be (and is still) dominated by democratic
pluralism with both a local flavor, including a decentralization mechanism. This
assertion is in accordance with W. A. E. Skurnic's observation that "Senegal's domestic
9 Michael Crowder, Senegal: A Study ofFrench Assimilation Policy (London: Methuen and Co
Ltd., 1967), 9.
10 Michael Crowder, Senegal: A Study ofFrench Assimilation Policy, 17.
11 Ibid., 27.
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political history has followed a pluralistic pattern, which probably reinforced the present
leadership's taste for conciliation as a method of settling conflict."12
Citing Senegal's privileged position in the French colonial system, her long track
record and experience with democracy, and political participation based on pluralism,
one can argue that Senegal has more experience with democracy than majority of the
countries sharing the West African sub-region. This, in and by itself, partly explains
political stability in Senegal. With this observation in mind, it could be concluded that,
even though Senegal's challenges and solutions mirror those of other West African states,
Senegal is better able to maintain democratic institutions and political stability. These
challenges include political, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural challenges.
However, citing its privileged colonial position, the overwhelming support of the French
republic, the long experience with the exercise of democracy and pluralism, the
decentralization of power, and the empowerment of local governments during both the
pre and post-independence eras, Senegal is able to respond to these challenges more
favorably than most West-African states. Consequently, Senegal has become a symbol of
stability in a very unstable region. This warrants the case study. By prompting the
inquiry into what Senegal did right, one can discover what most if not all the other
countries in the sub-region were unable to achieve. The above statement does not
insinuate that Senegal is a perfect democracy with a spotless record and no challenges of
political stability at all, but rather, challenges one to see democracy in a continuum and
political stability as relative.
12 W. A. E. Skurnic, The Foreign Policy ofSenegal (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1972), 19.
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As stated earlier, Senegal is not an exception when it comes to challenges,
agitations, and political agitations including frequent strikes, high unemployment rates,
one dominant party rule (between 1960-1980), border skirmishes with neighbors (Mali,
Mauritania, Gambia and Guinea Bissau), and the most challenging so far, the secessionist
aspiration of the Casamance region. Mirroring the rest of the sub-region, Senegal also
struggles with cleavages within its society including but not limited to ethnic, linguistic,
regional, and social classes. However, together with Cape Verde, Senegal is the exception
when it comes to democracy, political stability, and the lack of the coup, especially
following the elections of March 2000. One can argue that since 2000, Senegal has
managed to uphold a model of democracy beyond the electoral minimal threshold. Since
2000, Senegal elections by many standards are considered participatory. Despite the
above-mentioned challenges and fragmenting predispositions within Senegalese society,
Senegal still manages to remain democratic with considerable political stability. These
challenges and predispositions are further exacerbated and complicated with brewing
political upheavals that occasionally ebb and overflow resulting from economic
challenges ranging from higher prices and inflation to issues of governance. As many
Senegalese have lamented, a good example of mismanagement and displaced priorities is
the Monument of the African Renaissance.
As far as the democratization process and democracy in Senegal is concerned, the
power transition between Senghor and his handpicked successor, Abdou Diouf in 1981
was a less democratically significant election than the elections that follow after 2000.
The more democratically significant elections were the elections of 2000 and beyond.
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The 2000 presidential election marks the first of many transitions of power from and
incumbent president to the opposition. In 2000 power transitioned from Diouf to the
opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, Wade's fifth contest since 1978. Again in 2012,
power transferred to an incumbent president to the opposition candidate in an election
reported by many pundits and media outlets including the New York Times as free, fair
and peaceful. The New York Times referred to this election as "a rare example of prompt
and peaceful political turnover in a region tormented by coups and leaders who refuse to
give up power."13 After twelve years in office and seeking a third term, Wade lost the
election to opposition leader Macky Sail, after a second round in a hotly contested
election. Even though Senegal is challenged by other forms of instability, one could
argue that these peaceful transfers of power at the ballot box by the citizens since 2000
further solidified democracy and political stability and particularly kept the coups d'etat
at bay. It is safe to state that, the only major political stability challenge Senegal has
encountered in the last few decades has been the secessionist aspirations of the
geographically isolated Casamance region in the south.
Even though Senegal is referred to in this study as generally democratic and
politically stable as highlighted above, it goes without saying that there are critics and
observers that question the cost, genuineness, and the sustainability of Senegalese
democracy. As a matter of fact, some critics go as far as characterizing Senegal's
13 Adam Nossiter, "A Turbulent-Free Elections in Senegal," New York Times, March 25, 2012,
accessed on May 11, 2012, accessed May 21, 2014,
http://www.nvtimes.com/2012/03/26/world/africa/president-concedes-race-in-senegal.html? r=0
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democracy as being on what is considered to be the "thin" side, rendering the Senegalese
model of democracy and the political stability that results as relative and open to
interpretation. However, the fact cannot be denied that Senegal is the only other West
African nation that is yet to experience the coup d'etat, therefore rendering her politically
stable. Keeping in mind the shared developmental challenges, such could not be said for
all the other nations that share the West Africa sub-region.
Within the background of the research question, the political stability-democracy
dynamics remains important, rendering the story of Senegal on the subject matter
abundantly relevant. Senegal is viewed as an oasis of political stability in a desert of
political instability in West Africa. As a result, Senegal presents itself as a bastion of
political stability and a vanguard of democracy. By many measures, Senegal proves to be
a beacon of democracy and political stability in West Africa. However, it is suggested in
this study that even though the Senegalese model of democracy is grounded in the liberal
democratic model, there are variations between the two models. With the Senegalese
model taking Senegal's unique realities into account, this model is able to explain
political stability in Senegal. To be more precise, the study makes the observation that
the liberal democratic model cannot fully explain political stability in Senegal, but the
Democarassie model can. As a matter of fact, the Democarassie model is the driver
behind political stability in Senegal. In making the case that the Democarassie model
explains political stability in Senegal, the case study delves into the intricate nuances in
the relationship between political stability and the Democarassie model to illustrate how
the Democarassie model reinforces political stability in Senegal.
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In the interest of streamlining the unique position of Senegal, this introduction
closes with few observations that will be revisited later in the study: 1) Of the sixteen
West African countries in the exception of Cape Verde, Senegal has been the only
country that since independence is spared the coup d'etat followed by military rule (with
exception of Prime Minister Mamadou Dia's 1962 alleged coup plot), 2) In addition to
this "coup-less" credential, Senegal is recognized globally as a formidable democracy (by
many standards including the respectable current Freedom House standards), 3) Senegal
is also considered highly tolerant (religious, ethnic, and cultural) and in frontlines of
human rights, diplomacy, and peacekeeping, including past operations in Lebanon, East
Timor, and Liberia, in naming a few. Around the world Senegal is a renowned champion
of international peace-keeping operations. 4) Senegal also maintains apolitical culture
track record that entertains political dissent and encourages political participation. 5)
Despite challenges in this area, Senegal is considered a country with relatively free media
as indicated with the 2.02 overall score (near sustainability) on the 2012 Media
Sustainability Index.14 6) Senegal also has a vibrant economy and informed citizenry. 7)
With Nigeria Ghana and Ivory Coast, Senegal is among the hegemonic powers in the
sub-region in economic and political terms. 8) While Senegal's population is ninety-four
percent Muslim, Senegal is a secular country. The above observations culminate in
suggesting that democratization in Senegal is close to maturity and politically stability
has taken root. In the interest to a more balanced approach the introduction comes to a
conclusion with an acknowledgement of the critics of democracy in Senegal.
14 "Senegal Media Sustainability Index (MSI)," IREX, last modified April 24, 2014, accessed July
30, 2014, http://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/ul28/Senegal%200618b.pdf.
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Within the context of the above observations, the main inquiry of the study goes
beyond the question of whether Senegal is a democracy and politically stable: Senegal is
already considered democratic and politically stable. The inquiry is, despite similarities
in challenges and solutions, between Senegal and the rest of the West African sub-region,
how and why is Senegal able to maintain both democratic institutions and political
stability in a region that is generally challenged by both. Is there a relationship between
political stability and democracy in Senegal? It is an illusion to consider Senegal a perfect
democracy, with no political stability challenges, but by and large, Senegal is considered
politically stable, relatively democratic, and far along on the democratization path,
especially considering elections and elections outcomes since 2000. Therefore,
democratization, democracy, and political stability in Senegal are all seen in a continuum.
These are the issues the case study addresses in more detail.
Research Question
This dissertation seeks to examine what explains political stability in Senegal?
Within this backdrop, the study examines the implications of Senegal's Democarassie
model and its implications on political stability.
Significance of the Study
The significance of the study is captured in four major points of significance: 1)
Considering the challenges of political instability, if one can explain why similar
challenges gave birth to the same outcome (political instability-the coup) everywhere else
except Senegal and Cape Verde, this would help improve our understanding of the
political instability that plagues the sub-region. 2) If advanced democracies seldom
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experience the coup, but the West African emerging democracies are coup-prone,
revisiting and better understanding democracy and its implications on political stability,
especially in a region challenged with both is significant. This discussion, contributes to
the discourse on the democratization process and democracy as a concept and a system of
governing. 3) Considering the frequency of the coup exacerbated by similar development
challenges, only Senegal and Cape Verde make the "coup-less" list in West Africa, and
both remain politically stable. Discovering what Senegal did right proves to be very
significant. 4) The Democarassie model is considered a significant contribution towards
theory building.
Organization of the Study
Chapter opens with an introduction, followed with the research question. This
chapter also offers the significance of the study, before finally closing with a summary
and roadmap outlining the organization of chapter two to chapter six. Following the
introductory chapter; the rest of the study is organized as follows.
Chapter 2, the literature review, surveys the literature on the two main concerns of
the study-political stability and democratization /democracy. The review of political
stability approach is two pronged: political stability in general in the general literature,
and political stability in Africa with a West Africa focus. The democratization process
and democracy is also reviewed here. The discussion of political stability and democracy
in Senegal fits better in the case study and, therefore, delayed for chapter five. Following
an analysis of the literature, the literature review comes to completion with a presentation
of the gap(s) and a general conclusion.
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Chapter 3 focuses on the theoretical framework. The Democarassie model is
introduced here as the theoretical framework that better explains political stability in
Senegal. The Democarassie model is presented within the theoretical backdrop of
political sociology, democratic pluralism, consociation theory, and Mahmoud Mamdani's
decentralized despotism theory.
Chapter 4, the methodology chapter, opens with a conceptualization of political
stability and the coup, democratization/democracy, and the Democarassie model. This is
followed with the presentation of the data and data sources and the data collection
method. In exploring the implications of the Democarassie model on political stability in
Senegal, the method of analysis as pointed out in this chapter is an exploratory case
study. The case study follows in the next chapter.
Chapter 5 presents the case study. The implications of the Democarassie model
on Political stability in Senegal. The chapter begins with a comparative prelude. This
prelude is followed with an examination of the state of political stability, democratization
and democracy in Senegal. The crux of the chapter focuses on political stability and the
Democarassie model in Senegal vis-a-vis the function and role "establishments and
customary authority." The chapter closes with a presentation of the how and why of the
Democarassie model and its implications on political stability in Senegal.
Chapter 6 chronicles the findings of the study on the workings and processes of
the Democarassie model and its implications on political stability. This chapter also
concludes the study with a presentation of the key finding of the study, prior to offering
general conclusions, and suggestions for future study.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
It is evident that the discussion of the democratization process, democracy as a
concept and system of governing, and political stability is still an unfolding topic and far
from over, therefore revisiting the general enduring debate on the subjects matter,
particularly the relationship between democratic model and political stability, is timely.
As a passageway to the core of the research question, the existing literature on the subject
matter is thoroughly reviewed. Within this backdrop, the literature review unfolds by
first surveying the scholarly literature. This survey spans the classics, the mainstream,
and emerging arguments, explanations, positions taken, and theoretical and conceptual
frameworks surrounding the two concerns of the study-political stability and
democratization/ democracy. Second, following this in-depth survey is an analysis of the
literature review. This analysis is expected to reveal the gap(s) in the literature.
The literature review chapter is divided in three sections as follows. Following the
introduction is section one. Section one reviews the general literature on political
stability, followed with a review of political stability in Africa with a West Africa focus.
This is followed with a review of the literature on democratization and democracy. The
review on political stability, democratization, and democracy in Senegal is set aside for
the case study. Section two presents an analysis of the literature review. Section two, in
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detail, analyzes the literature review revealing a discrepancy between the liberal
democratic model and the explanation of political stability in Senegal. Section three
outlines and discusses the gap in the literature, and offers a better explanation of political
stability in Senegal. Finally, suggesting that exploration with a nation-centric model of
democracy is deemed tenable.
Political Stability in the General Literature
Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier discover in their paper Long Live Democracy: The
Determinants ofPolitical Instability in Latin America four key points of reference on
democracy and political stability: 1) Democratic countries on average experience less
political instability. 2) Low income and ethnic fractionalization are discovered to be
among the major causes of instability. 3) Demographic trends and the rural and urban
relationship are also found to be important indicators of political stability; the more
integrate the rural and urban relationship is, the more politically stable the nation is. 4)
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the usual economic indicators such as inflation, and
budget overruns, but with the exception of trade liberalization, do not increase
instability.1 These four reference points were the conclusions of the Blanco-Grier
collaboration on the study of eighteen Latin American countries between 1971 and 2000.
As the Blanco-Grier study indicated, Latin America is the third most politically unstable
region, where only three countries qualify as democracies in an unstable region that
1 Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier, "Long Live Democracy: The Determinants of Instability in Latin
America," Pepperdine University, School ofPublic Policy Working Papers 33(2009), accessed February
15, 2011, http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/sppworkingpapers/33.
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experienced 20 coups, 451 political assassinations, and 113 regime threatening crises.2
Even though the Blanco-Grier duo painted a grim picture of democracy and political
stability in Latin America, by all counts the West Africa region is worse. Therefore, the
Blanco-Grier study resonates and serves as an important point of reference for this study.
Richard Jong-A-Pin studies the measurements, causes, and consequences in his
dissertation entitled "Essay on Political Instability: Measurements, Causes, and
Consequences. " After reminding readers that since the degree of political stability is not
directly observable, it is a challenge for many scholars to readily define the concept.3
Within this background, Jong-A Pin went on to tackle the major concerns of the study;
measuring political instability, the causes of political instability, and the consequences of
political instability. In measuring political instability, Jong-A-Pin also looked at political
instability and its effect on economic growth, political instability and its effect on
democracy, globalization and ethnic violence, political instability and its effect on
terrorism and cabinet instability. As a measurement for political instability Jong-A-Pin
utilized an exploratory factor analysis on 25 indicators of political instability. On the
causes and consequences of political instability, Jong-A Pin teased out what is called the
"Chua thesis-that the current globalization and democratization waves are increasing
violence in much of the developing world."4 Most likely in the developing world market-
dominated minorities MDM dominate markets and this in and by itself result of
2 ibid., l.
3 Richard Jong-A-Pin, "Essay on Political Instability: Measurements, Causes, and Consequences"
(PhD diss., Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2008), 1.
4 Ibid., 73.
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resentment for the majority, this in turn results in instability. As a cause and consequence
of political instability, Jong-A-Pin also looks into the consequence of terrorism and
cabinet instability and concluded that terrorism increases the probability of cabinet failure
and this could exacerbate political instability.
Political Stability in Africa with a West Africa Focus
George Klay Kieh first reckoned with the endemic nature and the various
explanations of political instability in Africa before taking a position on the root cause.
As a passageway towards offering an alternative theoretical framework in explaining
instability, Kieh revisited the archetypical theories in the explanation of political
instability in Africa-the usual, the Cold War theory, the ethnic theory, and the rent-
seeking theory- all found to be lacking. The alternative theory Kieh offered is the
peripheral capitalist state theory. Within the backdrop of this theory, Kieh also discussed
the Berlinist state; a product of Western imperial capitalism. "Second, the domestic
political economies based on the peripheral capitalist mode of production in which the
major means of production (especially capital and technology) are owned and controlled
by various members of metropolitan-based ruling classes in the United States and
Europe."5 In conclusion, according to Kieh, "the best way to address political instability
and its events is to democratically reconstitute the peripheral capitalist state. This is a
multidimensional process that entails deconstruction, rethinking, and reconstitution. The
5 George Klay Kieh, "The State of Political Instability in Africa," Journal ofDeveloping Societies
(March 2009): 1, accessed December 6, 2013, http://dx.doi.Org/doi:10.l 177/169796X09028500101.
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end product is to establish substantive or deep democracy with human development and
well-being as the fulcrums."6
Anirudha Gupta asked whether African leaders can engage in meaningful nation-
building and simultaneously legitimize their hold on political power.7 Gupta
acknowledged the fact that these two endeavors are practically incompatible. As a matter
of fact, nation-building could alienate supporters (the elite class-evo/weY); this in turn
hinders holding on to power. Therefore, African leaders have their work cut out for
them. In order to succeed in both nation-building and legitimately holding on to power,
they will have to walk a fine line and delicately balance priorities. Gupta points out that
African leaders strategized by pandering toward a favored social class. However, this
strategy proved to be a temporary fix. In short order regimes started imploding resulting
in numerous coups. Even though this piece was published in 1967 (barely a decade since
Ghana started the independence revolution in 1957), Gupta was able to count seven coups
between 1965 and 1967. Among these countries are Algeria and Congo in 1965, Central
Africa Republic, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Nigeria (twice), and Ghana; all in 1966,
and Sierra Leone in 1967. As a result, Gupta concluded by suggested a further study of
the African elite class he refers to as the evolues because of the important role they play
within their communities. Notwithstanding the fact that these evolues are very influential
in their societies, and they always spark tensions amongst themselves as they jockey for
6 Ibid., 20.
7 Anirudha Gupta, "Roots of Political Instability in Africa," Economic and Political Weekly (June
1967): 1041-1046, accessed December 8, 2013, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4358039.
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more resources for themselves and their societies. As the leader panders to various elite
groups, the leader tries to be everything for everyone, and if everything fails they turn to
what Gupta refers to their "Africanness."
Antony Otieno Ong'ayo endeavors to examine and not only explain were the
problem of political instability in Africa lies, but to also offer alternative perspectives. In
his piece, "Political Instability in Africa, " Ong'ayo admits that internal factors including
leadership problems and Africa's colonial heritage that handed down the current weak
and ineffective institutions could be to blame for political instability in Africa today.
However, the biggest culprit, according to Ong'ayo, is the international community
operating in the international system. Ong'ayo posits that "the international community
constantly plays a significant role in undermining the very processes and institutions that
are expected to nurture democracy and instill a sense of stability for societal development
in Africa."8 Ong'ayo goes on to point out that Africa is endowed with enough resources
for all its citizens; however, these resources are rapidly leaving the shores of Africa into
the hands of the major players in the international community. In this backdrop, Ong'ayo
looks at Africa's leadership problem and political instability, economy and political
stability, and political violence in African political stability. Ong'ayo also shines light on
the international community's solution for Africa's political instability problems and
form of power-sharing, which he refers to as "electoral thieving" (another vice of the
Antony Otieno Ong'ayo 2008, "Political Instability in Africa: Where the Problem Lies and
Alternative Perspectives" (paper presented at the Symposium 2008: Afrika: een continent op drift."
Stichting Nationaal Erfgoed Hotel De Wereld, Wageningen, September 19, 2008).
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international community to rip off African resources). Ong'ayo looks at migration
policies, conflict resolution, and even peace building initiatives as tools in the
international community's toolbox for the extraction of resources.
As an alternative perspective to Africa's instability debacle, Ong'ayo offers the
following: first, solutions should go beyond the dynamics of resources and exploitation
and military or humanitarian intervention and assistance; second, a new type of
leadership for both Africa and Western countries who see themselves as equal partners;
third, a relationship between the African and developed based (the Western partners) on
equal footing and the recognition of the symbiotic nature of the relation; fourth, the
recognition that Western countries should help bolster African institutions and processes
rather than weaken them for a more exploitative relation.
Leonardo Arriola presents the sobering assessment that "the appointment of one
additional minister to the cabinet lowers the leader's coup risk by a greater extent than
does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth."9 With this assessment, Arriola
shines light on a pervasive patronage strategy that allows African leaders not only to
maintain power, but also to remain in office for an extended period. Arriola posits, well
aware of cleavages, fractionalization, and scarce resources, African leaders are building
patronage coalitions. With these coalitions, leaders build extensive and effective
networks of cabinet members (ordinarily, cronies) that effectively deliver spoils and
resources to keep the majority of the people. According to Arriola, one of the most
9 Leonardo R. Arriola, "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa, " Comparative Political Studies
Volume 2 Number 10 (2009): 1339-1362, accessed May 24, 2014,
http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/fdes/people/u3618/Arriola_2009.pdf\339.
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effective ways of building these coalitions is through ministerial and cabinet
appointments and the expansion of the cabinet. Arriola utilized a time-series cross-
section data of 40 African countries to come to this conclusion. From that conclusion, one
of the most important findings of Arriola's study is, contrary to the Africanist literature,
the most effective way for African leaders to keep themselves in power is to take
advantage of cabinet appointments to expand patronage, not the intra-elite explanation,
popular with Africanist.10 Arriola's conclusion makes a lot of sense because these cabinet
appointees have their own constituents and serve at the pleasure of the president; the
larger the cabinet, the larger the "patronage base," and the stronger the president. In
effect, the cabinet appointees work tirelessly to keep their constituency vested, that in
turn keeps the president in power.
Democracy and the Democratization Process
In this study, democratization is viewed as a path toward democracy, and
democracy is viewed in a spectrum with the outermost point, the ultimate destination,
being "pure" democracy. It must be pointed out that there is a general consensus that
reaching the outermost point and becoming a "pure" democracy is more Utopian than
real. In other words, democracy is messy and imperfect and all democracies face
challenges. Nonetheless, all democracies strive to get as close to the outermost point as
possible. It is also worth mentioning that the movement along the spectrum could take a
reversal path, away from democracy. Within this conception, democratization is viewed
as the movement along the democracy spectrum toward the outermost point, "pure"
10 Leonardo R. Arriola, "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa, " Comparative Political
Studies, 1358.
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democracy. Because "pure" democracy is more Utopian than real, this study views all
democracies as a point on the democratization path, within the democracy spectrum,
either progressing toward or reversing away from the final destination of "pure"
democracy. For this reason, the study does not make separating the two concepts a
priority. In this study, the two terms are seen as very closely related because
democratization leads to the democracy, and all democracies are still democratizing
toward to ultimate destination of "pure" democracy. In this milieu, some democratic
systems are closer to the final destination than others.
Democracy is hereby defined as a constitution limiting, self-governing form of
government that seeks the autonomous consent of the people while guaranteeing civil
liberties, political rights, political participation, and the rule of law. In the context of this
definition, the literature review on democracy and democratization unfolds, starting with
Larry Diamond.
Larry Diamond offers a normative perspective to posit that "democratization is
generally a good thing and democracy is the best form of government."1' Diamond
further points out that even though various forms, models, and concepts of democracy
exist, there is what he sees as the best form of democracy. This form must include 1) a
constraining constitution, 2) rule of law, 3) popular sovereignty, and 4) institutional
authority in check. Diamond goes on to write that:
Thus, as Locke, and Montesquieu, and the American Federalist
asserted, only a constitutional government, restraining and dividing
the temporary power of the majority, can protect individual
" Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1999), 2.
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freedom. This fundamental insight (and value) gave birth to a
tradition of political though-liberalism-and to a concept-liberal
democracy.12
Diamond defines democracy within a framework based on "thin" and "thick"
conceptions.13 According to Diamond the "thin" side is Schumpeterian and minimalist:
reducing democracy down to voting characterized with regular free and fair elections.
This Diamond refers to as electoral democracy. However, on the "thick" side, democracy
becomes more complex, demanding, and harder to achieve. On the "thick" side
reasonable expectations of democracy are expected. Diamond's reasonable expectations
are summarized as follows: 1) meaningful individual freedom (speech, press, assembly,
and petition); 2) all adult citizens retain the right to vote and run for office; 3) genuine
rule of law and equality in the eyes of the law; 4) an independent and neutral judiciary; 5)
due process of the law; 6) "institutional" checks and balances; 7) meaningful pluralism;
8) civilian control of military.14
Thomas Dye and Harmon Ziegler write along the lines of Diamond's proposition
that democracy carries different meanings depending on the individual, the society, or
even time in history; however, the spirit of democracy is unquestionable. This "spirit" is
formed along the lines of what Dye and Ziegler refer to as "democratic values." Dye and
Ziegler sums up democracy and democratic values as self-governing values that promote
12 Ibid., 2-3.
13 Larry Diamond, The Spirit ofDemocracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the
World (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008).
14 Ibid., 22.
33
"individual dignity, equality of opportunity, the right to dissent, freedom of speech and
press, religious toleration, [and] rule of law."15 Dye and Zeigler go on to state that,
democracy is ideally mean individual participation in the decisions that affects one's life.
Dye and Zeigler also state that democracy leads to individual self-development because
democracy promotes responsibility; develops character; promotes self-reliance,
intelligence, and moral judgment- in short human dignity.16According to Dye and
Zeigler, procedurally, in a liberal democracy the majority rule while respecting the
minority's rights. In a democracy, self-development means self-government where "all"
eligible individuals take part in the decision making process. In avoiding tyranny from
the majority or the minority in self-governing, both sides (majority and minority) should
be able to counter each other's passions and interests. Free and fair elections and
freedom of speech, press, assembly, petition, and dissent is expected.
Robert Dahl conceptualizes democracy as a political system conceived with the
idea that members of society regard each other as political equals: political equals as in,
equality to participate; equality in self-governance, ruling and association. Dahl refers to
this idea as "the Strong Principle of Equality."17 For a more profound understanding of
the bloated "democracy" concept, Dahl posits that even though democracy has its genesis
with the Greeks (particularly the Athenians) approximately 2500 years ago, democracy
15 Thomas Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony ofdemocracy: An Uncommon introduction to
American Politics, 2nd ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1972), 4.
16 Thomas Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony ofdemocracy: An Uncommon introduction to
American Politics, 8.
17 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 31.
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transitioned from various sources. Dahl offers four sources: "classic Greeks; a republican
tradition...; the institutions of representative governments; and the logic of political
equality."18 This confirms that democracy has gone through many transformations and
Dahl's observation captured substantiates the transformation:
Whatever it takes, the democracy of our successors will not and
cannot be the democracy of our predecessors. Nor should it be. For
the limits and the possibilities of democracy in a world we can
already dimly foresee are certain to be radically unlike the limits
and possibilities of democracy in any previous time or place.19
As far as Dahl is concern, in order to keep up with ever changing world realities,
democratic transformations are not only expected but inevitable. Dahl goes on to warn
that the transformations democracy undergoes can yield dissimilar democratic systems
however, the basic safeguards of the democratic ideals including self-governance,
political equality, and self-determination never changes. Dahl captures that:
We can be confident that in the future as in the past the exacting
requirements of the democratic process will not be met and many
of the theoretical and practical problems in the democratic process
explored here will not be completely resolved. Yet the vision of
people governing themselves as political equals, and possessing all
the resources and institutions necessary to do so, will I believe
remain a compelling if always a demanding guide in the search for
a society in which people may live together in peace, respect each
other's intrinsic equality, and jointly seek the best possible life.20




The above statement goes beyond Dahl's conceptualization of democracy. The
statement also makes the point-what democracy mean today is not necessarily what
democracy meant in the time of Periclean Athens.
David Held sought to follow the trajectory of a transforming and transitioning
democracy and takes various forms and subjected different models. Such transformations
and transitions are heavily influenced by a changing global world order. Consequently,
the literature reveals Held's steadfast focus on the effects of a changing landscape of
democracy given the transitioning and the transformation to the current international
system and the new global order. As succinctly presented in his book Models of
Democracy, Held captures the transitions and transformation of variants of democracy
from; the Classical Athenian Model, to Republicanism, to a Liberal Model of democracy
that forms the bases of elitist democracy, legal democracy, pluralism, and deliberative
and participatory democracy, with participatory democracy having the overtones of what
Held refers to as the Marxian Direct democracy. Compartmentalized in variants based on
epoch (classic, twentieth century, today), Held is able to capture the evolution of
democracy in what he refers to in the book as Models. Starting with Model /that dealt
with Classical (Athenian) Democracy, Held subsequently presented Models II-X.
Together the ten models highlight the various transformations democracy experienced
over the last 2500 years.21 As Held posits, democracy has its genesis in the highly
exclusive city-state in the Athenian (classic) model of democracy. However, as societies
21 David Held, Models ofDemocracy (California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 5.
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increase in number and complexity, democracy transformed. This transformation
assumes a republican nature where participation, liberty and self-government extend
beyond the city-state and the affluent. Held presents another transformation following
the French and American revolutions. This time democracy transforms from
republicanism to liberal democracy. In liberal democracy government is limited by a
constitution. In summation, democracy has been transformed from its Athenian (Classic)
form to a Republican form to Liberal democracy.
As Held points out, twentieth century democracy was further complicated by yet
new variants including competitive elitism, pluralism, and corporate capitalism, amongst
others. By the time Held presents Model X, he is looking at the present state of
democracy and rethinking democracy in a global age, thus looking into what he terms as
the cosmopolitan model of democracy.
David Held and Christopher Politt edited the book New Forms ofDemocracy. In
the introduction authored by Held, he highlighted the many challenges and controversies
of democracy in its current form, before making a case for new forms of democracy. By
new forms of democracy, Held meant "all those new initiatives as well as new
developments on formal political and policy agendas which seek to alter systematically
the dominant form of contemporary democracy... either by increasing the scope or
transforming the methods of democratic decision-making."22 Held's position is in line
with other observers such as Dahl. Held concurs that today's model of democracy is far
from the original Athenian Democracy. Therefore, the idea of incorporating current
22 David Held, New Forms ofDemocracy, ed. David Held and Christopher Politt (London, Sage
Publications Ltd, 1986), 7.
37
realities of the international system and globalization makes sense. As a result,
advocating for new forms and models for democracy as part of the democracy discourse
is hardly new for Held.
Alexis de Tocqueville, in the 1830s, made the observations that democracy
(American democracy) is based on pluralism of politically equal citizens forming
associations for self-governance as captured:
The most natural Privilege of man, next to the right of acting for
himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow-
creatures and acting in common with them. The right of association
therefore appears to be almost as inalienable in its nature as the right of
personal liberty.... In no country in the world has the principle of
association been more successfully used, or applied to a greater multitude
of objects, than in America. Besides the permanent associations which are
established by law, under the names of townships, cities, and counties, a
vast number of others are formed and maintained by the agency of private
individuals.23
Arend Lijphart also acknowledges the lack of social homogeneity and political
consensus in plural society, meaning deep political and social cleavages. As a solution to
such deep cleavages Lijphart offers a consociation form of democracy: a model of
democracy where the elites cooperate, and such cooperative attitude counteracts what
Lijphart refers to as the "negative plurality" in plural society. In other words, cooperative
attitudes serve as an antidote to deep cleavages in a plural society. For Lijphart this model
of democracy (consociational democracy) explains political stability in smaller
23 Democracy in America: Alexis De Tocqueville, ed. Richard D. Heffner. (Mentor Books. New
York, 1984), 95.
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multinational, multicultural European democracies such as Austria, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland.24
Arend Lijphart, some twenty-two years later, concludes that even though
majoritarian democracy proves better at governing, consensus democracy is better at
representation especially for minority groups and their interests. For this simple reason,
Lijphart views consensus democracy as a "kinder, gentler" form of democracy.25 To
arrive at this conclusion that consensus democracy is "kinder and gentler," Lijphart
applied the following eight benchmarks: 1) democratic quality, 2) women's
representation, 3) political equality, 4) electoral participation, 5) satisfaction with
democracy, 6) government-voter proximity, 7) accountability and corruption, and 8) John
Stuart Mill's hypothesis.26
Adam Przeworski conceptualizes democracy through a development lens. Puzzled
by the empirical evidence grounded in the fact that the 1990s witnessed a proliferation of
political democracy especially in Eastern Europe and the "Third World" (Africa and
Latin America); however, ironically, in response economic stagnation also increased
exponential. Przeworski in collaboration with other experts in the field investigated this
puzzlement further. In collaboration with other scholars Przeworski edited the book
Sustainable Democracy.27 With this book, Przeworski et al. engaged in rethinking what
24 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (Binghamton: Yale University Press, 1977).
25 Arend Lijphart, Patterns ofDemocracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six
Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 275.
26 Ibid., 276-293.
27 Adam Przeworski et al., Sustainable Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1995).
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constitutes a sustainable democracy. Przeworski and his team narrowed down
sustainable democracy to two variables: 1) institutions and 2) performance. Under
institutions, they examined issues which individually or together foster sustainable
democracy. Under institutions, the issues the Przeworski team reviewed include the
following: freedom from state violence, material security, equality and justice, states
capability of handling crises, and most importantly, the state capability of maintaining
normalcy. After examining institutions variable, Przeworski, et al engaged the
performance variable. According to the Przeworski team, the lack of performance
perpetuates the vicious cycle of un-sustainability of democracy. Consequently, if
nations' institutions are not up to the challenges, the issue of lack of performance sets in,
thus throwing the nation into a political and economic tailspin. Such result in political
instability and un-sustainable democracy becomes the end product.
Michael Parenti posits that the only way we can understand liberal democracy in
general and American government in particular is to incorporate the relationship between
economic and political power in a democracy. In his book, Democracy ofthe Few,
Parenti examines the relation between what he refers to as "corporate capitalism" and
political power in a democracy (American democracy). In this work, Parenti comes
across as a skeptic and a doubter and critic of liberal democracy, especially democracy in
the United States With a structural approach, Parenti views American democracy
cynically with heavy a dose of skepticism. With power and special interest in mind,
Parenti, from a Marxist standpoint, makes the case that in the U.S., political and
economic powers go hand-in-hand. His analysis spans the formal political institutions,
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the foundation and historical developments of American democracy and the political and
economic policies that "public policy" results from. According to Parenti, public policy is
nothing more that the administration's agenda. Where is the public in public policy, he
asked. With this mode of questioning, Parenti could pass as a cynic to many observers
who tend to see a positive relationship between democracy and free market capitalism.
As argued elsewhere, Parenti's argument is generally driven by the fact that when it
comes to democracy we all agree on the basic facts and pretend that political equality and
equal opportunity exist. However, power, wealth, class, and institutions play a major role
in not only setting the political organizations, but also in the economic system, and the
rules within society. For Parenti, even in the U.S. (the so-called champions of
democracy), power and influence determines "who gets what, when, and how," making
the case that contrary to conventional wisdom, democracy in the United States is not
democracy for "we the people" but democracy for the few: the powerful, privileged, and
the influential.28
Thomas Carothers succinctly captures the promotion of liberal democracy abroad
as an important U.S. foreign policy since the 1960s in his book, Aiding Democracy
Abroad: The Learning Curve.29 In this book, Carothers contends that since President
Woodrow Wilson called for concerted effort "to make the world safe for democracy," the
United States made the promotion of democracy a major foreign policy goal. The "tools
28 Michael Parenti, Democracy ofthe Few (Boston: Wadsworth, 2011).
29 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
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of the trade" for aiding democracy according to Carothers includes military, diplomatic,
and economic (including "democracy promoting" assistance and aid, the most sought
after tool since the 1960s). Carothers however, argues that despite half a century of
promoting democracy abroad the mission and the method is still unclear. For Carothers
the most basic questions concerning aiding democracy abroad are still unanswered.
Questions still linger around accomplishments, failures (where and how), and
improvement strategies. Carothers's main point of argument maintains that even though
in the 1990s the United States alone spends over 700 million yearly in aiding democracy
abroad, democracy in developing countries is yet to consolidate.30
However, according to Carothers the good news is a steady progression along the
learning curve. The main reason of what Carothers calls a "lack of learning" has a lot to
do with what he refers to as a "democracy template" that is mechanical, "United States
specific" and does not take into consideration the realities elsewhere. The democracy
template, a one size fit all is based on three sectors: 1) electoral process (free and fair
elections and strong national political parties); 2) state institutions (constitution, rule-of
law, legislative, local government, civil-military relations); and 3) civil society (NGO
advocacy, civic education, media strengthening, union building).31 Even though the said
"democracy template" yield haphazard positive results in promoting democracy abroad,
by and large the template proves to be inadequate. As a result, Carothers recommends;
.. .going beyond the simplistic use of United States models;
moving from the reproduction of institutional forms to the
30 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, 89.
31 Ibid.
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nurturing of core political processes and values, such as
representation, accountability, tolerance, and openness; coming to
terms with the multiplicity of political trajectories that follow
democratic openings; understanding the limits of electoralism;
confronting the inadequate will to reform that hampers the reform
of most state Establishments; giving up the simple advocacy of
NGOs with civil society; embracing more hands on training of
journalist as a solution to media reform; taking seriously the need
to synthesize top-down and bottom-up approaches rather than
merely pursuing them side by side; finding a workable middle
ground on evaluation between over-elaborate, mock-scientific
schemes and cursory, in-house reviews; and so forth across all the
areas of concern.32
Carothers's recommendation captured above seems to suggest the United States
democracy template is inadequate and lacking many ways. As a result, Carothers
suggests adjustments. In the case of West Africa, one contends that Carothers has a valid
point. As Carothers shows, "in sub-Saharan Africa fewer than ten of the more than forty
countries that experienced political opening at the start of the 1990s have managed to
achieve even plausibly democratic systems. Civil wars, coup d'etat, strongman leaders,
and failing states are still common on the continent."33
Fareed Zakaria points out that we are currently living in a "democratic age" where
even the worst of dictators and authoritarians, including Islamic theocracies, are claiming
to be democratic by holding elections. As Zakaria laconically puts it, in most parts of the
world democracy has managed to become "the standard form of government for
humankind... the sole surviving source of political legitimacy."34 However, Zakaria
32 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Cwve, 342.
33 Ibid., 350.
34 Fareed Zakaria, The future ofFreedom; Illiberal Democracy at Home andAbroad (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 2003), 13.
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discovers a disturbing trend, a trend he characterizes and refers to as "Illiberal
democracy." In such democracies, relatively free and fair elections produce a cadre of
less-than democratic leaders including separatist, racists, and fascists. From Peru to
Palestine, Ghana to Venezuela, such democratically elected leaders routinely ignore
constitutional limitation and deprive their citizens of basic rights and freedoms.35 Zakaria
sees this as a major problem for the future of freedom and the future of democracy.
Jim Schultz takes the idea of "illiberal" democracies further by including
enquiries in the state of the polity. These enquiries are captured in his book The
Democracy Owners' Manual: a Practical Guide to Changing the World. Schultz presents
five key debate points that liberal democracies must address as follows: 1) the role of
government; 2) the rules of politics; 3) tax and spending; 4) public rules for business and
the market place, and 5) civil rights and criminal wrongs. Focusing on the very first
debate point; the role of government in a liberal democracy (United States), Shultz
presents six fundamental and familiar public policy questions: 1) foreign interest and
foreign policy; 2) domestic crime and punishment; 3) liberty and freedom 4) tax and
spending and-public service; 5) economic policy-business and the market place; 6) quest
for genuine democracy.36 Shultz's questions captured above enshrine the main
discussions surrounding contemporary liberal democracy.
35 Fareed Zakaria, Thefuture ofFreedom; Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, 17.
36 Jim Shultz, The Democracy Owners' Manual: A Practical Guide to Changing the World (New
Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 2002), 7-16.
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Analysis of the Literature
General Consensus: Spirit and Values of the Democratic Model
Even though the debate on the democratic model and the processes towards
democratization still rages, there is a general consensus: what Larry Diamond refers to as
"the spirit of democracy."37 Diamond's conceptualization of the spirit of democracy
captures the general ideals of democracy. According to Diamond, the general ideals
include choosing one's leader-self-governing (voting), limiting government and
protecting citizens' (liberty), and freedom to choose and belong (freedom). Diamond's
conceptualization further insinuates that the debate on democracy is not about the general
ideals of democracy but about the nuances of democracy and the democratization
process. Consequently the general ideals of democracy prove to be simplistic, appealing,
and universal considering Diamond's spirit of democracy theory. However, the major
disagreement on democracy and the democracy processes centers on the means to
achieving the general ideals of democracy.
The above observation serves as testimony that the most basic ideal of democracy
the "spirit of democracy" and what Dye and Ziegler refers to as "democratic values"38 are
pure and universal, therefore could be applied anywhere. However, the question remains,
should the Western model be the chosen model? This question precipitates the
questioning of the wisdom in the internationalizing of the Western model of democracy.
Larry Diamond, The Spirit ofDemocracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the
World.
38 Thomas Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony ofdemocracy: An Uncommon introduction to
American Politics.
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More precisely, the question enquires if democracy is more relevant in Western societies
and developed countries with a liberal democratic heritage or is Western democracy
relevant everywhere regardless to experiences and history?
To answer the above questions, it is worth going back to the base, the genesis to
remind ourselves that the idea of democracy has its genesis in the Greek city-state and the
Roman republic. However, democracy is subject to various transitions, from the
Enlightenment period, to the American and the French revolutions, and to the subsequent
waves, (see Huntington and Held). As a result there is little doubt the idea of democracy
is a Western concept and eventually laid deep roots in Western societies. However, the
ideals of democracy were eventually promoted the world over. Even though results vary
democracy consolidated well in some parts of the world and on the same token fail to
consolidate in others.
The transformation of democracy that is evident throughout the literature reviewed
seems to enable democracy to transform into almost anything anyone wants to call it as
long as the spirit and values of democracy are incorporated. However, to be truly
democratic, the concern goes beyond the simple spirit and values of a democratic system.
For instance, the spirit of democracy includes inclusion and participation. Nonetheless, in
advanced democratic systems, the concern of who is considered a member of society, and
therefore allowed to politically participate, (vote, run for office, petition government and
so on) is constitutionally protected and well-articulated. In a similar vein, the democratic
values also go beyond lip service and something only written on paper. These values are
the constitutional limits on government and mechanisms that effectively limit
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government. Equality is also considered a value of democracy. The concerns on equality
include equal before the law, equal opportunity, equal protection of the law, and rule of
law. All these should be coherently incorporated in a true democratic system. These
enduring concerns of democracy can be easily violated, even with advanced democratic
systems.
Consequently, enduring concern on democracy is not the question of the spirit and
values of democracy, but how to create a democratic society around the spirit and values.
As an illustration, consider the question of inclusion and participation as a democratic
spirit and value. For example, inclusion and participation in the classic context of Greek
city state democracy is not necessarily the same as inclusion and participation in the
enlightened period and sure enough, not the same today, but the spirit and democratic
values remain unchanged. Inclusion and participation were limited to certain privileged
classed of Athenian citizens and were not extended to women, foreigners, and slaves.
Since then, the franchise has been significantly extended and today most nations boast of
attaining universal suffrage; however, participation and inclusion are still stymied in
many ways both de-jure and de-facto. A good example of limiting participation and
inclusion is during the Jim Crow era in the United States. Following the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, by most measures, the Jim
Crow system has been consigned to the dustbin of history; however, there are still
observers who believe that, even though de jure segregation is no longer a concern, de
facto segregation still exists in the United States
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Despite the above captured argument that the democratic value and the spirit of
democracy- self-governing, self, development, dignity, freedom, liberty, limited
government, and equal opportunity- remain constant and appealing and despite the many
transformations of democracy in the last 2500 years, one could argue that the "value" and
"spirit" will never change because it appeals directly to the most innate part of the human
spirit: John Locke is still relevant; the idea of individuals surrendering some of their
inalienable natural rights and entering into a social contract to protect their welfare and
well-being is still true today. Not mentioning that if such government fails its citizens,
the citizens still retain the right to replace such government, as argued by Thomas
Jefferson in the thirteen colonies' Declaration of Independence from Britain in 1776.
As discussed above, the literature confirms an existence of a general consensus on
the principles, attributes, and characteristics referred to as the spirit and values of
democracy. However, beyond the basic principles, attributes, and characteristics - spirit
and values- there exists a substantial lack of consensus on the nuances of democracy.
Therefore democracy comes across in the literature as a "chameleon": a reptile (a
concept) whose color is substantially determined by its environment. As the transitions
in model of democracy mimics the change of color that predispose the chameleon as they
respond to their personal environment, the enduring question remains, what is the true
color of the chameleon? Such dilemma precipitates the enduring debate between the
"believers" and "doubters" of democracy and the democratization process. Despite the
enduring debate in the last two centuries the liberal democracy model has managed to
remain the current consequential model with offshoot. However, the debate between
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believers and doubters perpetuate and this question remains: what is the future of
democracy, now that liberal democracy has become the "gold standard?" The analysis of
the literature is based on the above observations. Starting with the general consensus
observation, each point of observation is dealt with at length.
Beyond the General Consensus
Even though the literature review confirms a general consensus on the basic logic,
principles, and attributes (spirit and values) of democracy, it is prudent to balance the
argument by highlighting the general lack of consensus on the central arguments,
concepts, and theories of democracy and democratization. This general lack of consensus
abounds, including definition, application, process, and even the justification of
democracy. Such lack of consensus reveals that besides the spirit and values of
democracy, scholars and observers alike are not in total agreement of the nuances of
democracy.
Evident throughout the literature reviewed is that the spirit and values of democracy
means different things to different people. Larry Diamond succinctly echoed this lack of
consensus with this statement: "There cannot be any one 'right' answer to the question of
what democracy is; we can only be transparent, and logical and consistent, in whatever
standard we adopt."39 Actually, Arend Lijphart went further and flat out posits that
democracy is a concept that "virtually defies definitions."40 It goes without saying that
beyond the basic consensus discussed above the literature confirms that there exists
39 Larry Diamond, The Spirit ofDemocracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the
World, 22.
40
Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 4.
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diversity in the views on democracy. Such diverse views on democracy manifest in the
whole host of different terms scholars invoke in their quest to define, contextualize,
understand and explain democracy. Arend Lijphart sees democracy in patterns; David
Held sees democracy in models; Samuel Huntington and John Markoff see democracy in
waves; Francis Fukuyama views democracy as reaching its final destination in liberal
democracy; Seymour Martin Lipset sees democracy through the eyes of society and
societal conditions; Joseph Schumpeter sees democracy in terms of participation limited
to free and fair elections-minimal requirement. Thomas Dye views democracy
(especially in the United States) through elite theory (the primacy of the elite). Robert
Michels views democracy through the primacy of the few - the oligarchy. Michael
Parenti also views democracy in the United States as democracy for the few - the special
interest of the wealthy and the powerful. Quoting Collier and Levitsky, Diamond reports
that 550 subtypes of democracy were identified.41 Diamond drives this point home by
stating that:
[D]efining democracy is a bit like interpreting the Talmud (or any
religious text): ask a room often rabbis (or political scientist) for the
meaning, and you will have at least eleven different answers. In the
case of democracy these answer tend to group into "thin" and "thick"
conceptions.42
This lack of general consensus beyond the "spirit and values" of democracy is
hardly new. From Aristotle to contemporary scholars, scholars have argued and written
41 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation^ 1.
42 Larry Diamond, The Spirit ofDemocracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the
World, 21.
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extensively on the ideals of democracy. Renowned contemporary scholars including but
not limited to, Robert Dahl, Larry Diamond, Harold Lasswell, Adam Przeworski, Juan
Linz, David Held, John Markoff, Arend Lijphart, Thomas Dye and many others.
Departing from various conceptualizations, meanings, and models these scholars made
inroads in defining, understanding, and explaining democracy despite the general lack of
consensus
This lack of consensus also challenges the perpetuation of democracy in its current
general form. The perpetuation of democracy is also in the mind of many scholars.
Echoing Huntington's dilemma, Larry Diamond and Marc Platter also ask if democracy
(the third wave) will be perpetuated into the future, or if this third wave (1974-1990) will
reverse and succumb to democratic breakdown as experienced in the previous two
waves.43 Even Robert Dahl, a staunch proponent of democracy, airs his concerns on the
limits and possibilities of democracy in his book Democracy audits Critics. Knowing
that such limitations could serve as a solid point of argument for critics and skeptics,
Dahl reckons with what he refers to as the "desirability" (or lack thereof) of democracy.
As a result, it is prudent to question the passing liberal democracy as a universal
template, because it seems democracy takes the nature of a chameleon: a reptile that is
known to be capable of changing its color to match its environment for protection. The
next section discusses the chameleonic nature of democracy in greater detail.
43Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platter 2nd ed., The Global Resurgence ofDemocracy, x.
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The Democratic Model: A Chameleon
From the above survey of the literature two things are now evident: 1) there is
consensus, with little doubt on the ideal of democracy, the universality of the spirit of
democracy, and the democratic values; however, 2) there is a general lack of consensus
on the nuances of an "ideal democracy." Consequently, it is clear that democracy has
undergone many transitions and transformations in the last 2500 years. Accompanying
these transitions and transformations are changes in the conceptualization, definition,
applications, and even the justification of democracy. The most significant of these
transitions and transformations is from direct democracy (Athenian) to representative
democracy (in the modern electoral republic) and its various forms: electoral democracy,
participatory democracy, Madisonian democracy, deliberative democracy, pluralistic
democracy, and polyachical democracy among others. Two and a half millennia prove to
be a solid test of time for many things including democracy. All these transformations
and models confirm the chameleonic nature of democracy. A basic definition and a quick
journey in history will further confirm the chameleonic nature of democracy.
For a basic definition, Robert Dahl reminded us that "a useful starting point is the
etymological origins of the term: demos (the people) kratia (rule)."44 Nonetheless, the
question, what constitutes "the people," remains. The question on what constitutes "the
people" has prompted heated debate throughout the history of democracy, thus creating
believers and doubters. These supporters and opponents, in turn, construct theories and
explanations to solidify their respective positions. In explaining democracy and "the
44 Dahl, On Political Equality, 8.
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people" question, the theories offered tend to gravitate towards two general poles: 1)
Normative Democratic Theory (moral foundation of democracy and democratic
institutions) and 2) Descriptive and Explanatory Democratic Theory (interdisciplinary).
However, it is worth keeping Dahl's advice in mind: "There is no democracy theory—
there are only democratic theories."45 This means that no one democracy theory is
capable of explaining democracy single handedly. Not to mention that all democracy
theories have at least an element of validity. In other words, one should refrain from the
temptation of holding one democracy theory superior while discounting others.
Keeping in mind the transitions and transformations that democracy underwent in
response to changing times, changing political climate, and adaptation to new realities,
the author metaphorically refers to democracy as "the Chameleon." It seems that its
perpetuation over the last 2500 years is made possible partly because of the
"chameleonic" nature of democracy. In other words, even though the ideals of
democracy are universally appealing, the ways of achieving such ideals depends on time
in history, society and societal values, political and socio-economic values, and society's
world view.
The argument boils down to "democracy is desirable." However, if democracy is
to yield positive results for individual societies just like a chameleon changing its color to
adapt to its environment mainly for survival purposes, such a model of democracy should
also adapt to its environment. Athenian democracy extended participation to some
Athenians, not all, not to mention the rest of Greece. Conversely, the Roman republic
45 Robert Dahl., A Preface to Democratic Theory (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956), 1.
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extended participation to some Romans, not all, but at its best democracy generally
delivers in these governments. On the same token, one can argue that liberal democracy
generally works for Western countries. However, it is fair to state that all these models of
democracy worked in these respective policies because the model takes into
consideration the realities of that particular society. Because of these various models and
templates, the debate on democracy is ending, as evident throughout the literature: a
debate between the believers and doubters (skeptics), even cynics. The next section
focuses on this debate. As we transition to the next section, keep in mind that the final
destination in this review is the enquiry of liberal democracy a universal fit, particularly
for West Africa and Senegal.
True Color of the Chameleon: Debate between the Believers and Doubters/Critics of
the Democratic Model
True Color of the Chameleon: Debate between believers" and doubters/critics
The debate opens by revisiting Dahl as he highlights the confusing nature of
democracy, suggesting a source of lack of consensus of what democracy really is:
An important cause of the confusion over what democracy
means in our present world is that it has developed over
several thousand years and stems from a variety of sources.
What we understand by democracy is not what an Athenian
in the time of Pericles would have understood by it. Greek,
Roman, medieval, and Renaissance notion intermingle with
those of later centuries to produce a jumble of theory and
practices that are deeply inconsistent.46
Referring to Dahl's observation, the focus now turns to the debate between the
believers and the doubters of democracy.
46 Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, 2.
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In democracy's 2500 year history, there is a long line of "believers" (differing
degrees) including democracy in the classic sense (Socrates), democracy in the
Enlightenment period and thereafter (John Locke, Montesquieu, J. J Rousseau, de
Tocqueville), and contemporary "believers" (Robert Dahl, Arend Lijphart, Harold
Lasswell and many others).
As expected, there are also "doubters" of democracy from classic to contemporary
times. Classic "doubters" include Aristotle and Plato; Enlightenment doubters include
Hobbes; contemporary doubters include Robert Michels, Michael Parenti, and Thomas
Dye in naming a few.
Considering human nature and the perpetual struggle for basic survival, even greed,
and human's propensity towards evil as Hobbes and Machiavelli might contend, it is
almost common sense to note that this basic idea of democracy is pure and desirable,
given the fact that democracy in its perfect form uplifts the human in both being and
spirit. However, noting the fact that the world is yet to see a perfect democracy, the
question becomes how desirable is democracy. What are the justifications of democracy
in an imperfect world? Who actually rules? Who is included and allowed to participate?
Who is protected from government? Is there equality in access and equality in
opportunity? These questions lead to the examination of democracy beyond the surface.
With the question ofjustification and desirability (or lack of) of democracy, democracy
becomes questionable. Questioning democracy in an imperfect world is hardly new.
Aristotle asked these questions 2300 years ago. J. S. Mill, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and
many others asked these questions in the Enlightenment period and the same is true
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today. Today scholars such as Dahl, Parenti, Dye, and many more are still asking the
same questions about the justifiability and the value of democracy.
Consequently these questions are still relevant today and the author finds it prudent
to revisit them. To answer such questions, the author further reviews the literature on the
proponents and opponents of democracy. Considering the fact that both proponents and
opponents find themselves somewhere in the democracy spectrum (various degrees of
support/opposition), proponents are herein referred to as "believers" and opponents as
"doubters." Stemming from the literature review, some of "the believers'" and "the
doubters'" positions of the democracy debate are captured in the next section.
Is the Liberal Democratic Model a One-Size-Fits-All Model, or a Misfit for Some
Nations?
Up to this point, like a slow moving river the literature review meandered through
the many transitions and transformations of democracy. Upon reaching our current
destination we now turn attention to liberal democracy, the current consequential model.
But is our current destination (illiberal democracy) the final frontier? From this point on
the focus is on liberal democracy.
Borrowing from Diamond, liberal democracy is defined here as "political systems
in which individual and group liberties are well protected and in which there exists
autonomous spheres of civil society and private life, insulated from state control."47 As
extrapolated from Dahl's definition, the discussion now focuses on the core of the
concept of liberal democracy: 1) individual liberties and freedom, 2) political equality, 3)
majority rule and minority rights, 4) individual worth, and 5) the need for compromise.
47 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 3.
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The focus is on liberal democracy, not because the author is in complete agreement with
Francis Fukuyama's assertion that we have witnessed the "end of history" and liberal
democracy prevailed, but for the simple fact that liberal democracy is the model of
democracy promoted by the West particularly France, England, and the United States
since independence in the area of focus: West Africa in general and Senegal in particular.
As the literature review suggests, the current consequential model is the liberal
democracy model, but the question still lingers, is liberal democracy a model that fits all?
There is considerable evidence that the Senegalese model of democracy is the driving
force behind political stability in Senegal. The argument then becomes what model of
democracy fits Senegal more perfectly? It is believed that the Senegalese model of
democracy (the Democarassie model) is not only effective and responsive to the post-
independence challenges Senegal is facing, but also proves to be sensitive to Senegal's
realities, social mores, and cultural ideals, and therefore fits Senegal better. Stemming
from the findings in the literature review, the following observations are made, and
therefore follow-up questions on the issue of democracy and political stability in Senegal
become necessary. As captured in the next section, the follow-up questions are as
follows. In the case of Senegal, 1) Is the Democarassie model a customized refit of
liberal democracy that reflects the realities in Senegal and thus help maintain political
stability since independence in 1960? 2) Does the Democarassie model and political
stability share a natural symbiotic relationship (reinforcing each other)? 3) What is the
future of democracy especially in the West Africa sub-region and Senegal in particular?
Should liberal democracy still be the "standard" model or should each state pursue a
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model of liberal democracy that reflect realities on the ground and hopefully discover a
model that fosters political stability? In more detail, these questions are now
investigated.
Is the Democarassie Model a Customized Refit?
Prior to exploring if liberal democracy as a model fits realities everywhere,
revisiting Dahl is in order. In his book On Democracy, Robert Dahl makes a case for
democracy stating reasons "why democracy" as follows: 1) Democracy protects against
tyranny, 2) promotes essential rights, 3) fosters general freedom, 4) promotes self-
determination, 5) supports moral authority, 6) promotes human development, 7) protect
essential personal interests, 8) promotes political equality, and 9) in modern democracies
seeks peace and prosperity.48 If this is the case, there is something terribly wrong with
democracy in the context of West Africa, because a good number of West African
countries are deficient in many of these variables. Within "Dahl's democratic
environment," democracy is nurtured and stable. Full participation and a higher quality of
political and social life becomes the norm. Arguably, this is not the case in most West
African countries. This establishes the fact that democracy does not deliver the same
everywhere. The question then becomes why does democracy work for some nations and
not for others?
In answering the enquiry why democracy works for some nations and not for
others, revisiting Lijphart becomes necessary. Echoing and concurring with Sir Arthur
Lewis and the Lewis Model, Lijphart states that it is a fact that just because certain
Dahl, On Democracy, 45.
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models of democracy "work" in "class societies" such as Britain and France does not
necessarily mean that such models will also produce positive results in "plural" West
African societies where cleavages abound ranging from tribal, to religious, linguistic
cultural, economic and regional.49 If the Lewis Model recommends a consociation model
over a majoritarian model in plural societies, the question remains why Senegal (or other
West African countries for that matter) should adopt liberal democracy in the
majoritarian sense. Should the model of democracy reflect the realities and unique
societal challenges? The answer to the enquiry then becomes democracy should be based
on the type of society, "class," pluralistic and beyond. With the reasons stated above, the
question that is begging to be asked is whether countries or regions have to follow the
blue prints of Western concocted models of democracy or come up with their own hybrid
models of democracy that fit its environment and realities better. This question leads us
back to Senegal's model of democracy: the Democarassie model.
In the methodology section (chapter 4), the dissertation further explores the
Democarassie model to investigate why the Democarassie model produces better results
than liberal democracy in Senegal. This section will highlight the similarities and
differences between liberal democracy and the Democarassie model, prior to building a
case that the Democarassie model works more effectively and produces better results in
Senegal. At this point the focus turns to the relationship between the Democarassie
model and political stability which is considered to be symbiotic and further explored in
the next section. Following the case study in chapter five, the ultimate question in the
Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 144.
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final chapter will be, does the Democarassie model and political stability share a natural
symbiotic relationship? If yes, the recommendation for future study will be if Senegal
discovers a model of democracy embedded in liberal democracy, however, customized to
"fit" its unique needs, why not prescribe the same rationale for other countries in the sub-
region and beyond?
However, few "presidents for life" are still hanging on to power and "illiberal
democracies" still flourish. Consequently, many African countries in the sub-region still
experience governments that blatantly disregard the rule of law, and curtail liberties.
Patrimonialism, the stymie and manipulation of political participation and the political
process, considerable dissent intolerance, amongst others, all culminates to, not only
allowing un-democratic leaders to benefit from the democratic process (gaining and
retaining office through election), but holding on to power by undemocratic means.
Even though examples abound, captured here are three examples on how un
democratic leaders take advantage of the democratic process (gaining and retaining office
through election), by holding on to power by undemocratic means. The first example is
what is referred to here as "constitutional manipulation". A case in point, both presidents,
Wade of Senegal and Obasanjo of Nigeria unsuccessfully maneuvered to manipulate their
constitutions to allow a third term bid. Both finally only abandoned this constitutional
manipulation after staunch opposition. Second, is what is referred to as the trading of
"military camouflage outfit with the suit and tie or grand boubou." Again, using the
democratic process, successful military coup leaders transform to civilians for solely
legitimizing and keeping the presidency. Cases in point include but are not limited to
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Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, A. Toumani Toure of Mali (ex-presidents) and President
Jammeh of the Gambia. Thirdly, and equally disturbing is the case of a populist
opposition leader "gone wild." A great example is president of Wade of Senegal. In its
waning days, Wade's regime became increasingly corrupt- A president who had been an
opposition leader for over a quarter of a century; an opposition candidate who had
campaigned strongly against corruption sought to hold power by underhanded means. If
this trend continues the illiberal democracy Zakaria has been warning us about will lay
deep roots in West Africa's near future.
Gap in the Literature
The following archetypal authorities on democracy offer the following as the
basic elements of democracy. These authorities include Robert Dahl, Larry Diamond,
Arend Lijphart, and Fareed Zaria amongst others. For Robert Dahl the basic democracy




4. Citizen's control of the agenda
In multiple works, Larry Diamond summarizes and offers the thin and thick of
democracy as follows:
1. Meaningful Individual Freedom
2. Religious and ethnic freedom
3. Right to vote and run for office/(free and fair election)
4. Rule of law and genuine equality
5. Independent and neutral judiciary
6. Due Process
7. Checks and balances
8. Meaningful Pluralism
9. Civilian control of the military
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10. Openness and competition
11. Popular Sovereignty
12. Accountability of Rulers
13. Constraining constitution
Arend Lijphart presents prerequisites and factors conducive to stable democracy as:
1. Social Homogeneity
2. Political Consensus
Fareed Zakaria summaries the basic democracy elements as follows:
1. Free and Fair elections
2. Rule of law
3. Separation of powers
4. Protection of basic liberties
As highlighted above, for; Robert Dahl, Larry Diamond, Fareed Zakaria,
Arend Lijphart, and many other scholars and throughout the literature, the elements
of the liberal democratic model generally summarize as follows: 1) Elections
(frequent, free, and fair) 2) Individual liberties guarantees, 3) Political Rights
protected and 4) Political participation guarantees. Even though Larry Diamond
extended these elements to the "thick side" of democracy, these four elements
generally form the basic elements of the democratic model. Under the umbrella of
political rights and civil liberties, these basic elements of democracy also accentuate
the Freedom House methodology as follows:
Political Rights
Electoral Process
Political Pluralism and Participation
Functioning of Government
Civil Liberties
Freedom of Expression and Belief
Associational and Organizational Rights
Rule of Law
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights
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As captured above, the foremost democracy authorities narrow democracy
down to, and generally concur that the elements of democracy are guarantees of
frequent, free, and fair elections; individual liberties protected; political rights, and
political participation guaranteed. However, Senegal is consider democratic and
remain politically stable, despite deficiencies in many of these general guarantees,
especially when one considers the "thick" side of democracy-independence of the
judiciary, and checks and balances, for instance. This suggests that the liberal
democratic model cannot fully account for, and explain the political stability Senegal
has enjoyed since independence in 1960. This is in conjunction with the revelation
from the analysis of the literature review revealing that the liberal democratic model
cannot fully explain political stability in Senegal. This is seen as the main gap in the
literature; the inability of the liberal democratic model to account for, and explain
democracy and political stability in Senegal. In filling the gap in the literature, the
study offers the Democarassie model as a model of democracy that explains
democracy and political stability in Senegal more completely.
Conclusion
Beyond the general consensus, there lies a wide-ranging lack of consensus on
what qualifies as a democracy: a broad spectrum of disagreement ranging from the
question of simply holding elections, to the "thin" and "thick" conceptions of democracy.
In effect, what becomes evident as a result of the analysis is that beyond the general
consensus democratization and democracy carry different meanings across time, culture,
and space. Consequently, the democratic model comes across, as illustrated in the
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analysis as a chameleon; a reptilian character capable of changing color as necessary to
adapt to its environment strictly for survival purposes. This ever changing adaptive nature
of democracy is what drives the enduring debate between what is referred in this study as
believers and doubters/critics. Within the backdrop of this lack of consensus and the
enduring debate that ensued, it seems that since the eighteenth century and in earnest
after the 1990s, considering third world countries, most of the world's nations that
identify as democracies have settled with the liberal democratic model. However, even
with this model, the lack of consensus on democracy still exists, and the debate still
rages.
Therefore, as part of the of the analysis of the literature review the "big question"
is, considering vast differences between the developed democratic countries and
developing and emerging democracies on the issues of culture, social exchanges, ethics,
morals, economic development in naming a few, does the liberal democratic model in its
Western version fit all nations? As part of the analysis, it is this study's position that the
liberal democratic model in its Western version does not fit all nations. As a result,
considering the value in the "spirit and value" of democracy as universal and desirable to
many, the study suggests a version of the liberal democratic model that takes into
consideration and therefore accommodates nations' unique realities. This suggestion
stems from the findings of studying Senegal on democratization, democracy, and political
stability. The finding reveals that the liberal democratic model falls short of fully
explaining political stability in Senegal, but the customized version; the Democarassie
model is able to. As a result, one challenges the universality of the liberal democratic
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model, which the study generally sees as a misfit for many nations, and therefore
suggests a refit. This refit in the case of Senegal is the liberal democratic model version:
the Democarassie model. It is further suggested that other nations can discover their own
versions of the liberal democratic model that suit their individual nation's unique
realities. And as a result, fit the nation better than the liberal democratic model in its
current form. As evident the literature review followed by an analysis reveals the fact that
the liberal democratic model is unable to explain political stability in Senegal, but the
Democarassie model can. As a result, the Democarassie model, viewed as a derivative of
the liberal democratic model in this study is presented as the vanguard of political
stability in Senegal. The notion that the liberal democratic model is not capable of
explaining political stability in Senegal as the main gap in the literature.
CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE DEMOCARASSIE' MODEL
It is the study's position that the liberal democratic model cannot fully explain
political stability in Senegal. As a result, the study proposes a version of the liberal
democratic model: the Democarassie model. This is the study's main contribution
towards the theory and the general discourse on democracy and political stability.
Compared to the liberal democratic model, the Democarassie model is hereby introduced
as a theoretical framework that better explains political stability in Senegal. In the interest
of avoiding misconceptions and fostering deeper understanding, it is prudent to
extensively deal with the Democarassie model in this chapter beyond the scope of the
introductory chapter. Consequently, the theoretical framework chapter succinctly
conceptualizes, defines in detail, and operationalizes where appropriate, the core
theoretical concept of the study-the Democarassie model. The conceptualization and
definition of the accompanying main concepts in the study (democratization/democracy
and political stability) will be dealt with in chapter four.
' The term Democarrassie is coined by the author form the Senegalese Wolof pronunciation of
term democracy. By definition the Democarrassie Model is an offshoot (an offspring, a derivative, a
localized version) of the liberal democratic model sharing guarantees including frequent, free, and fair
election, political participation, civil liberties, political rights, and rule of law, however, considers and
accommodates the unique realities of individual nations, in this case, Senegal.
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Since the Democarassie model is the study's main contribution to the existing
body of knowledge on democracy and political stability; since this concept is the debut of
a nation-centric model of democracy; since the Democarassie model is expected to be a
trailblazer, significant volume of enquiry is expected. Just like all virgin concepts,
further questioning, probing, challenging, and even criticism is expected from peers,
critics skeptics, supporters and the "just curious" alike. These inevitable questions are
anticipated. Questions could include but are not limited to 1) what is the Democarassie
model? 2) What are the basic essentials (taproot, building block(s), and cornerstone(s) of
the Democarassie model? 3) What are the similarities or differences between the liberal
democratic model and the Democarassie model, and how can the Democarassie model
deliver where the liberal democratic model falls short? 4) Why the Democarassie model?
What makes the Democarassie model so unique? How does the Democarassie model
promote political stability? These questions and many more will be dealt with in this
chapter and in greater detail throughout the study, especially in the case study.
To begin to unpack the Democarassie model, one must start with an examination
of the values, elements, operations, and outcomes of the model. Within the context of
these values, elements, operations and outcomes, it is found important to remind readers
what exactly is the Democarassie model. The Democarassie model is a version of the
liberal democratic model that the study suggests upholds political stability in Senegal.
The Democarassie model is grounded within the parameters of the liberal democratic
model. Therefore, the Democarassie model is seen as a derivative/a localized version/an
offshoot/an offspring of the liberal democratic model. Why is the Democarassie model
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considered as an offshoot of the liberal democratic model? The Democarassie model is
considered rooted in the liberal democratic model in the sense that: 1) the Democarassie
model among other guarantees allows and promote frequent, free, and fair elections with
mass citizen's participation in the excess of seventy percent voter turn-out.1 These voting
citizens prove to be capable of not only significantly affecting election outcomes, but also
capable of voting an incumbent president out of office as evident in the elections of 2000
and 2012. 2) To a great extent, the Democarassie model extensively exhibits most, if not
all, the other hallmarks of the liberal democratic model including: civil liberties, political
rights, and the rule of law (as highlighted with the above elements). Together these
guarantees are referred to as "shared guarantees" between the two models. These shared
guarantees include the guarantee of frequent, free, and fair elections with mass citizen's
participation, civil liberties, political rights, and rule of law. Both the liberal democratic
model and the Democarassie model champion these shared guarantees.
To recap, the Democarassie model is 1) considered a version of the liberal
democratic model with shared characteristics including political participation, civil
liberties, political rights, rule of law and popular sovereignty. 2) Akin to the liberal
democratic model, the Democarassie model draws power from the people. 3) Unlike the
liberal democratic model, the establishments and establishment heads also referred to in
this study as the decentralized despots, or customary authorities, and also seen in the
image of power elites, play the important role of servicing the basic needs of the people
in terms ofjobs, business opportunities, spirituality, guidance and leadership, and so on.
This is especially true starting with the 2000 Presidential Election
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These customary authorities also intervene as needed in influencing the people's political
decision, especially if such decision threatens the political stability of the nation as a
coherent unit.
The Nature: Decentralized Despotism within the Backdrop of Political Sociology,
Democratic Pluralism, and Consociation Theory
In this study the Democarassie model is theorized within the wider context of
supporting existing theories including political sociology, democratic pluralism and
consociation. Evidently, one can choose to stay on course and follow norms and status
quo by invoking mainstream political and economic theoretical frameworks including but
not limited to: feminist, dependency, development theory; realism; idealism; structural
functionalism; constructivism, all capable of explaining democracy and democratization
in Senegal to some extent. Also as a level of analysis, one can choose to adopt the "gold
standards"; the international system, the state system, non-governmental organizations,
and international institutions; as these prove to be the preferred analytical tool in terms of
explaining issues of democratization, democracy and political stability. However,
considering the importance of 1) society and societal norms, 2) the reality of
"establishments" and "customary authority" in Senegal, and 3) patronage and clientelism
in Senegalese political exchanges and issues of governance, the study looks within and
beyond theories grounded in political science. As a result, in theorizing the Democarassie
model, the study utilizes decentralized despotism theory as the ultimate theoretical
framework, however, within the wider context of political sociology, polyarchy
democratic pluralism, and consociation theory.
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Consequently, decentralized despotism theory within the context of democratic
pluralism, polyarchy democratic pluralism and consociation, all with the wider context of
political sociology proves to be an effective theoretical framework. Hence, as a
passageway to the task of fleshing out the decentralized despotism theory, it is necessary
to revisit political sociology and democratic pluralism and consociation theory.
In Lewis A. Coser's definition, political sociology:
Is that branch of sociology which is concerned with the
social causes and consequences of given power
distributions within or between societies, and with the
social and political conflicts that lead to changes in the
allocation of power....Whereas traditional political science
tends to be mainly concerned with the machinery of
government and the mechanism of public administration,
the sociological analysis of political phenomena is
concerned with the wider interplay between politics and the
social structure, between political and societal processes.2
Anthony M. Orum and John G. Dale argue that democracy does not spring
full blown, but depends on a set of historical and social circumstances to emerge.3
Consequently, Coser characterizes political science as focusing on "the machinery
of government and the mechanisms of public administration and not the wider interplay
between politics and the social structure, between political and societal processes." Also,
Orum and Dale argue that in order for democracy to emerge, it must depend on a specific
set of historical and social circumstances. Given the role of customary authority, it is
2 Lewis A. Coser, Political Sociology (New York: Harper Torch books, 1966), 1.
3 Anthony Orum and John G. Dale, Introduction to Political Sociology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 2.
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evident that if one seeks to understand political stability in Senegal and its relation with
the Senegalese model of democracy more intimately, one should not only go beyond the
"machinery of government and the mechanism of public administration," but also include
the wider interplay between politics and the social structure and societal processes. One
must also seek to understand historical and social circumstances that bear heavily on
Senegalese society.
Within the backdrop of the greater political sociology theoretical framework one
realizes that decentralized despotism theory also shares values with polyarchic
democratic pluralism theory. Democratic pluralism according to Dahl's 1961 seminal
work, Who Governs is defined as democracy in the populist or pluralist/polyarchic sense.
Dahl contends that contrary to renowned scholars such as C. Wright Mills, within
democratic pluralism there exists multiple elite bases, and such elite bases contend and
compromise. Democratic pluralism or populist democracy also resonates with Lijphart's
consensus and consociation model of democracy, where power is shared. This sharing of
power is a very important aspect of the Democarassie model.
In view of the above, the study utilizes decentralized despotism as the perennial
theoretic framework within the context of political sociology, democratic pluralism, and
consociation democracy theory. But what exactly is decentralized despotism? Mahmoud
Mamdani describes decentralized despotism as, "A hallmark of the colonial state,
modeled as monarchical, patriachical, and authoritarian with a king in the center, a chief
4 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
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as the head of the administrative ground and a patriarchy in every homestead or kraal."5
Such decentralized despotism political arrangement takes place in a political setting
where significant political participation (democratic pluralism) exists. However, citizens'
political behavior is heavily influenced by what is referred to in this study as
"establishments" and what Mamdani refers to as "customary authority." Bearing in mind
the importance of "establishments" and "customary authority" within the Senegalese
political and social exchanges, Mahmoud Mamdani's theoretical framework of
decentralized despotism serves as the central theoretical framework of reference
supported by the wider framework of consociation and democratic pluralism theory, both
within the framework of political sociology theory. One now takes a closer look at the
Democarassie model vis-a-vis the decentralized despotism theoretical framework. For a
better understanding of the model, one must first understand its values, elements,
operation, and outcomes.
The Values
To set the stage towards a more profound understanding of the Democarassie
model, the values of the model must be considered here. The Democarassie model's
values can be summarized as, "kinder and gentler," sensitive to local realities,
accommodating to religious and socio-cultural exchanges, and adaptive to existing
systems, political, economic, cultural etc. All the other values help make the
Democarassie model "kinder and gentler."
5 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy ofLate
Colonialism (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 39.
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Akin to Lijphart's position on consociationalism, the Democarassie model is
believed to be "kinder and gentler" considering the following values: The Democarassie
model incorporates a high degree of liberty; a high level of political participation; a high
degree of tolerance (religious, ideological, and associational). The Democarassie model
also incorporates a high level of inclusion and acceptance. Instead of taking advantage of
existing cleavages, the Democarassie model makes inclusion a major priority. As a
result, the model recognizes cleavages, however, instead of excluding groups based on
ethnicity, location, social status, and gender, in naming a few, the Democarassie model
uses religion, culture, language, nationalism, patronage, age and gender roles to include
all, thus, converging instead of diverging existing cleavages.
All these values help make the Democarassie model "kinder and gentler." This
"kinder and gentler" characteristic of the Democarassie model is believed to promote a
system where citizens not only "buy into" but "claim ownership" of their political
destiny. As a result, all citizens regardless of social status (elites, peasants, and all in
between) display considerable confidence with the political exchanges in the system. This
sentiment is captured with these well-known Senegalese maxims, Senegal sunu gal
(Senegal, our boat/vessel-Senegal our country) and "boule yengal galgi"; a literal
translation of this might read "do not rock the boat," with Senegal being the proverbial
boat. As owners of their political destiny, citizens generally refrain from exchanges that
upset the political harmonic balance. Arguably, these nationalistic tendencies, in and of
itself, can lead to political stability. Adding to the "kinder and gentler" nature of the
Democarassie model, the model also proves to be sensitive and accommodating to
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Senegalese culture, social mores, religion, and political and economic realities. This is
what makes the Democarassie model unique. The importance of such accommodation
cannot be understated in upholding democracy and political stability in Senegal, because
Senegal is not only a class society, but also ethnically diverse with multiple languages.
Therefore, it is believed that a model of democracy, not only consociational in nature, but
accommodating and adaptive to Senegal's unique realities seems to serve Senegal better
than the traditional Western liberal democratic model. This is why the Democarassie
model is seen as a more perfect fit for Senegal. With these values in mind, the question
that is begged to be asked is what exactly are the elements the Democarassie model.
The Elements
To understand the Democarassie model, one must examine the elements of the
model. Since the Democarassie model is grounded the liberal democratic tradition,
besides accommodating a country's unique realities, the elements of the Democarassie
model are very similar to those of the liberal democratic model as listed.
1. Political freedoms and civil liberties.
2. Religious and Ethnic Freedom
3. Political Participation and Elections (frequent and relatively free and fair)
4. Rule of Law
5. Due Process
6. Pluralism and Collective bargaining
There is a general consensus within Senegal observers and critics alike, that under
Senegalese system of government, what is referred to in this study as the Democarassie
model, all the above element are significantly present. The only concern from observers
and critics is how deeply entrenched are these elements. This is a genuine concern
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because in Senegal some of these elements, for instance the rule of law, and due process
could use improvements and more oversight. There are also issues of checks and balances
and separation of power, considering the influence the president. The independence of
the judiciary is also called into question.
The Operations of the Model
Mahmoud Mamdani, decentralized despotism theory is conceptualized in the vein
of a political regime with multiple "customary authorities" all working in concert for the
perpetuation of the political unit. From their perch as establishment heads, these
"customary authorities" play their important unifying and stabilizing roles. The questions
that is begged to be asked is what are "establishments", who are these customary
authorities, and why are they are so important in decentralized despotism theory?
Utilizing the electric grid analogy, in short, the establishments are the various "power
houses," and the "customary authorities" as heads are the power brokers/distributors.
These customary authorities serve multiple functions and most importantly diffuse
populist tensions, serve as opinion leaders, provide leadership, services, and dole out
"goodies" and spoils. With these privileges, these opinion leaders command significant
influence over the people, and therefore, are capable of influencing behavior
significantly. The other part of the customary authority dynamic is the customary
authority's relationship with the political regime. In their relationship with the regime, the
main function of these customary authorities is to keep the regime, the status quo and the
central authority (the president) in place and into perpetuity. It is this study's position that
the "Senegalese model of democracy (the Democarassie model) that has upheld political
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stability for over half a century can be explained through these theoretic frameworks,
particularly decentralized despotism. Figure 3.1 captures the operations and the
exchanges of the model.
v."-".*-,;. V,: .■*"-.:■
Figure 3.1 Exchanges between the Political Regime Headed by the President and the
Establishments Headed by Customary Authorities and its Implications on Political
Stability.
President and Political System (provides) Establishment (provides)
1. Jobs and job security 1. Legitimacy and Recognition
2. Perks and Privileges 2. Votes, Support, and Advocacy
3. Material benefit and Access 3. Security and regime longevity
4. Financial and other Resources 4. Grassroots Support and Volunteering
5. Autonomy 5. Guidance and Advice
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Outcomes
1. Sense of normalcy
2. Expectation and hope for the future
3. Sense of ownership and belonging
4. Conformity and patriotism
5. Accountability and responsibility
6. Opportunity and resource access through the patronage system
7. Inclusion and tolerance through the religious and social exchanges
The outcomes of the Democarassie model will be revisited and discussed in great
detail in the case study. At this juncture, it is found important to draw attention to these
generally positive outcomes. Arguably, these outcomes and the fear of the unknown
keep the people vested in a system of government that operates under the Democarassie
model. Looking across the West African sub-region could also be a motivation for
staying under the Democarassie model, at least the model has a lot to offer, compared to
others.
How Democratic is the Democarassie Model?
The case is already made that the Democarassie model not only takes into
consideration, but even accommodates a nation's unique realities; therefore, it is less than
democratic in the pure Western liberal democratic model sense. In the case of Senegal,
this unique reality is the reality of "establishments" headed by "customary authorities," as
introduced above. Especially, important in the exchange between customary authority
and the people is the unique reality of customary authority influence. This influence
carries a heavy bearing on people's political decision-making and political behavior; both
having a direct impact on political stability. Even though, the activities of customary
authority renders this model less-than-democratic, the study argues that these same
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accommodating attributes of the Democarassie model have perpetuated political stability
in Senegal over half of a century.
Evidently, akin to the liberal democratic model, the Democarassie model assures
self-determination and guarantees "the people" effective political participation
influencing the decision of choosing their leaders. However, it is of paramount
importance to highlight a major departure; a departure of popular sovereignty. Even
though the Democarassie model is grounded in and considered an offshoot of and
therefore shares many characteristics with, the liberal democratic model, there is a major
difference between the two models. The Democarassie model not only considers, but also
recognizes, and accommodates, Senegal's unique reality: the permanence of what is
referred to in this dissertation as the "establishments." Arguably, any model of
democracy that accommodates any reality including the reality of "establishments" and
"customary authorities" or any unique reality could be considered by critics as less-than
democratic. In consideration of the accommodation of unique realities, one could further
argue that less-than democratic tendencies are woven into the very core fabric of the
Democarassie model. These less-than democratic tendencies include the general
acceptance of the role of an elite class (not necessarily a ruling class) that fulfills the role
of power brokers and serve as intermediaries between the state and the citizens.
Evidently, the Democarassie model is less than perfect Without asking if the
liberal democratic model is perfect, (and even it is, perfect for whom?), an important
distinction is to be made here: Unlike the Western liberal democratic model, the
Democarassie model is not only responsive to unique realities in Senegal, but the model
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considers cultural exchanges, mores, ethics and societal norms in Senegal. For instance,
within Senegalese society, society's elders enjoy a substantial degree of reverence and
respect. The Democarassie model considers that. The religious leaders are divinely
respected; the Democarassie model considers that, also. Heads of industry, government,
and the economic apparatus are not treated with contempt, but generally seen as divinely
ordained leaders; the Democarassie model considers that too. The military establishment
and its leaders enjoy considerable amounts of tryst and respect, the Democarassie model
also takes that into consideration. Furthermore the Democarassie model considers
ethnicity, age, gender, and occupational roles set in the Senegalese society.
Conclusion
Consequently, what unfolds is a version of the liberal democratic model that takes
into consideration society's realities. As already mentioned, Senegal's reality happens to
be the reality of establishments and customary authority and the important role they play
in Senegalese sociocultural, political, and economic life. Considering the degree of
political stability in Senegal one could argue that so far the Democarassie model within
the framework of decentralized despotism theory has been working well for Senegal up
to this point. Even though a detailed explanation as to why the Democarassie model is
working well for Senegal will be hashed out in the case study, to conclude this chapter it
is important to offer a brief explanation
The explanation departs from this observation. Considering the vast differences
between the developed, developing and emerging democracies, would it be an illusion to
expect the authentic Western liberal democratic model to produce the same positive
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results as the model produced for Western nations, given the multitude of differences
between the West and developing nations? The follow-up question becomes, is there a
nation-centric model of democracy? As far as this study is concerned, the answer is in the
affirmative; the time is ripe to explore nation-centric models of democracy. To bolster
this position, the study presents the Democarassie model as a nation-centric model of
democracy, producing positive results simply because, unlike the liberal democratic
model, the Democarassie model goes beyond considering local realities, this model
incorporates and places Senegal's realities front and center.
A plausible explanation as to why the Democarassie model is working well for
Senegal is that even though Western democracy as a concept is foreign to Senegal,
Senegal is able to forge a local version of the concept that accommodates its realities. In
other words democracy as a concept has adapted well in its new and foreign environment.
This idea of adapting a foreign idea is hardly new, and could be envisaged in the milieu
of a donated organ. Just like any donated organ, if a foreign organ, idea, or concept is to
fully adapt as part of a system/society such organ/idea/concept must "become one" with
its new local environment, or otherwise risk rejection. This means that such
organ/idea/concept must yield to adaptation to form or become compatible with the new
environment. Within this background, it is further observed that foreign ideas/concepts
are hardly adopted in their original/authentic form; the foreign idea or concept must
transform in varying degrees to its new host. The same holds true for Senegal or any
other nation for that matter. In the case of democracy and Senegal, the liberal democratic
model transforms into a nation-centric "Senegalese version" of democracy in the form of
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the Democarassie model. In accommodating the unique realities in Senegal, the
Democarassie model serves Senegal well. As a result, it seems "hybrid concepts/ideas"
(an amalgamation of the origin/the authentic mixed with the local version) work well for
individual nations. Therefore, given the success of Senegal and the Democarassie model,
in the case of democracy and West Africa, a region-centric "West African version" model
of democracy should be considered.
CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
This chapter is divided into three major sections. Since chapter three introduced,
conceptualized, defined and extensively discussed the Democarassie model as the
theoretical framework in this study, it is found judicious to start section one of the
methodology chapter with the conceptualization and definition of political stability and
democratization and democracy in the context of this study. Within the wider discussion
of political stability, the coup d'etat (as the main indicator of political stability) is also
contextualized as implemented in this study. Part two of the chapter follows the
conceptualization issue with a presentation of an overview of the data, data collection,
and data analysis method. Even though the actual case study in chapter five goes in great
detail showing the implications of the Democarassie model on political stability in
Senegal, part three of this chapter jump starts the discussion by presenting the theoretical
underpinnings and the justifications of an explanatory qualitative case study analysis.
Conceptual Issues: Political Stability
In this study political stability is viewed as the product of a legitimate political
unit where non-coercive civil order exist, as a result of habitual multidimensional and
multifaceted political exchanges that allows for perpetuation and longevity, however,
provides for transition of power as necessary. Such a transition of power should be
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guided by these three conventions. The transition must be: 1) legal, 2) within the
boundary of set rules, and 3) orderly, accepted and agreed upon, not coercive,
manipulated, or violent. Within this milieu, political stability is hereby conceptualized.
A study that proves to be very instrumental in the conceptualization of political
stability is Leon Hurwitz's Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability.1 After
reminding readers that the task of conceptualizing, defining, and operationalizing
political stability proves to be a Herculean task, Hurwitz proceeds to survey the
contemporary views and approaches of political stability. Such views and approaches of
political stability includes what Hurwitz refers to as "isolated monomeasures:" a) absence
of violence; b) governmental longevity/duration; c) legitimate constitutional regime; d)
absence of structural change; and e) a multifaceted/system stability approach.2
Considering all the approaches and views, Hurwitz contends that even though all
monomeasures are legitimate political stability approaches, Hurwitz recommends
avoiding isolated monomeasures and therefore recommends approaching political
stability through a multifaceted/system stability approach, because "stability cannot be
reduced to an isolated variable." According to Hurwitz, this approach
(multifaceted/system stability approach) is an attempt to integrate and synthesize the
various other approaches."3 With the recommendation of a multifaceted/system stability
1 Leon Hurwitz, "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability, " Comparative Politics, Vol. 5,





approach, Hurwitz finds allies in Arend Lijphart and Harry Eckstein, especially Eckstein.
Harry Eckstein also reached similar conclusions to Hurwitz, that the most comprehensive
approach to political stability should include multifaceted societal attributes, because
such an approach tends to encompass all monomeasures, therefore offering a more
comprehensive conclusion. Eckstein's conceptualization of democratic political stability
in the context of the several attributes includes: 1) persistence of patterns, 2) legitimacy,
3) effective decision making, and 4) authenticity.4 With these attributes in mind, Hurwitz
believes Harry Eckstein presumably presented the most comprehensive theoretical study
of the problem of a one dimension explanation of political stability. This means that both
Hurwitz and Eckstein advocate for "multi-measures" as the legitimate approach to
political stability.
Also in concordance with the multifaceted nature of political stability is Arend
Lijphart. Lijphart conceptualizes political stability as multidimensional, meaning that
political stability is affected by and could be explained from more than one dimension.
Most important among the many dimensions according Lijphart include: system
maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness.5
In a similar vein Claude Ake echoes the multifaceted/multidimensional nature of
political stability. Ake conceptualizes political stability in the context of political
exchange, highlighting the regularity of such exchange. Again, one notices the
4Leon Hurwitz, "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability, " 459.
5 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (Binghamton: Yale University Press, 1977), 4.
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multifaceted and multidimensional nature of political exchanges. As a result, Ake is
considered to be in good company with Hurwitz, Eckstein, and Lijphart. Ake's agreement
with the other scholars mentioned is captured in his definition of political stability as
follows, political stability is:
The regularity of the flow of political exchanges. The more
regular the political exchanges, the more stability.
Alternately, we might say that there is political stability to
the extent that members of a society restrict themselves to
the behavior patterns that fall within the limits imposed by
political role expectations. Any act that deviates from these
is an instance of political instability.6
Concurring with the above-cited scholars (Hurwitz, Eckstein, Lijphart, and Ake ),
this study takes the position that if political stability is to be conceptualized and defined
comprehensively, one must do so in a multifaceted/multi-dimensional fashion.
Conversely, avoid using single monomeasures because no one single monomeasure has
the capacity to completely explain political stability. For illustration purposes consider
Lijphart's monomeasures, for example. The first two monomeasures (system
maintenance and civil order) share a symbiotic relationship. Conceptually, civil order
helps perpetuate system maintenance, and system maintenance promotes civil order. The
other two monomeasures (legitimacy and effectiveness) are also closely related. The
more legitimate the political system, the more effective the system is in serving its
citizens. The more effective the system is in allowing participation and guaranteeing civil
rights and liberties the more legitimate the system. As evident, each monomeasure can
6 Claude Ake, "A Definition of Political Stability" (Jan. 1975): 278, accessed June 2010,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/421552.
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partially, but not entirely explain political stability. As a result the study conceptualizes
political stability in a spirit that is multi-dimensional and multifaceted in nature.
How does this multi-dimensional/multifaceted framework of political stability fit
with this study? Studying political stability in Senegal is no different from studying
political stability elsewhere. Just like anywhere else, a comprehensive understanding of
political stability in Senegal calls for a multidimensional/multifaceted approach.
Arguably, however, when it comes to setting a benchmark for political stability, a
monomeasure could be set. As already mentioned, in this study that benchmark is
crossing the coup threshold; therefore, the main monomeasure of political stability in this
study is the coup d'etat. Even though political stability in Senegal could be explained by
many of the monomeasures offered by Hurwitz, Lijphart and the rest, the coup d'etat is
considered the final frontier and the ultimate threshold especially when the coup is
successful: A successful coup puts the last nail in a regime's coffin.
Considering the various political exchanges between the president and the people,
and the role of "establishments and customary authority," as expected, political stability
in Senegal is multidimensional and multifaceted in nature. It is a fact that a nation could
experience various forms of political instability stemming from various sources;
however, the ultimate threshold, the benchmark for political stability in Senegal and West
Africa, proves to be the coup d'etat. Grounded in a conceptualization multifaceted and
multidimensional in spirit, political stability in the context of this study is hereby defined.
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As a result, political stability could be defined within a wide spectrum ranging
from Marta Reynal-Querol's simplistic definition that political stability is the ability of a
political systems to prevent conflict,7 to the more nuanced definitions offered by the likes
of Edward Luttwak, Issaka Souare, Samuel Huntington, Monty and Donna Marshall,
Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, the Political Instability Task Force (PITF),
and Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier in naming a few. With this in mind, a concise
definition of political stability in the context of this study must be offered here.
A fusion of the Hurwitz, Lijphart, and Ake conceptualizations lends context to the
definition of political stability in this study. Within the context of the multidimensional,
multifaceted nature of political exchange and extrapolating from these authors'
conceptualization, political stability is defined as:
A legitimate political unit where non-coercive civil order as a result of habitual
multidimensional and multifaceted political exchanges allows perpetuation and longevity,
however, providing for transition of power as necessary. Such transition of power should
be guided by these three conventions, the transition must be: 1) legal and within the
boundary of set rules, and 2) orderly, accepted and agreed upon, not coercive,
manipulated, or violent.
For a more balanced approach, it is recognized that the coup is not the only
source of political instability. As a result it is found prudent to reflect on other sources
7 Marta Reynal-Querol, "Political Systems, Stability and Civil Wars," Institut d'Analisis Economic
(April 2002), accessed May 10, 2010,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/politicalsystems stability and civilwars.pdf
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of political instability to help make the case that the coup is the benchmark for political
instability for the West Africa sub-region.
Even though the main measure of political instability in this study is the coup, as
mentioned above, there are various other sources of political instability. These sources of
instability other than the coup, also known as a. putsch and a pronounciamento are
captured as follows. Table 4.1 identifies fourteen sources of political instability that are
grouped into two source groups, extra-judicial and judicial/quasi-judicial.















Ethnic and Religious Conflicts
Liberation and Wars of liberation
Coup D'etat
According to Patrick J. McGowan, "A coup d'etat involves the sudden, often
violent overthrow of an existing government by a small group-in contrast to 'revolutions'
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achieved by large number working for basic social, economic and political change."8
Even though the literature confirms that coups could be peaceful and bloodless, the
following characterize the coup d'etat: sudden, violent, surprising, expeditious, and
deadly. In great secrecy a small band of conspirators conspire to topple and replace the
regime and its leaders, especially the most senior leaders. As Edward Luttwak pointed
out, the coup could involve some of the elements of revolutions, civil wars,
pronunciamientos, putsches, liberations, and wars of national liberation). However the
coup is unique in two ways: unlike the others, the coup does not necessarily require the
intervention of the masses or-a significant military-type force.9
Citing the authors (Luttwak, the PITF, Blanco and Grier) and their views on other
types of political instability in the previous paragraph, it is evident that the most
notorious types of political instability include, but are not limited to: assassinations,
putsche, demonstrations, guerilla action, purges, revolutions, riots, strikes, civil wars,
pronunciamientos, liberations, and wars of national liberation, genocides, politicides,
ethic wars, among others. As evident, other types of political instability run the gamut.
Despite the other types of political instability, the regime is likely to perpetuate while
fending off instability; however, when it comes to the coup-a successful coup, the regime
does not only cease to exist, but it is replaced. This is why the coup is considered here,
8 Patrick J. McGowan, "African military Coup d'etats 1956-200: Frequency, Trend, and
Distribution," Journal ofModern African Studies, 41,3 (2003): 342 accessed September 30, 2010,
http://dx.d0i.0rg/l 0.1017/S0022278X0300435X.
9 Edward Luttwak. Coup D'etat: A practical Handbook (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1969), 11-
12.
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the final frontier, the point of no return. This explains why the study considers the coup
as the main indicator of political instability, even though there are other political
instability drivers. The focus now turns to the frequency of coups and the challenges it
poses in the West Africa sub-region.
The facts captured with the above chart highlighting the frequency and the
stubborn nature of coups in the sub-region, partially explains why the study considers the
coup d'etat as the main indicator of political stability, and its frequency as the measure of
political stability. Beyond the chart, two great studies that deserve to serves as a doorway
to the literature review on political stability in Sub-Saharan and West Africa is Patrick J.
McGovern's 2003 study, "Africa Military Coup d'etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends
and Distribution," published in the Journal of African Studies and Issaka Souare's, "Civil
Wars and Coup d'etat in West Africa."
Patrick J. McGovern succinctly characterizes the frequency of the coup d'etat in
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as endemic and astounding. According to McGovern's
summary, (between 1956 and 2001) statistics from the forty eight SSA states reveal the
following: 80 successful coups, 108 failed coup attempts, and 139 reported coup plots.10
As if the high frequency of coups is not disturbing enough, McGovern's study also
reported that although all African regions have experienced coups, West Africa is the
center of coup activity in Sub-Saharan Africa. McGovern cited 85 failed and successful
McGowan, "African military Coup d'etats 1956-200: Frequency, Trend, and Distribution," 339.
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coups, totaling to one-third of all coups in SSA, even though West Africa only represents
16 of the 48 countries that make up SSA."
In a similar vein Issaka K. Souare sums up the coup activity in West Africa this
way:
It clearly showed that military coups have been by far the
most common form of political change in the region. Since
independence of the West African countries in or around
the 1960s, there have been 38 successful military coups.
Divided on a five-year-period scheme, most of the coups
occurred in the five-year-period between 1966 and 1970
followed by the period between 1976 and 1980 where five
coups took place.12
Souare also shows that when it comes to coups Nigeria and Benin lead the pack
with six successful coups each followed by Ghana with five, while countries such as
Liberia, Gambia, Ivory Coast and Guinea only experienced one coup.13 For the causes of
coups in West Africa, Souare also offers a three-pronged explanation outlined as: 1) the
politicization of the army, 2) ideological motives, and 3) foreign roles.14
Democracy and the Democratization Process
The analysis of literature reviewed makes it abundantly clear that beyond the
basics (the "values and spirit") of the democratic model there exists a general lack of
"Ibid., 355.
12 Issaka Souare, Civil Wars and Coup d'etat in West Africa: An Attempt to Understand the Roots




consensus on democracy as a concept, notwithstanding the fact that repressive countries
including African countries from Algeria to Zimbabwe refer to their systems of
government as democratic. This conundrum precipitates the enduring debate between the
believers and doubters of the democratic model as captured in the analysis section of the
literature review. This debate and the "rock bottom qualification" of democracy confirm
a lack of general consensus on what constitutes a democracy. This is evident throughout
the general literature and is highlighted in the literature reviewed in this study. In other
words, the canons of the democratic model are somewhat clear (free and fair election,
political participation, civil liberties, civil rights, etc.); however capturing what
constitutes a democracy becomes very complicated, even illusive. This explains why
many scholars conceptualize democracy in a wide spectrum; from the Schumpetarian
minimalist definition to Robert Dahl's and Larry Diamond's more demanding definition
of democracy. From Larry Diamond's thin to Diamond's thick definition of democracy.
As a result, it is obvious that beyond the "spirit" and basic values, the advanced values,
justifications, even the definition of democracy proves to be ambiguous. As a
consequence of such ambiguity, a succinct conceptualization and definition of democracy
must be considered here. The next paragraphs start the conceptualization process.
For the purpose of this study democracy is conceptualized in terms of the
ruler/ruling class and the ruled, with emphasis and focus on the ruling class. As a result,
in this study, democracy is defined as an attitude of self-governing that requires
autonomous consent and yields to transformations reflecting society and society's
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experiences. In this conceptualization attitude is very important because such attitude
should not be imposed or coerced neither vertically nor externally (from ruler to the
ruled). Such attitude should go beyond simple consent to what Simone Chambers refers
to as "autonomous consent".15 Autonomous consent means that informed citizens are
convinced and therefore consent to ownership of the decision making process. This
means that informed citizens consciously and whole-heartedly accept the self-imposed
limits set for the betterment of all within that society. In such an environment democracy
becomes a system Chambers refers to as possessing a deontological value. In such a
society citizens become bound to what Chambers refers to as "duty for the sake of
duty."16 With this definition, attitude (autonomous consent) is very important as captured
with Chambers's central politics thesis in her book, Reasonable Democracy: Mrgen
Habermas and the Politics ofDiscourse. Chambers writes that, "The more we employ
noncoercive public debate to resolve our deepest collective moral, political, and social
disputes, the better.17 Chambers goes on to state that, "Dialogue and persuasion are
constitutive of peaceful cooperation, and peaceful cooperation creates a secure and stable
environment in which to pursue our life plans."18 Chambers's overarching argument is
15 Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy: Jiirgen Habermas and the Politics ofDiscourse





that in a democracy dialogue and persuasion should take precedence over force and
coercion, thus the tenets of deliberative democracy.
As Larry Diamond puts it, liberal democracy extends beyond the formal and
intermediate conceptions of democracy. The "formal" being "electoral democracy"
following a minimalist conception (a system constrained by a constitution, where regular,
competitive multiparty elections are held with the parameters of universal suffrage).
Borrowing from Collier and Levitsky, Diamond refers the "intermediate" as the
"expanded procedural" conception, where the conceptions are not clearly related to one
another. Therefore liberal democracy can be conceptualized in a continuum. As Diamond
puts it, liberal democracy extends beyond the formal and the intermediate conceptions.
Beyond the formal and the intermediate conceptions, the liberal democracy model
(according to Diamond) can be conceptualized with the following characteristics: 1)
absence of military or other actors not directly or indirectly accountable to the electorate,
2) yields to both vertical (rulers to the ruled) and horizontal accountability (officeholder
to the order), 3) high degree of political and civic pluralism coexisting with individuals
and group freedoms, 4) fair and consistent application of the "rule of law" that promotes
political and legal equality.19
Considering the ambiguous nature of democracy, a concise working definition of
democracy is necessary; however, defining democracy proves challenging without a
precise conceptualization of the concept. Therefore, as a passage way leading to a
19 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1999), 10-11.
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definition, democracy is hereby conceptualized in the context of this study. Against this
backdrop a clear definition of democracy in the context of this dissertation becomes
necessary. To assist in this Herculean task (defining democracy), one is tempted to revisit
and reflect on democracy's most famous definition, today: Abraham Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address defines democracy as; "Government of the people, by the people,
and for the people." It is argued here that even this well adopted definition is not without
ambiguity, considering the fact that this speech was given in 1863 when most African
Americans in the United States were slaves with no civil liberties and political rights to
be respected and observed. The ambiguity in this definition zeroes in on "the people"
question. As the question of who is considered "the people" resurfaces to haunt us once
again. Even though the Emancipation Proclamation started the inclusion process in 1863,
by 1870 slavery was totally abolished in the U.S., with the Thirteenth Amendment, and
ex-slaves were extended citizenship courtesy of the Fourteenth Amendment. The newly
freed male slaves were extended suffrage courtesy of Fifteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. However by 1877, the Hayes-Tilden compromise followed by the
"separate but equal" system wiped out most if not all the political gains African
Americans achieved until then. Once again the question remains, who are "the people"?
Evidently, Lincoln's definition of democracy is great when one finds oneself qualified as
a member of the community of equals; qualifying as one of "the people." Consequently,
democracy does not mean much to the excluded. What if the majority is excluded?
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With such ambiguity in mind, it is important to highlight the multi-dimensional
nature of the definition of democracy. As mentioned in the literature review, democracy
could be defined in both normative and empirical terms; ideal and procedural terms;
however, for the purpose of this study, democracy is conceptualized in terms of the
relationship between the ruled "the people" and the ruler and ruling class. Therefore in
this study democracy is defined within the context of the attitude of self-governing that
requires autonomous consent and yields to processes and exchanges reflecting society
and society's experiences.
The Democarassie Model: A Conceptualization
As a point of departure on the conceptualization process, one finds it necessary to
depart from the etymology of the word Democarassie. Democarassie is coined and
originated from the Wolof20 pronunciation of the term democracy. In this study
Democarassie is conceptualized as a model of democracy grounded in the liberal
democratic tradition, thus the Democarassie version of liberal democracy. Since the
model was very briefly introduced in chapter one, a more in-depth presentation is
necessary. The Democarassie model is re-introduced here as an
offshoot/offspring/version/derivative of the liberal democratic model that takes into
consideration, and therefore accommodates a nation's unique realities. As delineated in
the introductory chapter, as a construct, the Democarassie model and the liberal
democratic model (democracy in the Western sense) typically share the basics: meaning,
20 Wolof is the linguafranca and the most prominent vernacular in Senegal.
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tenets, and prescriptions including but not limited to frequent, free and fair election; mass
political participation; civil liberties; political rights guarantees and rule of law. However,
the Democarassie model not only takes into consideration, but also accommodates
Senegal's unique realities.
Putting the Democarassie model in the context to the research question, one is
reminded that a plausible explanation to the political stability Senegal enjoys since
independence is a result of the Senegalese model of democracy -the Democarassie
model. As already mentioned in the introductory chapter, the Democarassie model is
grounded in the liberal democratic tradition, however, conceptualized within the
frameworks of C. W. Mills's "power elite"21 theory and Mahmoud Mamdani's
"decentralized despotism"22 theoretical framework. Mills's "power elite" theory posits a
political system with significant elite (political, corporate, and military) influence, against
the interest of a participating but citizenry prone to manipulation by the elite. Mamdani
describes "decentralized despotism" as, "A form of indirect rule...A hallmark of the
colonial state, modeled as monarchical, patriachical, and authoritarian with a king in the
center, a chief as the head of the administrative ground and a patriarchy in every
homestead or kraal."23 Both theories-Mills's "power elite" and Mamdani's
"decentralized despotism" seem to suit the conceptualization of the Senegalese model of
21 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York; Oxford University Press Inc., 1956).
22 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy ofLate




democracy well. Given power dynamic in Senegal, Mamdani's "decentralized
despotism" and what Mamdani refers to as "customary authority" is especially relevant.
Robert Dahl's polyarchy theory in the context of democratic pluralism24 is also of
immense relevance. Arend Lijphart's consociation theory also lends background and
context to the conceptualization of the Democarassie model.
Building upon Mills and Mamdani, Dahl and Lijphart's theories the
Democarassie model is ironically conceptualized also within the concept of "equality"-a
society of equals-equality within the elite and equality within the citizenry. Equality is
ironic because the model already suggests a class society of elites (customary authorities)
and everyone else. In the context of equality, one revisits de Tocqueville and Jefferson;
Alexis de Tocqueville and Thomas Jefferson's vein of analysis of democracy in America.
In his book, Democracy in America de Tocqueville characterizes "de Tocqueville's
America" as a society of equals who master the art of banding together to forward their
collective interests. In such a society there is political equality within the equal. In a
similar vein, Thomas Jefferson envisions a society of yeomen, a society where the
"ordinary man" is the harbinger of real power. Jefferson's ideal democratic society is a
society where power is retained by the "man." the family, the farm, the local area, the
local region, and the biggest entity, the state, but not a remote central government.
24 A system were the holders of sovereign power are "the people", who are also political equals,
and these holders of power, manifest their power in pursuit of their diverse, sometimes conflicting interests.
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In summation, it makes sense to revisit the four questions posed in the opening of
this section. These four specific questions help streamline the conceptualization of the
Democarassie model:
1) What is the Democarassie model? The Democarassie model is an offshoot of
the liberal democratic model in the sense that it allows frequent, free and fair elections
with high voter turnout to take place, because of its plebiscite underpinnings. With these
high voter turn-out elections, citizens/voters not only effectively choose their political
leaders including the president, but also self-determine their political destiny. The model
also shares most, if not all, the guarantees of the liberal democratic model as highlighted
in the "elements" of the Democarassie model in the case study.
2) What are the basic essentials of the Democarassie model? The basic essentials
of the Democarassie model are similar to the liberal democratic model including, but not
limited to; regular election, mass political participation, and the guarantee of civil
liberties and political rights.
3) What are the differences/similarities between the Democarassie model and the
liberal democratic model? Similarities between the two models (as mentioned above)
include, but are not limited to regular frequent, free and fair elections; mass political
participation; the guarantee of civil liberties and political rights, including the freedoms
of speech, press, association, petition, and religion, rule of law; and other constitutional
limitations and guarantees. As a result, the Democarassie model is grounded and seen as
an offshoot of the liberal democratic model. However, the two models have differences.
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The main difference between the two models is that the liberal democratic model draws
power and legitimacy directly from the people-demos, what is characterized here as a
democratic model with "direct and total popular sovereignty." On the other hand, with
the Democarassie model, power is brokered from the people through various
establishments (political, economic, religious, armed forces, and sociocultural) all headed
by recognized and revered customary authorities/decentralized despots/power elites at
various levels. It is evident that the elite hierarchy and the political exchanges they
oversee through the establishments is an important part of the Senegalese model of
democracy. Five establishments are identified in this study: political establishments,
socio-cultural establishments, religious establishment, economic establishment, and
military establishment. Through the lens of decentralized despotism these establishments
and customary authorities go a long way in explaining the political stability/democracy
nexus in Senegal. The 'establishments and customary authorities concept' in Senegal is
hardly new, considering Senegal's colonial history of indirect rule, that was handed down
at independence and still perpetuate in post-independent Senegal.
Considering this stratification, even though the Democarassie model is seen as an
offshoot of liberal democracy, it bears the character of a democratic model referred to
here as "indirect and partial popular sovereignty." In a Democarassie citizens make
voting decisions based on their own individual judgment, however the influence of
customary authorities in this endeavor cannot be underestimated. In other words, even
though citizens fully participate in choosing their leaders through plebiscite, under the
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Democarassie model, people's final choice is heavily influenced by the establishment
and customary authority. As a result, unlike the liberal democratic model, with the
Democarassie model, one cannot underestimate the influence of the establishments and
the influence of customary authority decentralized despots in keeping the whole system
intact. The customary authorities heading the establishments perform effectively in their
service as; pressure valves, circuit breakers, middlemen, power brokers, arbiters, umpires,
ombudsman, and referees between the state and the citizens. Even though a picture of a
stratified society is painted here, Senegalese do not only believe in political equality, they
believe that they are equal. This sense of equality is captured in the famous Senegalese
maxim, Senegal ben bop la (literally Senegal; one head, meaning shared decisions,
shared destiny). The sense of equality is also captured with the Senegalese national
motto: Un Peuple, Un But, Une Foi (One People, One Goal, One Faith).
The takeaway here is, just like any democratic system dissatisfaction could lead to
conflict however, with the Democarassie system these establishments and its leaders
(customary authorities) are generally able to broker a compromise between the citizens
and their government and political system. As a result, in times of crises instead of
taking the streets and trying to topple the regime, many Senegalese look up to the
establishments and customary authorities to intervene. Even after taking the streets, these
customary authorities are capable of minimizing/maximizing violence, or appealing to
protesters to refrain from violence and return to their homes. This and the apolitical
stance of the military are presented as among the main reasons why Senegal has
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maintained her coup-less credentials since independence in 1960. As a result, the
Democarassie model is conceptualized as a system where a president occupies the center
of the political regime. This president is then buttressed by customary authorities that
head various establishments, all working in concert to keep peace, order, normalcy and
most importantly the perpetuation of the regime.
4) The study now answers the fourth and final conceptualization question. Why
the Democarassie model? As already argued, despite the demerits of the Democarassie
model (see how democratic is the Democarassie model), it is argued here that this model
helped Senegal remain politically stable, even prior to 2000 when Senegal was less than
democratic. Any model that can achieve such stability in a region as unstable as West
Africa is worth keeping and exploring further: after-all, the literature on democracy
reveals that democracy is an ideal that is very hard to achieve, if achievable at all. Most
countries referred to as a democracy, including the United States have their own
shortcomings and flaws and Senegal is no exception. The point being made here is that,
even though the Democarassie model could be challenged as less than democratic, it is
getting the job done in Senegal.
Data, Data Sources, and Data Collection Method
The study utilizes the following secondary datasets: demographic, social,
economic, political, religious, country, freedom, governance, political instability, state
fragility, military, social conflict, and election.
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The data sources are as follows: The World Bank's Worldwide Government
Indicators (WGI) served as an important source for governance and political instability
data. From the Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie (ANSD)
demographic, country, social, political, and economic data was sourced. Datasets from
both the World Bank and ANSD assist in the more profound understanding of Senegal. In
gauging freedom in Senegal and around the world, datasets from Freedom House were
utilized. The Center of Systemic Peace's Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD)
provided resources on government and state fragility, social conflict, and political
instability. Defence Web served as a data source for military and economic data for
Senegal. From the CIAWorld Factbook demographic, religious, country, and social data
was sourced. In examining elections and elections quality in Senegal and in Africa, the
African Elections Database provided very important election datasets.
The data collection method in this study qualifies as a content analysis. Even
though, the author remanufactured and extrapolated from the data, the study entirely
utilized secondary data. The remanufactured and extrapolated data is the end product of a
content analysis of data already available.
The Theoretical Underpinnings and Justification for a Qualitative Explanatory
Case Study Analysis as a Research Method for Exploring the Implications of the
Democarassie Model on Political Stability in Senegal
This section departs with highlighting the theoretical underpinnings and laying
out the justifications of a qualitative case study analysis as the chosen research method,
over other research methods.
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The Case Study Approach
A review of the literature reveals a treasure trove of literature on case study as a
method of inquiry and analysis. Even though case study analysis has become not only
mainstream, but a genuine method of inquiry in social science following early and mid-
twentieth century debates, from the likes of Emile Durkheim to more contemporary
scholars, there are still observers that doubt its value as compared to the quantitative
scientific method. However, on the other side of the debate, scholars from the likes of
Max Weber, Robert Yin, and Robert Stake staunchly stand in defense of the case study
analysis methodology. Even though one delves into the literature for context, in this
study, the concern is not to reinvent the wheel, because there is already ample literature
on the case study method. What is important here is to justify the reason for a case study
as the chosen method of analysis. In other words, why is the qualitative explanatory case
study method chosen over other methods of inquiry including the quantitative/scientific
method? Within the backdrop of this question, it makes sense to unpack the qualitative
explanatory case study method starting with a definition of a case study.
One comes across a broad range of definitions of a case study in the literature.
However, after an extensive review a commonality emerges along these lines: A case
study: 1) is a real life, real world study involving people, events, and scenarios, in actual
reality, not abstracts. 2) Observes, studies, identifies, and eventually offers deeper
understanding and explanation. 3) Is an ideal methodology when the subject matter deals
with humans who think, driven by rationality, and have freewill; freewill that is heavily
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influenced by emotions. Consequently, the strength of a case study is not the numbers
and correlation, it is "holistic wholeness" that a case study offers that cannot by captured
by any other method of analysis, especially the quantitative method driven by numbers,
validity, sampling, arid correlations, in naming a few, A case study is particularly
important when an inquiry seeks to study human subject and human exchanges.
The "exploratory" in exploratory case study underscores the importance of the cause-
effect relationship between phenomena and events. As a result, exploratory case study
analysis can connect the dots and set outto trail what happened, and also discover the
connections of phenomena and/or events. Therefore, in this study an explanatory case
study analysis is deemed ideal, because the study seeks to investigate the connections and
implications of the Democarassie model (a process) on the political stability (a
phenomenon).
Other methods of analysis including a quantitative method can be adequate in this
inquiry. However;'since the study seeks to explore the implications of the Democarassie
model on political stability in Senegal, it is prudent to implement a case study analysis
that is qualitative and exploratory in approach because of the following reasons. First, the
human decisions-that lead to political stability are a phenomenon that could be
empirically observed studied in real life in its natural environment. Second, the type of
analysis yields to descriptions and drawing inferences, this feature is. a must have in this
endeavor. Third, the literature shows that in studying the human subjects and human
exchanges, the case analysis method is ideal: ideal considering innate human nature;
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ability to think, possessing freewill, and decision-making strictly driven with emotions
and rationality. Because humans (citizens, voters, customary authorities, political leaders,
etc.) make the decisions on the form and system of government driven by the
Democardssie model that upholds political stability in Senegal, a case study analysis
makes sense. Fourth, because of the .study's position that the Democarassie model
explains political stability in Senegal, a causal investigation is necessary; therefore, the
exploratory case study analysis must be considered. For these reasons, the explanatory
qualitative case study analysis is seen to fit the study well.
As already mentioned, there is no need to reinvent the wheel; the case study
method is also extensively represented in the literature. Winston Tellis alone single-
handedly offers a succinct overview of the "application of the case study methodology"25.
Invoking lead authorities in case study research methodology such as Robert Yin, Robert
Stake, and other case study authorities, Tellis ran the gamut when: including the history
of the case study methodology,- the supporter and critics and their points of argument, the
designs (exploratory, explanatory, descriptive, instrumental, intrinsic and collective), and
many other concerns of a case study methodology. However, in seeking a more profound
knowledge of what the case research method is, one revisits a renowned authority on case
studies, Robert Yin. Yin posits that the case study research method "is an empirical
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when
25 Winston Tellis, "Applications of a Case Study Methodology," The Qualitative Report, Volume
3. Number 3. (September, 1997), accessed May 16, 2014, http://www.nova.edu7ssss/QR/QR3-
3/tellis2.html.
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the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which
multiple sources of evidence are used".26 From Yin's definition notice the following:
"empirical inquiry," "investigate," "real life," "when boundaries between phenomenon
and context are not clearly evident," and "multiple sources of evidence." Consequently,
from Yin's definition of the case study method one can deduce that a case study method
is an inquiry that is driven by observation of phenomenon in its real life natural
environment from multiple sources, especially when the essence of the study cannot be
readily and easily captured with numbers, thus the quantitative method.
The Qualitative Method
According to Bill Gillham, qualitative methods are,
Essentially descriptive and inferential in character and focus primarily on
the kind of evidence (what people tell you, what they do) that will enable
you to understand the meaning of what is going on. Their great strength is
that they can illuminate issues and turn up possible explanations:
: . essentially a search for meaning-as is all research.27
Therefore, the qualitative method allows the researcher to go beyond descriptions
and make inferences for a deeper understanding of the inquiry. The qualitative method
could be multiple sourced or one of five methods (observation, interviewing,
ethnographic field work, discourse analysis, and textual analysis). Consequently, the
26 Robert K, Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Method (Hewbury Park, CA: Sage, 1984), 23.
27 Bill Gillham and Inc. ebrary, "Case Study Research Methods" Continuum International
Publishing, 2010. ebrary collections (2000), accessed May 24, 2014,
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/westga/Doc?id=l0404926andppg=i6.
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qualitative method goes beyond the numbers, to capture the fleeting iliusiveness of the
human subject. .
Gillham posits that a powerful argument for the qualitative method is what he
calls the model's philosophical base, which he summarizes in points and is captured as
follows:
1. Human behaviour, thoughts and feelings are partly determined by
their context. If you want to understand people in real life, you have
to study them in their context and in the way they operate. 2.
'Objective' research techniques - abstracted, controlling - can
produce results that are artefacts (artifacts) of the methods used, An
artefact (artifacts) is something that only arises because of the
method that has been used (like controlled memory experiments in a
laboratory or 'opinions' given in a questionnaire). You get results,
but are they 'true' for the people concerned in the practice of real
life? 3. How people behave, feel, think, can only be understood if
; you get to know their world and what they are trying to do in it.
'Objectivity' can ignore data important for an adequate
understanding.28 .
According to Gillham, the qualitative method enables the researcher to investigate
where other methods fall short and in situations with little known facts. This method also
enables the researcher to explore complex phenomenon beyond the "scope of more
controlled approaches", lending the case to be viewed from different angles. Such allows
the researcher to go beyond "significances," into the realm of "processes".29
Since examining the implication of the Democarassie model on political stability
in Senegal is the study's main focus, as pointed out in the opening of this section, a
28 Gillham "Case Study Research Methods," 11-12.
29 Ibid., 11.
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qualitative exploratory case study serves as a befitting research method. In this study, one
deals with human subjects and human decision making in a real life and real world
situations: In other words, tangible and observable subjects, processes, and events that are
empirical and readily observable, not abstracts and inferences. This justifies a case study
research method analysis for this study. Referencing the two previous sections, both
Robert Yin and Bill Gillham attest to the utility of the case study approach when a study
deals with processes and. human subject driven by greed, emotions, thoughts, and feeling
in naming a few.
In studying the implication of the Democarassie model on political stability in
Senegal, one deals exclusively with processes and human subjects who are solely
responsible for such processes including war and peace, type of government and
economic system, what is good and evil, what is legal or not legal, in naming a few. The
only issue is, even though human subjects strive for rationality, they are limited by
emotions, greed, feelings, and etcetera. In relation to this study, studying a model (the
Democarassie model that is constructed by humans), and its implications on political
stability that is upheld by humans, a qualitative explorative case study analysis is found
appropriate.
Conclusion
In consideration that the major concerns of the study are all subject to many
. interpretations, and could therefore result into confusion, it is found prudent to tease
out these conceptual issues in this chapter. As a result, the major concerns (political
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stability and democratization/democracy) are conceptualized in the context of the
' study. Within the discussion of political stability, the coup in the context of the
study is also hashed out. The Democarassie model is also conceptualized. The
importance of conceptualizing this model cannot be underestimated, since the
Democarassie model is completely new and the main contribution of this study. For
accountability purposes, it is also deemed important to highlight the type of data
utilized in this study; its source, collection, and analysis method All this is captured
in this chapter. The methodology chapter finally offers justifications why the study
chose a qualitative explanatory case study analysis as the chosen method of analysis.
The case study follows in the next chapter, chapter five, :
CHAPTER 5
THE CASE STUDY: THE DEMOCARASSIE MODEL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
ON POLITICAL STABILITY IN SENEGAL
This ease study explores the implications of the Democarassie model on political
stability in Senegal. The inquiry leads to the study's suggestion that political stability in
Senegal is driven by Senegalese model of democracy. As indicated in the theoretic
framework chapter, in this study the.Senegalese model of democracy referred to as the
Democarassie (Wolof pronunciation of the term democracy/ In his book, Democracy in
Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture, Frederic Charles Schaffer
refers to the Senegalese democracy as demokarassi} this study refers to the same
framework and process as Democarassie. Both Schaffer's book and this study are
referring to the same Senegalese model of democracy. However the central purpose for
this study is different from Schaffer's. In his book, Schaffer tried to debunk the
conventional wisdom that democracy (the Western liberal democratic model) leads to
transparency and accountability. In studying democracy in Senegal, through voter
behavior, attitude, and language, Schaffer found that democracy in unfamiliar cultures
does not necessarily mean the same as Western democracies. For instance, he discovered
■ •'•■ ' Frederic Charles Schaffer, Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar
Culture (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998).
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that, instead of voting behavior driven by policy choices, good governance, and/or the
candidate's credential, experience, and qualification, the Wolofs of Senegal, tend to vote
based on a completely different set of facts and calculations.
These facts and calculations include but not limited to 1) voting because the act of
voting forms part of the popular culture (what is model citizen is expected to do), 2)
voting because the act of voting is an important function of the clientelism system they
thrive in, 3) voting because of religious loyalty (fulfilling the command of a caliph), and
4.) voting because of community solidarity (standing with the one that stands with your
community). Therefore, Schaffer's book focused on the explaining democracy in
unfamiliar cultures. However, even though the Democarassie model is discussed at
length in this study, the focus of this study is examining the implications of
Democarassie model on political stability in Senegal. This renders the explanation of
political stability in Senegal the most important purpose.of the study, not the
Democarassie model per se.
As argued in this study, it proves to be a Herculean task to reconcile the liberal
democratic model with a nation's unique local realities. For instance, given the
communal societal exchanges, the stratified social structure, the patron-client political
systems that still prevail in most West African countries, regardless of all the
democratization efforts, the liberal democratic model by and large proves to be a misfit.
Therefore a model of democracy that reflects society's realities is timely, even overdue;
and the Democarassie model is suggested to be such model. More precisely, considering
1) the class structure and diverse society with multiple languages; 2) the fact that the
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prerequisites of a democratic society is not quite in place; 3) the communal tradition of
society is still popular in the sub-region, the Democarassie model seems a better fit than
the liberal democratic because the Democarassie model is more sensitive to actual
conditions, and the unique realities in Senegal and West Africa for that matter.
Consequently, the study investigates how and why Senegal is able to maintain
relative political stability, and remain on the democratic path,, while avoiding coup,
except the alleged 1962 coup attempt led by Momodou Dia. Senegal shares this coup-less
credential with only one other country in the sub-region, Cape Verde. Apart from these
two countries, all the other West African countries have experienced political instability
through the coup d'etat. As a result, this phenomenon suggests that despite similar
challenges and solutions between SenegaL and the rest of West Africa, dissimilar results
follow. Apparently, it appears that despite similar challenges and solutions between
Senegal and the rest of the sub-region (as highlighted in the case study), Senegal seems to
be generally successful in maintaining democracy and political stability. Since the study
suggests that such political stability is driven primarily by the Senegalese model of
democracy, the Democarassie model,,the main task of case study becomes the discovery
of the functioning of Senegal's Democarassie model and its implications on upholding
political stability in Senegal.
At this juncture it is abundantly clear that Senegal is currently considered both
politically stable and a thriving democracy. Ifc is also clear that the Senegalese model of
democracy {the Democarassie model) is not necessarily a replica, but a derivate of the
liberal democratic modelthat takes into consideration Senegal's realities. What is not
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clear is how does the Senegalese democratic model work? More importantly, how does
. this model reinforce political stability in Senegal? This is where the case study becomes
instrumental. Grounded in the quest of explaining political stability in Senegal, the main
purpose of the case study is to reinforce the thesis and central position that political
stability in Senegal is driven principally by the Democarassie model. As mentioned
earlier, the Democarassie model delivered, even during the Senghor years (1960 -1980),
an era during which Senegal was not considered democratic. Therefore, the study stands
steadfast behind the proposition that political stability in Senegal is driven by the
Democarassie model. Examining the implications and linking political stability to the
Democarassie model (the latter explaining the former), the case study in particular, and
the dissertation in general adds t6 the general discourse on democracy and political
stability.
With the notion that the liberal democratic model is not a "one-size fits all"
model, the case study aspires, to illustrate how the Democarassie model (a derivative of
the liberal democratic model), reinforces political stability in Senegal. Guided by the
literature review, the case study provides the platform for a more intimate study of the
relationship between political stability and democracy in a "real world" practical situation
through the study of the Democarassie model and political stability in Senegal.
The theory part of the argument that the Democarassie model drives political
stability in Senegal was dealt with earlier, in the literature review, the theoretical
framework, and the methodology chapter. The case study now deals with the practical
implications of the Democarassie model and its implications on political stability. In
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doing so the case study incorporates a twa-pronged function. 1) It functions as a bridge of
democracy in.theory.and democracy:in action through the Democarassie model (a
.country-specific, model of democracy reflecting realities on the ground). 2 The study
examines the implications and links the Democarassie model to political stability in
Senegal. As a means to an end; in conjunction with utilizing theory from the literature
reviewed and information from the methodology chapter, the case study extensively
examines the Democarassie model and its implications on political stability in Senegal
since independence in 1960, but in earnest after 2000.
With the above stated goals in mind the case study unfolds as follows: First, the
case study departs from the stand point of a "comparative prelude"'. This comparison
highlights the fact that, even though Senegal and other countries in the West African sub-
region share similarities in challenges and solutions, different outcomes result-democracy
and political stability for Senegal as compared to democratic challenges and political
instability for the majority of the countries .in the West Africa sub-region. Second, issues
and political stability in Senegal are hashed out, revealing a country that is both
democratic and politically stable. Third; to lay out the Democarassie model as an
offshoot and model of the liberal democratic model that suits Senegal better; democracy
the Senegalese way, Fourth, showcase the role of "decentralized despots and the
establishments" they head. Fifth, show the practical implications of the Democarassie
model on political stability in Senegal. This leads to the illustration of how the
Democarassie.model explains political stability in Senegal.
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With emphatic reference to the conceptualization of the Democarassie model in
theory as captured in the methodology chapter, the nuances of the Democarassie model
(in-actibn) is extensively discussed here, with special attention paid to the role of
"establishments and customary authority" in the upholding of political stability through
the Democarassie model. As mentioned above, the case study now opens with the
section referred to as "a comparative prelude" between Senegal and the rest of the
countries that make the West Africa sub-region.
A Comparative Prelude
To lend background and substantiate the inquiry whether political stability in
Senegal is driven by the Democarassie model, introducing the case study with a
comparative prelude becomes necessary Even though the focus of this dissertation is a
case study of Senegal on the subjects of political stability, democracy, and
democratization, a comparative analysis of Senegal and the rest of the West Africa sub-
region serve as aprudent launching pad. The comparative analysis outlines the
challenges that are being faced, and the solutions that are being implemented by West
African countries, as compared to challenges that are being faced, and solutions that are
being implemented by Senegal specifically. This comparative analysis is expected to
illuminate similar challenges and solutions, however different outcomes have occurred:
West Africa's record proves to be one of political instability as manifested in coup galore
as compared to Senegal's "coup-less" credentials vis-a-vis her relative politically stable
record. The portrayal of similar challenges and solutions, however dissimilar outcomes,
serve not only, as background and context for the study, but also paves the way leading to
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the crux of the problem; the problems of political stability, democracy, and
democratization in both Senegal and the West African region.
Political instability in post-independence West Africa is manifested in the
frequency of coups and many other variations of instability. Political instability in the
sub-region is considered here as the presence of violence and unrest, and is found to
result from four chronic challenges summed up as follows: political, economic,
environmental, and socio-cultural These challenges are believed to breed instability,
which in turn leads to the numerous coups and other sorts of instability the sub-region has
experienced since the 1960s. These challenges are further discussed.
. West Africa: Challenges and Solutions to Democracy and Political Stability
The catalog of challenges starts with the most pervasive source of instability, the
political challenges. Political challenges are manifested in the form of both internal and
external conflicts such as coups, rebellions, uprisings, riots, cross border attacks,
secessions, street protests, marches, and other forms of demands. Political instability
generally results from many factors, including but not limited to, thexolonial legacy of
"divide and rule," cronyism, chronic corruption, mismanagement and mal-appropriation,
one-party rule, "presidents for life," and wanton disregard for the rule of law.
. Economic challenges constitute another source of instability Economic and
political challenges tend to have a symbiotic relationship, feeding upon each other.
Economic challenges, among other things, result from economic stagnation, even
deterioration stemming from unfavorable balance of trade in the international market.
117
mono cash-crop, high unemployment, and high population growth, class systems, and
many others. .
Environmental challenges, the third source of instability, results from, but is not.
limited to famine, drought, deforestation, desertification, over fishing and over grazing.
Exacerbating the environmental challenges is the fact that many of these challenges
mentioned feed upon and worsen each other. In Senegal for example, the drought
condition that is most prevalent in the Podor and Matam region in northern Senegal is
seen as the major culprit for the famine experienced in this region and beyond. This
famine then leads to overgrazing and adds to the deforestation problem, which in turn
results in another problem, desertification. With life getting increasingly unsustainable,
the natives of these areas see moving to cities and further south, a survival necessity. This
migration leads to urban problems of overfishing, overpopulation, health concerns due to
housing and traffic congestion, inadequate sanitation in medical facilities, and other
challenges as delineated.
Socio-cultural challenges are also cited as the fourth source of instability. Such
challenges include diverse ethnic groups, and languages, young and exploding
populations, rural to urban migration, literacy, health, women and family issues. Staying
with Senegal as an example, driven by unsustainable living in rural Senegal, the rural-
urban migrations that ensue create unintended consequences of its own. Dakar and the
surrounding area's population have now exploded to over three million in a country of
twelve to thirteen million people. Such a spike leads to high unemployment rates close to
fifty percent in some counts, health and housing issues and many other challenges
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discussed in the case study. .The issue of ethnic diversity also plays a role. In Senegal for
instance, the Wolof(major ethnic group in the Dakar and other urban areas) and the Diola
(major ethnic group of the Casamance region) dynamic serves as a microcosm of a
greater ethnic diversity problem. Unlike many north/south conflicts in Africa that are
■ generally driven by religious and other cleavages, the conflict is southern Senegal-the
Casamance is overwhelmingly driven by ethnic divide and economics; thus, a
Wolof/Diola dynamic of suppression, even colonization as held by some observers, The
Diolas (and other minority groups) of Casamance believe that they have been suppressed
since independence, and even before by the government of Senegal with its seat in Dakar.
Dakar is controlled mainly by the Wolof, and this group directly or indirectly controls
Casamance. As a result, the Diolas identify more with their Gambia Diola brethren in the
southern region they share, than with the Wolofs of Dakar and the northern regions of
Senegal. The dynamic results in dismal economic and infrastructural development in
Casamance; a region called the "bread basket of Senegal". The indigenes of Casamance
grieve that they do not have much to show for their bountiful rivers, fertile land and lush
vegetation,
The challenges introduced above will be subsequently revisited and discussed in
greater detail in the ensuing case study. The focus at this point is to highlight the fact that
these challenges are endemic realities of post-independence West Africa, including
Senegal. As responses to these challenges, solutions implemented are delineated. .
In retrospect, one could argue that the "independence honeymoon" period was
short-lived. The honeymoon period that survived on a heavy dose of nationalism, self-
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determination, and nation-building soon became infighting within the new African elite.
Such infighting not only hampered progress and development, but exacerbated instability,
prompting most African leaders in 1960s and 1970s to transform their states to a one-
party state. During this period, instability was manifested in many different fashions
(coups, rebellions, riots, protests etc.). As already alluded to, amongst multiple responses
(solutions) to the political challenge (the most pervasive challenge), that is exacerbated
by economic, environmental, and socio-economic challenges, many countries in the sub-
region, including Senegal experienced with the one party system, "president for life", and
the nationalism. Senegal remained a one party state for almost twenty years, with no
formidable opposition party accompanied by a heavy dose of "nationalism calls" (country
first) between the early 1960s to fhe early 1980s,
Among the first solutions, from the dawn of independence through the first
decade, a period an observer refers to as "the decade of disappointment" or the "lost
decade," was the call for nationalism. West African leaders of all stripes, ranging from
the nationalistic Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure, to the accommodating black
Frenchman Leopold Sedar Senghor, continued experimenting with the call for
nationalism into the late 1960s and early 1970s. However, such nationalist calls soon
dissipated to singlerparty politics in the name of nation-building, Even moderate African
leaders experimented with one-party politics, while outlawing the opposition and
clamping.down with vengeance on dissenters. A case in point: Leopold Sedar Senghor of
Senegal and his response to Prime Minister.Mamadou Dia's December 26th 1962 alleged
coup attempt. Following.the alleged abortive coup plot, Dia was forced to resign and was
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imprisoned between 1962 and 1974. Senegal remained a one-party state without any
formidable opposition until 1980. As it has now become evident that during periods of
one-party rule, leaders tend to stratify with inner circles. Cronies in the inner circle tend
to trade their loyalties for the "goodies" the ruler and the state have to offer. This in itself
promotes political instability. Many observers posit that Houphouet Boigny was well
known for maintaining his thirty-three year rule over Ivory Coast with this strategy: a
moderate dictatorship where the inner circle is pacified with goodies, and the inner circle
in return, kept "the people" (citizens) either contented or silenced.
As nationalist calls and one-party rule in the name of nation-building became
untenable as a result of both internal and external pressures, some African leaders saw
democratization, "socialismization"1 and authoritarian rule attractive alternatives in
combatting instability. As a result, following independence various countries
experimented with various forms of democratization. These include Botswana, The
Gambia, Mauritius and Senegal. Other countries experimented with socialism, African
socialism or some form of authoritarian rule. Countries such as Guinea Conakry
followed in the Socialism traditions, and Guinea Bissau followed some form of African
Socialism. Gnassingbe Eyadema's Togo serves as an example of a West African country
that adopted authoritarian rule.
Second, as an economic solution, from the 1960s onwards, in a bipolar world
order, West African countries experimented with the two major world economic systems:
1 "Socialismization" is used in the context as an alternative to democratization. Socialismization
is the process towards establishing a variant of a socialist state
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Western capitalism and Eastern centrally controlled economic system. However, by the
early 1980s, most if not all the West African countries settled with some variant of
Western capitalism. One could argue that capitalism triumphed and became the
economic standard, because African nations eventually adopted the modernization
argument and by the late. 1980s many were well on their way in the modernization
paradigm, with the notion that modernization in the Western sense is the ticket out of
poverty into prosperity.
As a result of adopting the modernization theory, West African nations tried to
"play catch up" with the West while ironically ignoring the prerequisites of
modernization. Topping the prerequisite list is; A) lack of a significant industrialization
and economic base as most West Africa economies are generally driven by non-industrial
agriculture or a single cash crop that is eaimarked for export. B) West African countries
lacked a substantial working class; deficient in high skill labor, highly educated
■ workforce, and credit. It is also observed here that West African governments
overlooked the fragmented society and the real challenges citizens encounter daily as a
result of class structures, gender streamlining, multiple ethnic groups' struggles, rural-
urban problems, high illiteracy, work culture that promotes or even rewards patronizing
and embezzlement. C) West Africa lags behind developed countries, especially in the
west in the consolidation of democracy. The political systems prevalent in the sub-region
only maintained minimum.tolerance for political participation and dissent; opposition
leaders jailed, dissenters silenced with violence or "goodies," political parties banned,
opposition parties, membership criminalized, and elections rigged. Also, nation-building
122
efforts prove to be self-serving benefiting the political leader and cronies, and not
necessarily the general citizenry. Examples abound from building modern airports, to
monuments, and skyscrapers, and purchasing a fleet of shining vehicles for the state amid
slums and destituteness. Even though a city might look modern and prosperous (Abidjan,
Dakar, Lagos), citizens have very limited access to such facilities. Many African
presidents became blinded with their pet projects (white elephants to critics) and personal
gains while amassing personal wealth and building an inner circle that ensures the
"presidency for life." The case in point is that of the infamous Mobuto Sese Seko and his
large stock of wealth. In 2004, Charlotte Denny of the Guardian reported that Mobuto's
accumulated wealth earned him the position of the wealthiest in the world in the rank of
Suharto.and Marcos. According to the Guardian, these three leaders ripped-off their
countries in excess.of $50 billion dollars. Mobuto alone stealing over.half of the $12
billion aid money to Zaire, now Congo.2
'.. Third, and still serving as an economic solution is the implementation of austerity
measures as early as the latel970s. African states had to implement austerity measures in
compliance with the prescriptions of the World Bank, and the International Monetary
Fund. Such austerity measures needed to be put in place in order to qualify for much
needed financial aid from these Establishments. Even though in hindsight, there is
significant evidence that such austerity measures produced destructive results to West
2 Charlotte Denny, "Suharto, Marcos and Mobuto Head Corruption Table With $50bn Scams,"
Guardian, March 26, 2004, accessed 9/5/12,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/tnar/26/indonesia.philippines.
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Africa's economic health arid beyond. As agreed to by many observers, Jeffrey Herbst
wrote, "The structural adjustment programs currently proposed for Africa make the
political climate much riskier for leaders while weakening the central apparatus of the
state on which the rulers have long relied to stay in power."3 Despite the negative
repercussions, austerity measures were set in place regardless, because 1) for compliance
reasons and as a condition of debt; and 2) to bring their economies in line with the rest of
the global economy, in the 1970s, 1980s, and beyond. Also, considering West Africa's
peripheral position in the global scheme of things and its dependency on ex-colonial
masters, West African countries had no other attractive choices but to implement
austerity measures, ignoring, the fact that in the sub-region the public sector happens to be
the largest employer and subsidizer of education, public health, and other social services.
As a result, many critics argued that such austerity measures did little more than reinforce
political instability, therefore doing more harm than good.
Fourth, West African governments had to (and still do) deal with their peripheral
positions; therefore, torn apart on whom to serve: the core (ex-colonizers-developed
world) or the core-("the West African people"). In response, and with a heavy dose of
nationalism at times, various African leaders tried an array of solutions. Such solutions
ranged from nationalizing factories, mines and industries as in the case of Sekou Toure of
3 Jeffrey Herbst, "The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa," World Development 18, no. 7
(1990): 949, accessed September 5, 2012,
http://seafch.proquest.com/docview/229661845?accountid= 15017.
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Guinea (Conakry), to the promotion of "going back to the base"4 as advocated by
Amilcar Cabral of Guinea Bissau; to projects such as Kwame Nkrumah's Akosombo
Dam in Ghana (a white, elephant to critics). West African countries also implemented
impractical industrial and agricultural policies by blindly promoting an export monocrop
at the expense of other sustenance crops as in the case of cocoa in Ghana and Ivory
Coast. The industries that blossomed were inadequate for the reason that the production
cyclcwas not complete, and the equipment maintenance, repairs and spare parts were
. entirely imported; besides the fact that industry leaders are generally expatriates from the
West.
Presidents such as Senghor also tried to ameliorate Senegal's peripheral position
from a philosophical angle by promoting the idea of Negritude. Even though the
understanding of Negritude goes beyond simple definition, but for simplicity reasons we
will borrow Senghor's definition and define negritude as "Negro-African cultural
values."5 With Negritude heavily anchored in a brand of nationalism that recognizes the
uniqueness and the contribution of the African world, Senghor was able to harvest the
best of both worlds: remaining a true Frenchman, while simultaneously remaining
grounded in his "African-ness." Unlike many African leaders of his time of the stripe of
Sekou Toure who advocated Africa-centric nationalism, Senghor envisioned a political
arrangement where Senegal could be part of a greater French Republic, while still
4 Exploring an African way to self-sufficiericy as championed by Amilcar Cabral (1924-1973) of
Guinea Bissau
. 5 Jacque Louis Hyrnan, Leopold Sedar Senghor (Edinburg, Edinburg University Press, 1971), 23,
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maintaining its unique "African-ness." Senghor believed that Senegal could benefit
immensely from this "Unum inpluribus" (one in many) arrangement.
Also as a solution to dealing with its peripheral position, West African countries entered
into interregional pacts in order to promote inter-state cooperation, to promote trade, and
colleetive security amongst others. These pacts resulted in regional .co-operations such as
ECOWAS and the more recently ECOMOG, the sub-regional peacekeeping force.
Fifth, even though all of the West African states joined the Non-Align Movement
and tried to distance themselves from the travails of the Cold War, West African leaders
often found it necessary to align with either East or West, as seen beneficial to the leader
and not necessarily "the people" or the region. Like the other leaders in the African
continent, West African leaders "played off or tried to play off'the East against the West
for their own benefit. Examples span all cadre of African leaders from "the good"
Kwame Nkrumah, to "the bad" Mobuto Sese Sekou, to "the ugly" Jean-Bedel Bokassa of
Central African Republic.
; Sixth and arguably the most discussed are issues surrounding democracy and
democratization.as political instability solutions. One could argue that the majority of
West African leaders only became "genuinely" interested in democracy in the beginning
of the 1990s. Apparently, facade or pseudo-democracy, political instability exacerbated
by economic, environmental, and socio-cultural challenges characterized post-
independence West Africa prior to the 1990s. However, following the fall of the Berlin
Wall, arid the subsequent end of Marxism- Leninism (as we know it), democracy became
"the only game in town". West African leaders migrated to the democracy field in
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droves, but most observers agree, that democracy in West Africa serves nothing more than
a tool for legitimacy. A good number of leaders even the most oppressive in the pedigree
of Sgt. Samuel K. Doe of Liberia considered their administration a democracy. Even
. though the. 1990s ushered in a new era on democratization, considering the
democratization improvements of countries such as Ghana, Mali, and Senegal, such
observation does not suggest that democratic transition has been completed, nor that
democratic consolidation is in full swing.
With the challenges and solutions highlighted above serving as background, it is
evident that West African countries encountered and are still encountering a wide range
of challenges (political, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural)- endemic reality of
postrindependence West Africa). As discussed above, in response to such challenges,
West African governments have since experimented with many solutions to combat the
challenges.
Despite the instability that characterized the sub-region, one country stands out to
be relatively democratic even before independence and in earnest since the 1980. This
country has also enjoyed relative political stability since independence and even before;
this country is Senegal. Prior to investigating the uniqueness of Senegal in maintaining
political stability while avoiding coup d'etat and steadily marching towards
democratization, it is paramount to succinctly point out that Senegal shares simrlar
challenges and solutions with the rest of the sub region. These challenges and solutions
are delineated. !
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Senegal: Challenges and Solutions to Democracy and Political Stability
, . Like most West African countries, Senegal gained its independence in the 1960s,
on April 4, 1.960. Also, like the rest of West Africa, Senegal has its share of "stability
testing" challenges (political, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural). High on the
political challenges list is the alleged coup plot orchestrated by Prime Minister Mamadou
Dia in 1962, prompting one-party rule between 1962 and 1980. Apart from this abortive
coup plot, Senegal also experienced numerous relatively orderly street and peoples'
protests and marches. However, one could argue that the most menacing source of
political instability has its genesis in the secessionist aspirations of the Casamance region,
since the 1980s, Even though the Senegalese government is trying to solve this crisis
diplomatically, nonetheless, from time to time violence flares up to threaten not only,
Senegal but her neighbors The Gambia and Guinea Bissau.
In addition to political challenges, like the rest of the West Africa sub-region,
Senegal also faces economic challenges, including a devalued currency, high inflation, an
export monocrop (peanut/groundnut) with dwindling market value, high unemployment,
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), and austerity measures. Data from the CIA
World Factbook help paint the economic picture of Senegal: Even though inflation is
currently tamed at 0.8% (2013), in 2008 inflation was a record high of 5.8%. Senegal's
GDP ranked 120 out of 229 countries and territories; however it shows an impressive
growth rate of.4%. In 2013, Senegal posted a budget deficit estimated at 5.3 of GDP,
adding to the public debt of 38.4% of GDP. Unemployment in certain sectors of the
economy appears remarkably high, but sketchy at best, the latest rates found were in
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2007; a rate of 48% unemployment. Export commodities are generally agricultural
amounting to 2.691 billion in 2013 as compared to 5.733 billion in imports.6 These
figures paint a picture of a developing country making strides, but still faced with
. enormous challenges. These political and economic challenges are further complicated
by environmental challenges, including famine and desertification (mostly in the Matam
and Podor regions in northern Senegal), persistent drought, deforestation, overgrazing
and overharvesting of seafood products, and problems of drying and saline river basins.
With its diverse, ethnic groups speaking multiple languages, a young and
exploding population characterized by gender and children's issues; it is obvious that
Senegal also struggles with socio-cultural challenges. In Senegal, at least five major
groups coexist namely; the Wolof 43.3%, Pular 23.8%, Serer 14,7%, Diola 3.7%, and
Mandinka 3%.7 In addition to these major ethnic groups there are minor ethnic groups
such as the Balant, Manjack, and immigrant groups such as the Lebanese and the French
in naming a few. It is also worth mentioning an intra-ethnic group cleavage. Ethnic
groups such as the Wolof are further divided into subgroups with a regional flavor, such
as Baol, Saloum, and Lebu, each with more loyal to the clan rather than the larger ethnic
group in general.
6 "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 6/23/14, last modified June 20,
2014, https://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html.
7 "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 6/23/14, last modified June 20,
2014,.https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook;/geos/sg.html,
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. Data from Senegal's National Agency of Statistics and Demography (ANSD)
shows an exploding population with an annual growth of 2.48%.: Such population is
comprised of 49.93% mate at .6,428,:189and 50.17% female at 6,445,412, totaling to a
population of 12,873,601 (2013 projection), 2,956,023 of this population reside in the
(550km2) Dakar region, making Dakar over populated, with a population density of 65
people per square kilometer. Besides the Dakar region where the capital Dakar is
situated, there are thirteen other regions, giving Senegal its fourteen regions.8 2013
figures show the following: life expectancy averages 60.95 years, children per mother
stands at a staggering 4.52, and an infant mortality rate of 52.72/1000. Literacy rate for
women is lower at 38.7 (2009) as compared to men at 61.8,9
• :.. Considering the challenges and solutions as highlighted above, it is evident that
Senegal's challenges mirror the rest of the West African sub-region. However, since its
independence in 1960, Senegal is the only one of two West African countries that has
avoided the coup d'etat experience followed by military rule. ..It becomes evident that,
even though Senegal's challenges mirror the rest of West Africa, Senegal has managed to
maintain relative democracy and political stability since independence. Consequently,
despite similar challenges between Senegal and the rest of the West Africa sub-region,
the outcomes prove to be considerably different. Naturally, the question that needs to be
asked is: Is it by design, chance, or mere luck that since the 1960s, all West African
...... 8 "Senegal in Brief," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Dernographie (ANSD), accessed
June 23, 2014, http://www.ansd.sn.
.-.■..■•• 9 "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 6/23/14, last modified June 20,
2014 ■. https://www.cia.gov/'library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.htrnl
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nations- independent in the 1960s- experienced political instability in the form of coups
d'etat, except Senegal. .
With reference tothe above comparison of similar challenges but different
outcomes, the significance of the study hinges upon the greater discourse and scholarly
debates on democracy, democratization and political stability. Nonetheless, the focus of
the study is the discourse and debates about democratization and political stability as
related to Senegal specifically, while keeping in mind the West African region in general.
The literature review shows that the current literature and scholarly debates extensively
deal with democratization and political stability in general. However, there seem to be a
gap in the discourse and debate when it comes to democratization and political stability in
the West-African sub-region, and Senegal in particular. Therefore, studying Senegal as a
model country, relatively democratizing and politically stable, in an unstable sub-region
tends to help fill this void.
. • By studying Senegal's model of democracy, and her strategy in sustaining
political stability, one might discover the relationship between the "Senegal model" and
political stability. With this discovery a model of democracy that fosters political
stability in an unstable sub-region helps enhance our understanding of democratization
and political stability in this unstable part of the world. Consequently, discovering the
bedrock of the Democarassie model and its relationship to political stability in Senegal
can help identify a preferred model of democratization that "works" and "fit" Senegal
and perhaps West Africa more practically. With the Senegalese version of the
democracy model grounded in liberal democracy one could argue that like most foreign
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ideas that "work" and are comfortably adopted in Africa, the Democarassie model shares
the common denominator. Such idea(s), including the Democarassie model, are
incorporated, adapted, tailor-made, customized and married to Africa's realities and
societal values; flexible enough to incorporate the "old and the new", Examples of such
amalgams of foreign and indigenous African ideas abound and are manifested in religion,
attire, language, medicine, music, mores, attitudes, even food; and democracy is no
exception.
As captured above, Senegal and the rest of the West-Africa region share similar
challenges (political, economic, environmental, and socio-cultural). In response to such
challenges, similar solutions were implemented; however, it seems as though the
outcomes are dissimilar:. While many of the sub-region's countries became increasing
undemocratic and politically unstable during one time or the other, Senegal seems to
remain relatively on the road of democratization and stability, especially political
stability. Such a perplexing situation leads to the possible conclusion that Senegal's
model of democracy fits Senegal well, and perhaps the model is more country-centric;
one that reflects realities in Senegal. Senegal is showcased because of her model of
democracy (the Democarassie model) and her enviable record of political stability, which
she has enjoyed since independence. This is a major achievement in a region plagued
with instability and lack of democracy.
As already noted, and reiterated here, West Africa is plagued with political
instability exacerbated by economic, environmental, and socio-economic challenges.
Generally speaking, liberal democracy supports democratization that in turn reinforces
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political stability in the West; however, this is not totally true for West Africa.
Considering the fact that the liberal democracy model that has generally been
haphazardly adopted by West African countries for over half century and in earnest for
quarter century, it can be argued that the liberal democracy model that is yet to totally
consolidate in West Africa generally failed to foster political stability.
The State of Political Stability, Democratization, and Democracy in West Africa
As already indicated/it seems, thus far, despite close to a quarter century of
experience with the liberal democratic model, democracy is yet to fully consolidate,
prevent coups, and generally foster political stability in the West Africa sub-region;
Furthermore, the literature reveals an paradoxical nature of the current state of democracy
in West Africa. It seems electoral democracy is on the rise; however, meaningful
democracy is in retreat It is also evident that West African countries, such as Ghana,
managed to turn their politicalsiluation around from coup-prone military dictatorships to
emerging, even model democracies. However, then majority of the West African
countries have taken the opposite.route; from relatively democratic designations to the
Freedom House Designation: "Partly Free" or "Not Free." Two very striking examples
are two neighbors; Senegal under the leadership of President Wade (from free to partly
, free) and back to Free under Sail in 2013,10 and the Gambia under the leadership of
Jammeh (from partly free in 2011 to not free in 2012).11
: ""'Freedom in the World: The Gambia," Freedom House, accessed June 4, 2014
http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/senegaltf.U7a2-JRdW3l.
11 "Freedom in the World: Senegal," Freedom House, accessed June 4, 2014,
http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/gambiatf.U7al8JRdW3I.
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As a result, one realizes that the liberal democratic model is anything, but a "one
size fits all" model. Prompting the question, why do Western nations, particularly the
U.S., place the promotion of the liberal democratic model at top of their foreign policy
agenda, especially toward developing countries and emerging economies, including West
Africa? Such liberal democracy-laden foreign policy is promoted regardless of the vast
cultural, political, socioeconomic, even.religious diversity between the West and West
Africa. Western nations, the United States in particular, still push for the adoption of
liberal democracy as a prerequisite for diplomatic relation and as a condition of aid. But,
the question remains, does the Western liberal democracy model fit West Africa? With
reference to the lack ofconsolidation despite over a quarter century of experience,
coupling with the prevalence of political instability in West Africa; evidently the model
falls short. The follow-up question then becomes, is the time ripe for revisiting the liberal
democracy as a model for West Africa? Should the discussion include idea of
redesigning, refitting or even replacing the liberal democratic model with a democratic
model that reflects West Africa's realities? Perhaps the time is ripe for the exploration of
an offshoot of liberal democracy that fits nations individually or regions collectively, but
must reflect "realities on the ground." As already alluded to, the liberal democracy model
in its current form generally falls short of arresting coups and promoting political stability
because it does not reflect West Africa's realities. These observations highlighting the
deficiencies of the liberal democratic model in the case of West Africa leads us to the
discussion of political stability and democracy in Senegal.
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Plausible Explanations to Political Stability in Senegal as a Democracy
One might wonder, why the Democarassie model? More precisely, what is the
reasoning behind the study'sposition that the Democarassie model explains political
stability in Senegal, when there are other explanations to political stability in a
democracy, and Senegal is a democracy? The other explanations include, but are not
limited to the following:
Social
Open, tolerant, classless, egalitarian
Economic
Economically Developed/Matured
Acceptable access to resources
Opportunity and upward mobility








-'..' Economic, social, academic, political and government explanations are
all capable of explaining political stability, or can all be drivers of political stability;
however, "the devil is in the details." Neither single-handedly nor collectively, are
these explanations incapable of fully explaining political stability in Senegal. A
second look of Senegal reveals inefficiency in ail these explanations, however
Senegal is still politically stable. Therefore the explanation for political stability in
Senegal lies elsewhere. Take the economic explanation first. In developed stable
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democracies, the economic system is usually fully developed and mature with built-
in mechanism to access the majority of citizens. There are also opportunities for
upward mobility and acceptable standard of living, this is not quite true with
Senegal. In developed stable democracies, society is relatively open, tolerant,
classless, and egalitarian; this is not quite true in Senegal. In developed stable
democracies, education is advanced and readily accessible, this is not quite true in
Senegal. In developed, stable democracies politics is matured and relatively
transparent; Senegal has issues in this area. In developed stable democracies
government is accountable and responsible, and strives to be fair and impartial;
Senegal also has issues in these areas. By now a pattern has formed. This pattern
confirms the fact that even though Senegal lacks in all these explanations, it still
manages to remain relatively stable. Again, the explanation of political stability
resides elsewhere, and it is this study's position that the explanation for political
stability in Senegal is with the; Democarassie model. The study now gives a closer
look at the Democarassie model, after looking into the state of political stability and
democracy in Senegal.
The State of Political Stability, Democratization, and Democracy in Senegal
It is an illusion to believe that just because one refers to Senegal as politically
stable, Senegal does not experience any unstable under-currents, or threats to stability. As
highlighted by .Defence.Web, even though considered stable, Senegal is faced with
threats to. stability including, "A growing youth population, limited employment
prospects, increased urbanization, weak private sector investment, and the gradual
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erosion of good governance and transparency."12 However, in examining the state of
political stability, and underscoring political stability in Senegal, the data presented from
various reliable sources proves to be very instrumental. The study examines and
implements data from The Robert S. Strauss Center's Social Conflict in Africa Database
(SCAD)r Center for Systemic Peace's State Fragility Index (SFI), and Country Watch's
Political Stability Index (PSI), amongst others.
.The Robert S. Strauss Center's Social Conflict in Africa (SCAD) proves to be
one of the most comprehensive and complete databases on the sources of conflict:, a
precursor of instability, The beauty of this database is the versatility that allows
individual country searches arid the conflict type the country experiences. A country
search reveals the following sources of instability Senegal experienced. As per the SCAD
database between August 1, 1990 (Event 4330001) and October 22, 2012 (Event
4330167), 167 instability events were cataloged.13 The database put the instability events
in context by breaking the events down to types (event types) as follows:
1. Violence
a. Pro-Government Violence
b. Extra Government Violence
c. Anti-Government Violence
d. Intra-Government Violence
2. Strikes (General and Limited)
3. Riots (Spontaneous)
4. Demonstration (Spontaneous and Organized)
5. Insurgency and Civil War
12 "Senegal Armed Forces," Defence Web, accessed June 2, 20 ] 4,
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com contentandview=artieleandid=32272:senegalese-
armed-forcesandcatid= 119:african-militariesandltemid=255.
13 "Social Conflict in Africa Database SCAD " Robert S. Strauss Center, accessed May 27, 2014,
https://www.strausscentef.org/countrv-search.html?countrycode^433.
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From the SCAD data one observes that just like many advance democracies,
Senegal is generally challenged with "low intensity" conflict. The most challenging
conflict in the last two decades, since the early 1990s, is secessionist insurgency
challenge imposed by Casarnance secessionist movement. Some observers, including the
Center for Systemic Peace refer to this conflict as an ethnic warfare/conflict. Perhaps
rightly so because the insurgents mainly share Diola ethnicity, the ethnic majority in the
Casamance region of Southern Senegal. Besides insurgency as a source of conflict, other
sources of instability are generally expected in a democracy. As SCAD indicated, these
other sources of conflict include violence (pro/anti-government), strikes (general and
limited), and demonstrations (spontaneous/organized). The SCAD data helps make the
case that Senegal is'relatively stable, because the conflicts that challenge Senegal are
generally within the parameters of a democracy; as a matter of fact, an advanced
democracy, where people have to right to assemble and petition their government. This
will be discussed further later in the case study.
To put Senegal's fragility score in context to its West African neighbors, Table
5,1 is constructed. With a fragility rating of 9 (only second to Cape Verde's as indicated
in Table 5,1), Senegal is considered stable as compared to the other West African
countries in.the data set. The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) measures conflict,
governance and state fragility and presents the results in what they call, the Global
Report- Even though the 2014 Global Report is compiled, according to the CSP website,
the release is delayed at this point in May 2014. Therefore, the latest data available to the
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public at this time is the 2011 data. A. score of 9 for Senegal represents moderate fragility
since moderate fragility falls between a score between 8 and 11.





































Source: Table 1 State Fragility Index Matrix 2010.
Center for Systemic Peace- Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance and State Fragility
http://www.svstemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011 .pdf
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Besides the unsuccessful 1962 coup, Figure 5.1 also presents Senegal as
politically stable. It is especially important to note the longevity of a period of stability
from the mid-1960s.to the early 2000s. As depicted in Figure 5.1, since the early 1990s,
the only main challenge to stability is the Casamance ethnic warfare.







Armed Xocigial OoMflirt Un
T>-pt> of Armed Ctutfiirc:
Periods of stability (blue) and instability (red) are denoted by vertical dotted-sines
Source. Center for Systemic Peace. hUp://www.systetnicpeace.org/afTica/Flsen.htm
Figure 5.1: Political Stability in Senegal 1960-2004 (Center for Systemic Peace)
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Evidently, Senegal was political stable even during the Senghor years when
Senegal was,a one party state, and also during the 1980s when Senegal was more or less
considered an anocracy.
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi's publication of the Worldwide Governance
Indicator (WGI) on behalf of the World Bank proves to be very instrumental in not only
capturing stability in Senegal, but also other variables of governance in Senegal and more
than two hundred countries. The WGI dataset allows a researcher to place Senegal in
comparison to any country or region on all the indicators of governance. The six
governance indicators identified in the WGI includes: 1) Voice and Accountability, 2)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, 3) Government Effectiveness, 4)
Regulatory Quality, 5) Rule of Law and 6) Corruption Control. Even though all the WGI
are important, respectable governance indicators, the concern of this study is "Political
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism" indicator. Such precipitates the necessity
to unpack this indicator and further explore Senegal vis-a-vis the rest of West Africa as
captured in Table 5.2. According to the WGI, on the Political Stability indicator, Senegal
falls in the top five in the sub-region. More importantly, while the other countries in this
category are slipping between 2002 and 2012, only Senegal and Ghana increase their
stability rating. As indicated in Table 5.2, Senegal increased from its political stability
rating from 34.62% in 2002 to 41.23% in 2012. Also evident is that with a rating of
41.23% as compared to Cape Verde's impressive, 72.04%, Senegal still has some
catching up to do.
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The higher the number, the more stable the country
The up and down arrow indicates progression or regression in the ten year period.
Compiled by author. Source: Data from Worldwide Governance Indicator;
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspxtfreports
Daniel Kaufmann, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo, The Worldwide Governance Indicators:
Methodology and Analytical Issues (September 2010). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.
5430. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1682130
142
Democratization and Democracy in Senegal
Senegal partisans would like Senegal be referred to as a democracy, actually a
model democracy in the West African sub-region, and many observers have referred to
Senegal as a democracy, especially following the presidential election of 2000. On the
same token, Senegal's political system has been associated with many other names other
than a democracy. Even though; many, observers, news media outlets, think tanks, in
naming a few, all designate Senegal as a democracy, this has not always been the case.
' As captured in Table 5.3, the Africa Election Data helps to illuminate the political
situation in Senegal from independence in 1960. As Table 5.3 indicates, Senegal became
a democracy after 2000 (this is still debatable). Over the years, Senegal is referred to as
. an emerging democracy, a flawed democracy, an anocracy; but since 2,000, Senegal
finally, earned the democracy designation in general terms or at least in the "thin" of the
concept, an electoral democracy
However, between 1960 and 1980, Senegal transitioned.back and forth from an
. . emerging to a restricted, to a one party state, back to a restricted, then back to an
emerging democracy. This back and forth progression is better understood when one
follows facts surrounding presidential elections and elections outcomes during this time.
Table 5.4 reveals that with the elections of 1963, 1968, and 1973, President Senghor was
unopposed. The reason behind the lack of opposition, is following the 1962 abortive
coup, Senghor was able to consolidate power and suppress dissent. By the elections of
1978, a very weak opposition candidate emerged, however was no match to Senghor as
indicated in. the 1978 election results: Senghor was able to garner 63.1% of the votes as
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compared to Abdullah Wade's 17.8%. This trend will continue into the subsequent
elections of 1983, 1988, and 1993. These three elections were contested between
Senghor's handpicked successor. Abdoii Diouf and the main opposition candidate Wade,
and other less significant candidates. The tide will turn for the first time, and power will
change hands from an incumbent president to the opposition with the election of 2000.
The 2000 election is especially significant because it was touted around the world as a
truly free, fair and democracy, giving the Senegal the designation; a democracy amongst
other things.
One can argue that democracy is analogous to 'free' in the Freedom House's
freedom in the World designation. The Freedom House data in Table 5.5, helps make the
: case that Senegal is a democracy since mainly democracies are designated "free." In the
almost eleven years between 2003 and 2013, Senegal is designated "free". It is
affirmative that Senegal experienced challenges between 2009 and 2012 ("partly free"),
but after the peaceful transition of power, as a result of the 2012 election, Senegal was
able to recaptured the. "free" designation in 2013 with a current Freedom Score of 2.5
("free").
Now that the case is made that Senegal is both relatively politically stable and
democratic to a tolerable extent, the focus now turns to nuances of democracy and the
workings .of political stability in Senegal: More precisely, the examination of the
Democarassie model and its implications on political stability in Senegal.
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Source: African Election database http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.htrnl



























































































Source: African Election Database http://africanelections.tripod.com/sn.html
Legend:
*Percentage of valid votes.
Elections Years in blue depicts the democratically significant elections.
R2= Round Two Runoff Election.
+# following "main opposition leader" depicts number other serious opposition candidates.
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Source: Freedom House-Freedom in the World
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/senegal
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The Democarassie Model: Democracy the Senegalese Way
A powerful revelation stemming from the literature review is that despite a
quarter century of experience, democracy is by and large yet to consolidated in this sub-
region, except for few bright spots; Ghana, Senegal, and Cape Verde, amongst others. As
a result, what is suggested here is that there is a good chance that those countries
including Senegal discovered their own version of the liberal democratic model that
addresses their realities better, With this in mind, arguably, Senegal is fortunate enough
to discover a unique offshoot of liberal democracy that works well for Senegal. This
model is already introduced as the Democarassie model.
The Democarassie model is a model of democracy that resonates with Lijphart's
consociation model of democracy, where power is shared and/or brokered through
establishment heads and their networks. Such thinking is hardly new because lijphart's
endorsement of consensus for Africa is an endorsement of the Lewis Model as a model of
democracy for Africa, given the pluralistic nature and deep cleaves that characterizes
African societies including West Africa. Such deep cleavages range from tribal, to
religious, to linguistic, to cultural, to economic and regional cleavages. Concurring with
Lewis that majoritarian democracies only serve the majority, arid also concurring with
Lewis that "all who are affected by a decision should have a chance to participate in
making the decision either directly or through chosen representative,"14 not only the
Arend Lijphart, Patterns ofDemocracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six
Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 31.
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majority, Lijphart posits that as far as the Lewis Model is concerned, the consensus
model serve pluralist societies such as African societies better. Pluralist societies tend to
operate within the parameters of consensus building and coalition governments.
Consensus building and coalitions are what the Democarassie model offers: A model of
democracy.for a pluralist society where government is limited by a constitution, where
: rule of law is adhered to, where civil rights and liberties are protected, and where political
participation is high; however, the state and society alike, highly considers and pays close
attention to the "establishments" and "customary authority." Such is indicative of
corporatism. In other words, Senegal's Democarassie model could also be understood
from a corporatism theory standpoint.
Before.looking into corporatism in the context of Senegal, it is prudent to start
with a reflection and a definition of corporatism as used in the context of this study. In
the consideration of corporatism, the study draws from the contributions of Phillippe
Sehmitter and Howard J. Wiarda. Schmitter considers corporatism as, "A system of
interest and/or attitude representation, a particular modal or idea-typical institutional
arrangement for linking the associationally organized interest of civil society with
decisional structures of the state."15 In a similar vein highlighting the organized natural
interests in society and their relationship to the state, Wiarda posits that corporatism
exists where:
: 1) Society is organized in whole or in part, not on an
individualistic level, but in terms of functional, societal, or
13 Phillippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" The Review of Politics, Vol. 36, No.
1 (January 1974): 85-131, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1406080.
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"corporate" units (family, clan, region, ethnic group, military
organization, religious bodies, labor or business groups, interest
groups etc.) that make up the nation. 2) The state seeks to
structure, limit, organize, or license these groups as a way of
controlling them-limited pluralism. 3) The state tries to incorporate
these groups into the state system, converting them into what are
often called "private-sector governments"; while the groups
themselves seek both to take advantage in terms ofprograms and
benefits for their members from such incorporation, and at the
same time preserving some, usually contractually defined (as in a
constitution or basic law) autonomy or independence from the
state.16
Wiarda's postulation above is in line with the literature; corporatism could be
viewed as the "third way," a middle-of the-road system between Liberal Pluralism and
Marxist-Leninist systems. Liberal Pluralism (in its purest form) interest groups are the
harbinger ofpower and the state only assumes the role of an umpire, ombudsman, arbiter
etc. Marxism (especially in its Leninist form), the all-powerful state, is in control
(sometimes total control); interest groups and the proletariats play an insignificant
subordinate role: With these two systems forming the two extreme poles of the spectrum,
Corporatism (where the state is relevant and effective, but interest groups are equally
relevant and effective), fits neatly in the middle of the spectrum.
Considering the function of establishments and the role of customary authorities
in Senegal and the various constituencies and interests they serve, all in the context of the
Democarassie model, exchanges based on corporatism is a major underpinning of the
model. As already mentioned, in this study three establishments/interest groups/
"corporate" entities are identified: the political, citizen and society (religious
16 Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great Ism , (Armonk,
New York. M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 1997), 9.
149
sociocultural), and economic), and the military. The functions and the roles of these three
establishments/interest groups/ "corporate" entities all headed by customary authorities
unfolds in the rest of the chapter, subsequent to the discussion of the Values and elements
of the Democarassie model that follows.
The Values
In addition to effective constitutional limits on government, the guarantees of civil
liberties, political rights, and rule of law, the Democarassie model offer the following
values. Even though these values were presented in chapter three; in the interest of
fleshing out the values of the Democarassie model, it is found prudent for the case study
to revisit these values.
.: Even though the Democarassie model is grounded in the liberal democratic
model, what make it unique to Senegal is that the Democarassie model not only
considers, but accommodates, society's unique realities; the reality of cleavages,
establishments, and customary authority. As a result of this accommodating characteristic
of model, the Democarassie model addresses Senegal's unique realities; therefore
arguably fitting Senegal better, when compared to the Western liberal democratic model.
In addition to the accommodating characteristic of the model, the Democarassie model
also utilizes religion, culture, language, heritage, nationalistic sentiments, patronage, and
age/gender roles as "unifying glue." The model is well aware of the cleavages within the
Senegalese society; therefore it counters the negative effect of divergent cleavage, with
the "unifying glue" to converge the cleavage. The "accommodating characteristics" and
the "unifying glue" are seen as the strengths of the Democarassie model over the liberal
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democratic model. These "strengths" of the model help uphold political stability in
Senegal. The strength of the model is better, understood when one understand the values,
element, and the institutions (establishments and customary authority), and how all these
components work together to uphold political stability in Senegal. One starts with
examining the values of the Democarassie model as follows:
"Kinder and gentler"
Sensitive to local realities
Accommodating to religious and socio-cultural exchanges
Adaptive to existing systems (political, economic, cultural etc.)
High degree of freedom and liberty
High level of political participation
High degree of tolerance (religious, ideological, and associational)
High level of inclusion and acceptance
Convergent cleavages
The Elements ' . ; ■ ,
. : Within the backdrop of the above highlighted values, the elements of the
Democarassie model presented in chapter three are also revisited because of their
. importance in the case study. The elements of the Democarassie model follows:
1. Political freedoms and Civil liberties .. ■ ■ .
2. Religious and Ethnic Freedom
3. Political Participation and Elections (frequent and relatively free and fair)
4. Rule of Law and Functioning of Government
5. Due Process
6. Pluralism and Collective bargaining
As mentioned in chapter three, the elements of the Democarassie model are quite
similar to the elements of the liberal'democracy model. This is expected because the
former is grounded in the latter. Consequently, it is evident that the elements of the
liberal democratic model are present in the Democarassie model, because if nothing else
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Senegal is generally considered a democracy.17 The question then become, what is
Senegal's track .record on these elements of the Democarassie model? How deeply
entrenched are these element? What is the degree of adherence? How meaningful are the
elements in political, socio-cultural and economic exchanges7 The significance of these
values and elements manifest in the operations of the establishments and customary
. authorities. This becomes clearer in the discussion that follows.
The Institutions: The Democarassie Model-Decentralized Despotism, and the
Role of Establishments and Customary Authority and its Implications on
Political Stability in Senegal
In this study "establishments" are analogous to institutions, and within the
Democarassie model, three major establishment/institutions are identified:
1) Political Establishment: Political and Government System
2) Citizen and Society Establishment-Religious, Socio-cultural, and Economic
3) Military Establishment: The Armed Forces
. One cannot fully understand the Democarassie model concept without
understanding institutions referred to in this study as establishments and customary
authorities. Especially important is the role of customary authorities in political,
religious, socio-cultural, and economic, security exchanges and their function in
upholding of political stability allowing the perpetuation of the political system.
Through decentralized despotism theory lenses, the case study turns its analysis to
the role of establishments and customary authority in strengthening political stability
through the Democarassie model. As already alluded to, by keeping 'the people,'
■ - l7 Different observers refer to Senegal's democracy as an emerging, flawed, pseudo democracy,
and anocracy, in naming a few.
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happy and satisfied, or at least minimally contented or vested, or at least, committed,
customary authorities/establishment head's share the vested interest of keeping the
center (political system) intact, thus protecting the president and the regime. Among
.other roles, these customary authorities serve as power brokers in maintaining the
status quo.
Together the establishments and its customary authorities could be viewed to as
guardians of "the system." At the helm and throughout the ranks in the various
establishments, are establishment heads armed with significant soft power, connections,
and far-reaching influence. As mentioned in the theoretical framework chapter (chapter
3), these establishment heads are seen in the image of Mahmoud Mamdani's customary
authorities/decentralized.despots or C. W. Mills's power elites, or simply seen as power
brokers and middlemen between the political system and the people. Hence,
interchangeably this study refers to these establishment heads as customary authorities, or
decentralized despots. The establishment heads are also viewed as power elites and
power brokers. These customary authorities could also be visualized in the functionality
of "circuit breakers", "pressure valves" or "pressure conduits." As mentioned above,
customary authorities could be viewed as power elites; however, in the case of Senegal
the elite class (customary authority) is considered more as a non-despotic "guardian" of
the nation, than a ruling class. Either by heritage, appointment, or connection to the
regime, these elites happen to. occupy the helm of what is referred to in this study as
"establishments."
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One could argue that the. power elite concept is hardly a new concept, Even in
liberal democratic Western countries, elites (a ruling class, upper class, corporations and
industry) wield significant political influence. However, with the Democarassie model
customary authority influence seems to be welcomed. Customary authorities' influence
tends to bear heavily on citizen's political decision, nevertheless, unlike the power elites
in advanced Western liberal democracies, these customary authorities are not only
accepted as the civil praetorian guardians of society, but placed on a pedestal; highly
revered and respected, arguably to the point of worship. A good example is the marabou
(religious leaders)/7a//6 (flock) relationship. Ironically, customary authority influence is
not considered coercive, or seen as a threat, but recognized, respected, expected,
accepted, welcomed, even worshipped, and revered as divine authority. Such positive
attitude towards the: establishments and customary authority is deeply woven in the fabric
of Senegalese political, religious, economic, and socio-cultural exchanges.
Furthermore, even though the Democarassie model extends popular sovereignty, unlike
the liberal democratic, model and the guarantees of "direct and total popular sovereignty,"
popular sovereignty, under the Democarassie model is significantly vulnerable to
customary authorities' influence. Considering the great influence of customary
authorities, one observes a model that only allows "indirect and partial popular
sovereignty" instead. It is not an exaggeration to posit that because ofthe depth of their
influence, these customary authorities have the capacity to dictate and/or direct when it
comes to the people's sovereignty; thus the indirect and partial popular sovereignty
mentioned above. The dictating and/or directing could be as simple as the Grande
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Marabout's endorsement of a candidate. The endorsement amounts to an edict (ndigeul)
dictating that the followers vote for a certain candidate, or politically behave in a certain
way. An edict can be as direct as blatantly asking followers to say, break up a riot, vote
far.or against a particular candidate, support or oppose a piece of legislation,
In terms of the Democarassie model and the maintenance of political stability,
even though establishments' customary authorities divide the nation into cleavages and
constituents all bringing demands to hear on the political, religious, socio-cultural and
economic system, it is in .their common interest to operate as convergent cleavages. In
the process, the customary authorities arguably assume the role of king maker. Common
and shared interest in upholding the status quo (most of the time) dictates that customary
. authorities work together, and not against each other; a huge advantage in maintaining
political .stability in Senegal. This partially explains why all cleavages realize the
necessity of cooperation: to .keep the overall political system, the status quo, the regime
intact. Obviously, various establishments and customary authorities serving different
constituents and interests, reveal cleavages within the Senegalese society. However, it is
also evident that such cleavages are not as deep, and most importantly, such a cleavage
tend to be convergent, and not divergent. Such convergent nature of cleavages is
especially important in maintaining political stability in Senegal.
II; is. apparent that all customary authorities (political, religious, socio-cultural,
' economic, society, and military) enjoy considerable respect, acceptance, and are seen as
guardians of the nation. In return these customary authorities reciprocate by attending to
the heeds of the people, This two-way relationship proves to be an enduring and sacred
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relationship where both leaders and the led assume and play important roles: The people
seek guidance and defer to authority as necessary, especially at the time of national crisis,
and the leaders offer great services and deliver to the common people. These services
include advice and guidance (including political advice) as in the case of religious
leaders; jobs and access to resources, as in the case of political and economic leaders; .
moral and material support, as in the case of heads of communities and households.
As mentioned earlier, the Democarassie model and the role of customary
authorities are viewed through a "power elite" or "decentralized despotism" lens. One
could score points in arguing that this model is nothing more than a model of patronage, a
patron-client system. Nonetheless, because of its uniqueness and responsiveness to
societal realities, the Democarassie. model is able to achieve for Senegal what the liberal
democratic model fails to achieve for the sub-region. As it becomes clearer later in the
case study, the establishments and customary authority form the bedrock of political
stability and occupies a special place within the Democarassie model.
The three major establishmentsveach headed by customary authorities are briefly
introduced here. First, the political establishment: The political establishment
incorporates the entire political and government apparatus all headed by strategic
customary authorities within the ranks. Within the political system customary authorities
are present in all branches of government including the executive, legislative and the
judiciary. In the government apparatus, customary authorities are present in all ministries
and in all tiers of the government apparatus from the central government in Dakar to the
14 Regions, 45 Departements 110 Communes, 103 Arrondissements, and 320
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Communautes Ruraux.l& This arrangement forms the decentralized political apparatus the
Democarassie model thrives in.
Second, the Citizen and Society Establishment-Religious, Socio-cultural, and
Economic establishment: Considering the far reaching influence of the religious
establishment, it is.prudent to start with the religious aspect of this establishment,
with a focus on the various Muslim brotherhoods. The study focuses on the four
major Muslim brotherhoods; the Mouride, the Tidjaniyya, the Layenne, and the
Qadriyya. Even though Senegal is 94% Muslim, the religious establishment
includes the head of the Catholic Church. The head of the Catholic Church, who is
the Cardinal of the Dakar Archdiocese and the bishops under him, are also seen as
religious customary.authorities, even though there are only about 300,000 Catholics
in a country with a population in excess of thirteen million. Arguably the religious
establishment (the Muslim Brotherhoods and the Catholic Church) is the most
influential, when-it comes to brokering public support and lending legitimacy to the
system. The religious customary authorities amongst other functions lend support,
guidance, legitimacy, advice and most importantly votes for the president and the
party in power. In return the president and the administration reciprocates by making
resources available, allowing autonomy, and extending privileges, material, and
other benefits. The case study will go into greater detail to showcase the symbiotic
relationship between the president and his party at the center of the customary
1 "Senegal in Brief." Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie (ANSD).
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authorities. In effect, the customary authorities operate in concert to buttress the
president and his administration and in return receive the spoils that they further
distribute to their clients^ This exchange, in and by itself, helps keep the regime in
place and further cement stability.
The socio-cultural aspect of this establishment includes all classes and social
. cleavage with Senegalese society, including city, regional, and local, the body politic
outside government, interest groups, political parties, household heads, and so on.
The economic aspect of establishment includes all specially connected and
privileged business and industry leaders who also find it imperative to work with,
and lend their support to the president, his administration and the political system in
general.. In return the president and the system reciprocate by doling out resources,
access, privileges, benefits, in naming a few incentives. Within this arrangement, the
economic establishment's customary authorities work tirelessly to keep the president
and the system in place. ~
Third, the Military Establishment: The customary authorities here are the top
brass that occupy key leadership positions in the armed forces establishment. Again
the president and the system have considerable influence on who occupies these top
military positions. These handpicked military leaders in turn play their part in
keeping the president and the system in place and the perpetuation of the regime by
keeping the military out of politics and political intervention.
From the discussion above, the role of customary authorities in upholding
political stability is becoming apparent and those at the helm of every establishment are
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recognized and revered customary authorities at every level. It goes without saying that it
is imperative for the power elite class and ail the decentralized despot/customary
authorities to function in concert to maintain the center, because they all have a vested
interest in the perpetuation of the regime. Such an arrangement precipitates the inquiry,
whether democracy in Senegal draws strength from the demos or the establishment
heads-customary authorities/decentralized despots/power elite. If that is the case, this
model of democracy seems to be flawed. Flawed or not, the study argues that this model
has helped keep Senegal politically stable for over half a century, even though it seems
flawed. Following this general discussion on the establishments and customary authority,
it is found prudent to more intimately explore each establishment headed by customary
authorities, starting with the political establishment.
Political Establishment: Political System, Government Apparatus (National,
Regional, Local), Political Party Machine, and the Body Politic
■.. • . The political establishment includes the political system, the government
apparatus, political parties, the party machine and the body politic. The political system
includes the three branches of government (presidency, the cabinet, parliament and
ministers, and the judiciary); the government apparatus includes the national, regional
and local government units;.political parties, the party machine, body politic and the
grassroots include all those directly or indirectly functioning and primarily involved in
the political process.
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Politically, Senegal operates as a semi-presidential system grounded in the French
Fifth Republic of 1958.19 In a semi-presidential system, a popularly elected president co-
leads with a legislature empowered Prime Minister and a cabinet. The institutions of
government in the Senegalese semi-presidential system are the typical three branches: the
President of the Republic; the National Assembly (parliament); and the Judiciary. Since,
it is a semi-presidential system, a fourth branch is the government with the Prime
Minister and the head. This Prime Minister is also the head of all ministers. Currently,
(June, 2014) Prime Minister, Ms. Aminata Toure, heads thirty two ministries each headed
by a minister. In addition to these branches is the Economic Social and the
Environmental Council. This council, was created by Law No. 2012-Septemberl6,
2012.20 .
. . The above particulars confirm that with the Senegalese semi-presidential system
there is definitely separation of power, and relative checks and balances. However, the
question is how genuine is separation of power and checks and balances? A second
glance raises concerns on both. Especially notable are issues with checks and balances
considering the president's power and influence in hiring and firing from the Prime
Minister to members of the other branches of government. The study draws attention to
this overwhelming presidential power. The power the president wields allows him
: . '9 "Constitutional History of Senegal" Constitutionnet, last modified July 11, 2013, accessed July
3, 2014, http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-Senegal.
20 "Institutions" Gouvernemenl Du Senegal, last modified January 7, 2013, accessed July 3, 2014.
http://www.gouv.sn/-Le-Gouvernement-.hlml.
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considerable advantage over the members other branches, that are supposed to be
separate and capable of countering presidential power with their checks and balances. As
a result, the weight of the president's power can easily make members of the other
branches recapitulate, or compel them to support or even rubber stamp the president or
risk losing their positions. Consequently, an important point to be made here is, even
though the Democarassie model help uphold political stability, this overwhelming
presidential power is one of its shortcomings. The study now turns to the 2001
Constitution of Senegal (latest) to map out presidential power and influence in the hiring
and firing of members other branches of government.
Title III, Article 49 of the current Senegalese Constitution reads, "The President of
the Republic appoints the Prime Minister and terminates his21 function .. .On the proposal
of the Prime Minister, the President of the republic appoints the Ministers, establishes
their and terminate their functions,"22 Title III, Article 51 empowers the President to
submit a bill of law to referendum, with a mere opinion from the President of the
National Assembly and the Senate. Title III, Article 52 allows the president additional
"exceptional" powers in times of crises,23 Articles 49, 51, and 52 captured above partially
explain why Senegal has strong presidents. Because of their constitutional power,
especially the power and influence in hiring and firing, a president can easily eclipse the
21 The current Prime Minister in August, 2014 is female, therefore her function
22 "Constitution of the Republic of Senegal," World Constitution Illustrated, ed. and Trans. Jefri J.
Ruchti, accessed July 3, 2014, http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/UNPAN048952.pdf.
23 World Constitution illustrated, "Constitution of the Republic of Senegal."
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members of the other branches. Unlike the United States presidential system, or even the
English parliamentary, system, the President of the Senegalese Republic can directly
influence the decision of who is part of the political and government apparatus from the
Prime Minister, to the ministers, to the parliament, the Economic and Environmental
Council, and even the Judiciary. Take the President's influence on the National
. Assembly's composition for example, with the 100 members, 65 members are chosen by
the president and the overwhelming majority of the 35 other members are from the
president's party. The justices of the highest court are also named by the president. The
president also names the governors of all the 14 administrative regions24. These
leadership positions are occupied by what the study refers to the customary authorities.
Therefore, if these customary authorities are rewarded with the positions they serve in,
and serve at trie pleasure of the president, and could fall out. of favor if the president so
decided, these customary authorities to not have much of a choice but to work tireless to
gain the accolades of the president and work even harder to keep the president and the
status quo in place. Their survival is directly dependent on the president's survival. In
ensuring their survival, these customary authorities turn to their deputies, who turn, turn
lower deputies further down the line through the political party, party machine, body
politic and the grassroots at the national, regional and local level of government and civil
society. This trickling down effect eventually reaches the lowest echelon of the
constituency. At the end of the process, the. distribution of spoil, favors, access, resources
24 "Senegal: Government," Michigan State University Global Edge, accessed July 3, 2014,
http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/senegal/government.
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and so on, are widespread and far reaching; all culminating in servicing and maintain an
. elaborate patronage system. In return the clients/constituencies ensure that they reward
by retaining.the deputies with their votes and support, those deputies ensures that the
superior deputies remain in place; such a trend reverberates all the way back to the
president; thus help keep the president and the regime in place.
Consequently, it seems the hallmark of the Democarassie model is "well oiled",
elaborate patronage system, where customary authorities and deputies takes care of
constituencies, and the constituencies reciprocate by rewarding them with votes and
grassroots support, thus keeping them in office. This exchange is hardly democratic, but
keeps the democratic process in motion. One could argue that this communal model of
democracy resonates with Senegal communal history. A system where expectations run
high that the powerful, the well born, the well placed, the fortunate are obligated to take
care of the less fortunate, and the less fortunate in turn pledge their allegiance to the
higher tips. This arrangement is what Cheikh Anta Diop captured in his analysis of the
Senegalese, caste system and the relationship between the two castes; .the "superior" caste
-the gor (including the ger and neno) and the "inferior" caste, the djam (slaves).25 Diop
captures the relationship this way.
Unlike the attitude of the nobles toward the bourgeoisie, the lords towards
the serfs, or the Brahmans towards other Indian castes, the ger (superior
caste) could not materially exploit the lower caste without losing face in the
eyes of others as well as their own. On the contrary, they are obliged to
; assist the lower caste members in every way possible; even if less wealthy,
. ■ ■ 25 Cheikh Anta Diop, Precolonial Black Africa: A Comparative Study ofthe Political and Social
Systems ofEurope and Black Africa, from Antiquity to theformation ofthe Modern State. (New York:
Lawrence Hill Books, 1987), 1.
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they had to "give" to a man of the lower caste if so requested. In exchange,
the latter had to allow them social precedence.26
As a result, according to Diop, "The originality of the system resides in the
fact that the dynamic elements of society, whose discontent might have endanger
revolutions, are. really satisfied with their social condition and do not seek to
change it."27 Even though less pronounced, the caste system in Senegal is still in
place and the sacred bond between the customary authorities (the
fbrtunate/leaders/the upper class) and the client/constituency (the less
fortunate/lower class) is still faithfully observed. This underlies the Democarassie
model that in turn upholds political stability. Effectively, members of the lower
class expect favors from their leaders and anyone else in the community they see
as more fortunate,, even if that person have to raid state coffers, bend rules, practice
nepotism, and grant extra special favors. This is one of many the reasons why
corruption is an endemic Senegalese problem, but ironically such corrupt
exchanges keeps satisfaction high, tensions low and people vested, and in the
process foster political stability.
Civic Establishment; Religious, Socio-Cultural, and Economic Dimension
The civic establishment includes a religious, socio-cultural and economic




Muslim Brotherhoods and Religious Dimension
As far as maintaining stability, political or otherwise, the religious establishment
and its customary authorities are arguably one of the most influential and effective.
Considering that 94%28 of Senegal's population is Muslim, from the president, to the top
armed forces chiefs, to top political, cultural, business, and household leaders, an
overwhelming majority of the Muslim population identify with these brotherhoods. The
brotherhoods are all headed by what is referred to in this study as customary authorities.
Given their influence and role, these customary authorities serve as glue that keeps
society together, regardless of existing cleavages such as; ethnicity, gender, age, and
social status, in naming a few. The brotherhoods smooth out and dilute, thus converge,
instead of the normal divergence of cleavage lines. Also, regarding the power and
influence of the religious establishment .and the brotherhood justification grounded in
Islam, Islam has almost a millennium of history in Senegal, and therefore it has been
deeply rooted since the eleventh century,. Such compares to Senegal as an independent
country for just over half-century, precisely sixty four years. .However, it is interesting to
note that Senegal is a secular country. Therefore, even though not included as part of the
Muslim brotherhoods, the Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church is viewed as a
religious customary authority, because the 300, 000 ( 5% of the population) mainly
Roman Catholics enjoy meaningful religious freedom and are politically relevant. Even
the 1% animist population also worships as they please. This informs the fact that even
. • 28 "World Almanac of Islamism." The American Foreign Policy Council, accessed June 7, 2014,
http://almanac.afpc.org/senegal.
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though Islam is deeply entrenched in Senegal, religious freedom and tolerance is also
genuinely observed, thus the laicity alluded to.
The four major Muslim brotherhoods in Senegal are; the Tidjaniyya (the largest),
the Mouride/Muridiyya (second largest and most economically prosperous, and most
tightly knit), the Layenne:(third largest), and the Qadriyyah, (the smallest, but oldest).
Accordingly, each brotherhood is hierarchical headed by a figure called the Caliph,
(surrounded with deputies), and in the millions, both in Senegal and around the world
(the Mouride especially), are followers referred to as Talibs. The Talibs pay tribute, offer
support of the financial type and others, execute the Caliph's commands (ndiguel),
habitually without question. All the brotherhoods in Senegal are grounded in the Sufi-
Islamic order. According to Michael Lings, one of the preeminent Western scholars of
Sufism, Sufism is described as follows:
From time to time a Revelation 'flows' like a great tidal wave from the
Ocean of Infinitude to the shores of our finite world; and Sufism is the
vocation, and the discipline and the science of plunging into the ebb of
one of these waves and being drawn back with it to its External and
Infinite source... Sufism is a kind of mysticism:29
Citing 14th century Ibn Khaldun, BBC Religions describes Sufism as,
.. .dedication to worship, total dedication to Allah most High,
disregard for the finery and ornament of the world, abstinence
from the pleasure, wealth, and prestige sought by most men, and
retiring from others to worship alone Sufis are emphatic that
Islamic knowledge should be learned from teachers and not
exclusively from books. Tariqas can trace their teachers back
through the generations to the Prophet himself Modeling
29 Michael Lings, What is.Sufism? (Cambridge, UK: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1975), 11-12.
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themselves on their teachers, students hope that they too will
glean something of the Prophetic character.30
Understanding the philosophical underpinnings of Sufism and the Caliph/Talib
relationship goes a long away in shedding light on the power of the Muslim brotherhood
Caliphs and their influence in upholding political stability in Senegal. In regard to the
Caliphs' power and influence, Elizabeth Blunt of BBC News posits that, "Senegal's most
powerful men are not politicians, but the leaders of the country's Islamic Sufi
brotherhoods, to which a very large proportion of Senegalese belong, and whose
influence pervades every aspect of Senegalese life."31 Blunt's statement is hardly a
surprise to anyone with any knowledge of the Senegalese brotherhoods. These Caliphs,
who are direct descendants of the founder, are not generally considered gods, or even
prophets, but to the most devout of their followers, they occupy a space very close to a
prophet, or even God; A good example is.the sect of the Mouride brotherhood known as
the Baye.Fall and their unwavering belief and support for the Caliph. Another example,
even though some Muslims have reservation, many talibs of the Layene brotherhood
believe their founder Limamou Thaiw, is a prophet. The two points made here
underscore the reason behind the position that the religious establishment is one of the
most influential and the most effective. First, Sufism (the anchors of the brotherhoods)
traces the "teachers" back to the Prophet Mohammed; therefore placing the "teachers"
: . 30 "Sufism", BBC Religions, last modified September 8, 2009, accessed June 7, 2014,
http://www.bbcco.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sufism l.shtml
'■' Elizabeth Blunt, "Senegal's Powerful Brotherhoods," BBC Religions, Accessed June 7, 2014,
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/4268342.stm
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on a very high pedestal, and these caliphs, among other roles are viewed as "teachers",
partly explaining the devoutness of the talibs. Second, since these caliphs are seen
■ almost as supernatural, their commands are not usually questioned. Apparently, the
power and influence of the religious establishment and religious customary authority is
beyond doubt. Even though these religious leaders are powerful enough to upset the
political harmonic balance and instigate instability, most of the time they show resolve
and reservation, and.endeavor to remain apolitical. This does not mean that these
leaders are completely detached from politics. There are many occasions when these
religious leaders have to take positions and make political decisions. It is affirmative that
disagreements occasionally surface, and the religious leaders protest, but such protest is
not geared toward agitating violence and instability, even though this is within their
power. In retrospect, there generally exists a cordial and harmonious relationship
between the political apparatus and the religious establishment. The study now turns to
the religious establishment, their relation with the political system, and their role in
maintaining political stability, within the Democarassie model framework.
The relationship between the religious establishment and the Senegalese state, and
arguably the upholding of political stability, is captured well in a special report by David
Dickson for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). After characterizing Senegal as
exemplary, where political Islam is constructive, as compared to other regions in Africa
and other nations with a high Muslim population such as Nigeria," Dickson posits that the
harmonious relationship between the Muslim leaders and the Senegalese state dates back
to the colonial period. "The French,.fearing jihad, deferred to these (religious) leaders on
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religious affairs in exchange of. acceptance, of the French control of administrative matter,
such as taxation".32 In a different context, one can argue that "fearing jihad", is still real,
and a major driver behind this symbiotic relationship between the religious leadership
and the state. In this symbiotic relationship the Senegalese state works diligently not to
agitate the religious establishment, and in return the religious establish works equally
hard not to interfere, intrude, or in the least antagonize political affairs. Though, this not
always the case; many a time the people, general followers and more devout talibs alike,
expect the religious leadership to intervene, give direction and take position, and they, in
varying degree do, especially at the time of crisis. Because their positions have far
reaching consequences and repercussions, frequently the position taken is on the side of
peace, unity, and love of country.
. From the president, to military leaders, to cultural, business and community
leader, to ordinary citizens, if there is one thing they have in common, is commonality of
brotherhood membership: In the excess often million people, Senegalese of all stripes,
social class, and ethnic groups (some more closely than others) overwhelmingly identify
with one of the Muslim brotherhoods. With this huge number of followers, the religious
customary authorities can undoubtedly fulfill their role as vanguards of political stability
very effectively. Conversely, these leaders could also be agents ofpolitical instability,
but Senegal's political history shows that religious leaders are most of the time on the
side of peace and stability; notwithstanding the fact that they sometime disagree with the
. 52 David Dickson, "Special Report: Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New
Research Agenda," United States Institute of Peace, accessed June 7, 2014,
http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/amcdouga/Hist446/readings/political%20islam%20subsaharan%20africa.pdf
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president and his administration, and publicly display their disagreement. However, the
first president, President Senghor, set the precedent of cordiality and symbiotic
relationship between the presidency and the religious establishment. From the first
. president to the current president, President Sail, all display great respect, and honor
towards the religious leader. Even though President Senghor was Catholic, he strongly
identified with the Muslim majority and had strong ties and healthy relationship with
both the Mouride, and theTidjaniyya leadership, and other brotherhoods as well. Even
though, President Senghor's successor, President Diouf was one of those presidents who
avoided "wearing his religion on this sleeves," he also established a cordial and
harmonious relationship and close ties with the religious leaders. The third president,
. President Wade's devotion to the Mouride brotherhood was overwhelming to the point of
upsetting others. Wade, without reservations, identified fully, and considered himself a
devout Mouride, to the extent of making his first order of business after winning the
electionsiin 2000, a visit to Touba (home of the Mouride leaders and the Mouride in
general) .The current president, President Sail is following the footsteps of his
predecessors, by keeping close ties, and creating allies with the religious establishment,
especially the two biggest, the Mouride and the Tidjaniyya.
Considering this tight, cordial and harmonious relationship between the religious
establishment and the political leadership, also considering the caliph/talib relationship,
one cannot help but wonder, if the caliph and the religious establishment is too strong and
too influential to overshadow the political apparatus. Since Senegal is considered a
democracy, any inquiry concerned with the question of the separation of religion and
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state (a very important pillar of democracy) becomes a genuine concern. In addressing
this genuine concern of the separation of religion and state, one submits that, besides the
regular disagreements stemming from democratic exchanges, (the fact is that in Senegal
sometimes these disagreements have religious undertones), and besides the agitation of
very minority extremists within the brotherhoods, Senegal is genuinely a secular country,
with no intentional mix between religion and state. Despite a very high Muslim
population (94%), this country has all the attributes of a secular country, and the
overwhelming majority believes it should stay this way. As a result, it is safe to posit that
there is generally or in theory a separation of religion and state, however, in certain areas,
especially dealing with culture, the lines are very blurry. One must remember that
religion in Senegal: is so pervasive it touches every aspect of Senegalese life, therefore
religion transcends "religion,"it is a way of life. Religion forms the socio-eultural pillars
for society and to a certain extent, guides economic exchanges. Therefore, one posits that,
in Senegal there is decent separation of religion and state, however there is no separation
of religion and culture, and this tends to complicate the separation of religion and state.'
This brings us to the discussion of culture and the religious establishment, within the
Democarassie model and the upholding of political stability in Senegal.
The Socio-Cultural Dimension
As mentioned, there is definitely a lack of separation between religion and
culture, a plausible explanation such an entanglement is, even though Senegalese culture
predates Islam, in Senegal today culture is firmly grounded in religion (Islam and
Christianity). Considering a 94% Muslim population and the fact that the Islam existed
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and flourished in Senegal for a thousand years, the influence of Islam in Senegalese
culture should not be a surprise. Christianity is also as deeply rooted- even though its
presence is centuries younger. As a result, religion and culture in Senegal is inseparable,
and the role of the religious establishment is undeniable. The religious customary
authorities also assume the important role of cultural leaders. In effect, the religious
leader can offer religious and spiritual guidance, and simultaneously offer counseling on
marriage parenting, cultural ethics and morals, in naming a few. In effect, followers look
up to the religious establishment and its customary authorities, the caliph and his
deputies, for religious and spiritual guidance in connecting with their creator in
preparation for the Day of Judgment and afterlife. However, simultaneously, followers
seek cultural guidance for a more fruitful life while on earth. One observes a connection;
many followers believe the religious quality of cultural life determines the rewards the
afterlife has to offer. Therefore, one's cultural life is heavily influenced by religion.
Since Muslims strongly believe in the afterlife, the Day of Judgment and the narrative of
heaven and hell, the rewards and punishments of the afterlife seems to deeply influence
one's earthly decisions. As a result, believers/followers strive hard to stay on task with
the teachings, the wishes, and the directives of the "teacher" (the caliph and his deputies),
in the process, ensure that one's cultural life is in line with one's religious life, all under
the directions of the caliph'. This partly explains the reason behind dutiful devotion,
without the asking question, or challenging the Caliphs directives. In this regard, a
practical example that comes to mind is the observance of fasting during the Ramadan
and celebration of EidAl Fitr that follows (the first day after Ramadan), Both Ramadan
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and EidAl Fitr are grounded in Islam however, anyone familiar with Senegalese culture
is aware of the cultural importance of both. In showcasing the importance of the Caliph in
this religious/cultural affair, the fasting of Ramadan continues, and the celebration of Eid
Al Fitr. does not start until the Caliph makes that decision. Even though this is strictly a
religious undertaking, the Caliph's word is final. Frequently, various brotherhood caliphs
disagree on the date, resulting to in EidAl Fitr celebrations observed on different days.
Even though Ramadan and EidAlFitr are strictly religious, it seems the cultural aspect
and the influence of the caliph is more important.
Obviously, the influence of religion and the religious establishment intertwine and
drive culture. After a millennium of coexistence, it is safe to observe that religion and
culture have become one, the latter flowing from the former. Even though ironic,
Senegalese are very, comfortable in mixing religion and culture. For instance, considering
monotheism as a major pillar in Islam, many Senegalese are very comfortable observing
the daily Islamic prayer, before or after consulting with a cultural mystic (locally known
as serigne/marabou).33 Senegalese also perform weddings the cultural and religious way,
but simultaneously consummate the same marriage at the court house. Evidently, there
exists a very cozy relationship between religion and politics, and a much cozier
relationship between religion and culture in Senegal, so cozy that they are inseparable.
Religion and culture have finally melted into each other, but still both the political and
religious establishment strive hard to maintain a secular society; however, no one
33 These marabous are not the same as the brotherhood leaders, those are referred to as Grande
Marabous
■ ■ 173
pretends that there is a separation of culture and religion in Senegal. After all these years,
it is practically impossible to divorce the two. After all, considering the role of religion
and religious establishment, the shallow entanglement of religion and politics, and the
deep entanglement of and religion and culture, perhaps these arrangements are the key
ingredients in maintaining political stability in Senegal.
The Economic Dimension
The economic establishment and its customary authorities functions within the
context that could be better explained as an economic system of corporatism. This
establishment includes business and industry. Similar to other establishment, this
establishment is also headed by business/industry customary authorities. These customary
authorities, within the framework of the Democarassie model, also bear out their part in
maintaining political stability in Senegal. Economic customary authorities play their role
in the distribution of spoils in the form ofjobs, access, and resources. As long as these
spoils are~ distributed efficiently, political stability is reinforced. As a matter of fact, the
distribution of spoils is so.entrenched in Senegalese society that it has come to be
expected; a way of doing business, an incentive to vote for/against a candidate or a
policy. It is admitted that this breeds corruption and Senegal has its share of corruption,
•however this arrangement helps maintain stability.
Arguably,' the religious establishment overshadows both the socio-cultural and
economic establishment. The far reaching hand of the religious establishment reaches out
and touches both the socio-cultural and economic establishment. As already pointed out,
religion and culture in Senegal cannot be divorced, because socio-cultural exchanges in
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Senegal today find its grounding in religion. In a similar vein, the majority of business
and industry customary authorities have.close and sacred ties to the religious customary
authorities.. The relation they share is a caliph/talib relationship and in this relationship
the caliph is supreme. Therefore, the caliph can dictate downwards. As a result, having
connections with the caliph and his deputies can open doors and lead to business
opportunities. At the same time if the caliph's order is to break or start a demonstration,
these orders will be carried expediently and diligently. As a result the religious
establishment and its customary authorities, by far command more influence than other
customary authorities, including the political and military customary authorities. The
military establishment and its role in upholding political stability are examined next.
Military Establishment: Armed Forces
In the interest of understanding the military establishment and the role of its
customary authorities within the.Democarassie model in upholding political stability, one
start the inquiry by examining the Senegalese armed forces. In researching the
Senegalese armed forces, one frequently comes across characterizations such as "highly
professional", "well trained", and "well disciplined". Such characterizations are hardly
new. These characterizations could be traced back to the mid-nineteen the century, but
more so during World War I and II, citing the valor and gallantry of the now famous
Tirailleurs Senegalaise. Today the Senegalese armed forces are known for their
professionalism and discipline, both at home and around the world in the numerous
peacekeeping missions they lead ;or participate in from Darfur, to Sudan, to Haiti, in
■naming a few. According to Defence Web, Senegal's armed forces consist of; an Army of
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11900 personnel, an Air Force of 770 personnel, a Navy of 950 personnel and
Paramilitary of 5000 personnel; a total armed force close to 19,000. The National
Gendarmerie, the wing primarily charged with internal policing arid domestic security, is
also part of the armed forces. Each unit of the armed forces is headed by Chief of Staff,
except the Gendarmerie which is headed by a High Commander, At the zenith of the
chain-of=command is the President in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief, followed
by the Prime Minister, then the Minister of Defence.34
Clearly, the armed force is under civilian control, similar the United States
system. Under the civilian leadership are the heads of the various branches of the armed
forces. With the influence of the president and "displaced allegiance" in mind, one must
be concerned with the issue of how these top military leaders are appointed to these top
positions.. In Senegal, the president in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief names
these leaders to these top positions. For instance, on December 31, 2012 the Africa
Review reported, "Senegal's President Abdoulaye Wade has named 13 army generals in
his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Senegal."35 However,
the issue of "displaced allegiance" is not seen as a major concern. Research shows that
the professionalism of these top military brass guards against the president's influence,
but this does not mean that the president does not exert some influence over the top
military leadership. These heads are also viewed in the study as the customary authorities
34 "Senegal Armed Forces," Defence Web.
35Jean Matthew Tamba, "Senegal's Wade Appoints 13 New Army Generals," Africa Review,
(December 31, 20 It), accessed June 2. 2014. http://www.africareview.com/News/Senegals-Wade-names-
13-new-annv-generals/-/979180/1297978/-/p87pkiz/-/iridex.html.
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of the military establishment. Just like the other customary authorities in the other
establishment, they operate within the parameters of the Democarassie model, with high
expectations to fulfill their duty in helping uphold political stability. The focus now turns
to, how does this establishment and its customary authorities contribute their part in
upholding political stability?
One could argue that as an independent nation, Senegal was fortunate to come
into existence with well-disciplined, well trained, internationally exposed, professional
armed forces. Equally important is the civilian leaders' vision since the early
independence days to 1) keep the Senegalese armed forces under civilian control, and 2)
incorporate the armed forces as a partner in development, hence part of civil society. The
aimed forces in Senegal are not seen as a distant force in confinement in some distant
barracks and only come to town in the time of crisis, or come to suppress the people
during an uprising. Instead, from the beginning the armed forces are seen as protectors of
the nation. In addition to that, the armed forces are seen as being on the service of the
people; building public projects, offering health service, educating people and so on. As a
result, the armed forces are seen as members of the community, not machines of death.
The Senegalese people are also very proud of their armed forces because of their splendid
performance in peace keeping around the world, a source of goodwill for the entire
country, This idea of incorporating the armed forces as a partner in development
underwrites the genesis of the Armee-Nation concept: a concept promoting civil-military
partnership in development. According to Partners for Democratic Change, Armee-
Nation is a Senegalese Indigenous model for building peace, stability and civil-military
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relationships."36 The original idea ofArmee-Nation and its framer's vision is hereby
captured: "Shortly after Senegal's independence, President Senghor and Chief of Defense
Jean Alfred Diallo determined that the military should play a major role in the country's
development as well.as serve the Senegalese people under the unequivocal leadership of
the civilian authorities."37 Since the inception of the Armee-Nation. concept, it has always
been part of the military mission to assume three responsibilities: "safeguard peace,
protect the Senegalese people, and assist the population in economic and social
development."38 This idea took the armed forces out of the barracks into the civilian
community as partners in development. Busy with developing the country and under the
civilian leadership, this partly informs the apolitical nature of the Senegalese armed
forces. Tn retrospect,.the Senegalese armed forces, since independence, engaged more in
development that protecting the country, because Senegal has been relatively peaceful
and stable, besides the sporadic uprisings from time to time and the Casamance debacle.
In Senegal the armed forces strictly observe the pledge of.protecting, developing, and
staying out of political affairs. Thus, in and by itself adds to stability.
Today, the Senegalese armed forces command admirable trust, respect, and
goodwill from Senegalese citizens. The Senegalese armed forces have never been seen by
36 Partners for Democratic Change, "Senegal's Armee-Nation: Lessons Learned from an
Indigenous Model for Building Peace, Stability and Effective Civil-Military Relations in West Africa,"
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leaders and citizens alike as a national security threat or a threat to the Senegalese way of
life. Unlike armed forces in other West Africa countries such as Nigeria, Ghana,
Mauritania, in naming a few, the Senegalese armed forces stay at arm's-length and so far
seem to avoid at all cost in.meddling with the political status quo. As a matter of fact,
instead of trying to overthrow the regime, the armed forces are known to have a very
harmonious relationship with both the civilian leadership and civil society. Such a
harmonious relationship is captured by Biram Diop in his piece Civil-Military Relations
in Senegal. In this piece, Diop postulates that, "Since independence, civil-military
relations in Senegal have been proficient and exemplary. The international community
has. often cited as a model."39 Diop went on to reiterate on few points of general
consensus within Senegal observers concerning the Senegalese armed forces. Diop
observes that the primary reasons behind the successful civilian-military relationship in
Senegal are; 1) the generally peaceful political environment; 2) the wisdom and vision of
leaders to very early on develop the Armee-Nation concept; 3) nurturing an environment
with policies that help in the institutionalization of civil-military relationships; 4) treating
the armed forces as a partner in development; 5) the professionalism and high standards
the armed forces adhere to; 6) the partnership between the Senegalese armed forces and
other more experienced and sophisticated armed forces such as the United States and
■■ . 39 Biram Diop, "Civil-Military Relations in Senegal, "accessed June 4, 2014,
http://www. ccd.21. org/military handbook/volume two/12_senesal.pdf, 236.
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France armed force; and 7) the Senegalese armed force peacekeeping experience and
international exposure.40
The discussion thus far,, paints a picture of an internationally exposed, well-
trained, highly professional, civilian controlled armed force, charged with not only with
maintaining peace and security, but national development, and service to the people.
Maintaining peace and security is a given for any armed force, however a charge for
national development and serving the civilian population during times of peace is not out
of the ordinary, but not typical. In other, words, when one thinks of the armed forces,
national development and serving the people during peace time is not on the top of the
agenda. This is arguable, in the case of the armed forces in Senegal, the armed force's
role in development and citizens' service results in.credibility, respect, appreciation, and
goodwill of citizens towards the armed-forces. As a result, customary authorities/leaders
of the military establishment play their important role of maintaining political stability in
Senegal. Arguably, since the armed forces and their leaders enjoy significant credibility
and goodwill with the Senegal people, this allows them to perform the duty of
maintaining political stability effectively and more importantly in a peaceful democratic
manner.
Arguably, the armed forces and its customary authorities will continue to be
apolitical and avoid meddling with the political system, because this is what the citizens
have come to expect. This, has become the status quo and the norm. Therefore, the
40 Biram Diop, "Civil-Military Relations in Senegal", 236.
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armed forces and its leadership will lose significant credibility and goodwill with the
people, if they ever decide to deeply meddle with the political and/or the civilian
leadership. Such will be a great price to pay considering the fact that the armed forces,
including the top brass customary authority, have been generally satisfied with the status
quo. In the relationship the president and the civilian authority take care of the military
establishment authorities by allowing autonomy, job security, rewards, recognition, and
flexibility, arid in return the military establishment customary authorities ensure that the
president and the civilian administration perpetuate. Leonardo Arriola succinctly captured
this exchange by observing that, "The deployment of patronage has been used to explain
the. exceptional durability of some African regimes. The evidence from such paradigmatic
cases as Cote d'lvoire, Kenya, and Senegal suggest that the leaders can achieve a degree
of stability for their regimes by using the resources to facilitate intra-elite
accommodation."4'Arguably, unless a civilian leader and civilian administration poses
major and tangible threats, the armed forces will continue to do their part in upholding
political stability and keeping out of politics. In that environment, a coup will not ever
take place.
41 Leonardo R. Arriola, "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa, " Comparative Political
■Stadias Volume-2 Number 10(2009): 1339-1362, accessed May 24, 2014,
http://polisci.berkelev.edu/sites/default/files/peovle/u3618/Arriola_2009.pdf, 1340.
CHAPTER 6
FINDINGS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, LIMITATION, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
The findings from the study reveal the following workings and processes of the
Democarassie model: The first finding of the study is that other than the issue of
accommodation for nations' unique realities the two models (liberal democratic model
and the Democarassie model) are practically the same. Since the Democarassie model is
grounded in the liberal democratic tradition, as expected, the elements of both models are
quite similar; both models extend guarantees and protections, as highlighted in the study.
The only major difference between the two models is the consideration of unique
Tealities. The liberal democratic model is deemed universal with no considerations to
individual nations' unique realities, and the model allows for "direct popular
sovereignty". However, the Democarassie model is a nation-centric model that takes into
consideration and accommodates the nation's unique realities. Because of the unique
reality of establishments and customary authority in Senegal, the Democarassie model is
seen to offer "indirect popular sovereignty": A situation where people hold sovereignty
however, that sovereignty is heavily influenced by customary authority, thus the notion of
"indirect popular sovereignty".
The second finding of the study is that the Democarassie model possesses
"system stabilizing" values. As highlighted in the study, these values make the model
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kinder and gentler, responsive and accommodating to Senegal unique realities. As a
result of these accommodating tendencies, it is found out that in the form of the
Democarassie model of democracy, the democratic framework has adapted to Senegal's
existing realities, therefore adopted as the Senegalese system of government. Because of
this arrangement, one can posit that democracy is married to realities (political, socio-
cultural, religious, and economic) that Senegalese are already familiar with. The result is,
Senegalese becoming more open and comfortable with democracy. This informs the lack
of major resistance, the "buying into" and the adopting of democracy in Senegal.
Because of the local flavor, democracy is no longer seen as s foreign or a Western
construct being "shoved down in their throats." As a result, one posits that Senegalese
are now very comfortable, and to an extent understand the working of democracy,
therefore fully participate. This explains the high values of political participation, high
degree of freedom and liberties guarantees, high level of tolerance, and the high level of
inclusion.
The third finding of the study is the "tools of the trade," the "glue," the
Democarassie model applies in making the model work well, and keep all components
operating in tandem. As already mentioned, the strength of the Democarassie model is
accommodating the nation's realities, and an important reality in Senegal is the reality of
cleavages within society. It is no surprise that diverging cleavages makes a society
unstable. The Democarassie model is well aware of that, and therefore accounts for and
accommodates this reality. As a result,, the model utilizes religion, culture, language,
nationalism, age and gender roles in the application of the "convergent glue." Evidently,
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the same ingredients of the "convergent glue," are also the perfect ingredients for
divergent cleavage and agents of instability. However, the Democarassie model makes it
possible to convert these ingredients from creating divergent cleavages and political
instability to convergent cleavages and political stability. The most important finding of
the study is discovering how the Democarassie model makes this possible. In other
words, the implications of the Democarassie model on political stability in Senegal.
The ultimate findings of the study on the implications of the Democarassie model
• on political stability in Senegal are captured as follows.
In addition to sharing the elements of the liberal democratic model, and offering
meaningful "system stabilizing" values, the Democarassie model taps into institutions,
referred to in this study as establishments and establishment leaders, referred to in this
study as customary authority. The case was made that it is in the interest of the customary
authorities to work with, rather than against each other, in keeping the regime in place
and fending off instability. It was found out that all customary authorities serve their
constituents, who in turn pledge allegiance to customary authority, who also pledge
allegiance to the regime and the head of the regime-the president. The political, religious,
socio- cultural, economic, and military establishments all have special constituencies they
serve and serving these constituencies will well help them remain vested, thus maintain
stability. The arrangement is seen to maintain stability, through the Democarassie model.
In conclusion, it is found prudent to recap the main points of the study. Within the
background that, democracy upholds prosperity and political stability, chapter one teases
out the fact that this is not the case in West Africa, given the magnitude of coups and
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general economic stagnation or even deterioration. However, in the region, Senegal and
Cape Verde stand out, as far as: political stability as manifested in the frequency of coups
and the maturity of democracy is concerned. The study focused on Senegal and found
out that not the liberal democratic model, but the Democarassie model was responsible
for democracy and political stability in Senegal. This led to the literature review on the
. two concerns of the study (the democratization process, democracy, and policy stability).
In.this review it is discovered that the liberal democratic model is not one-size-fit all. As
a result, the literature review analysis concluded with a suggestion for a model of
democracy that is grounded in the liberal democratic tradition, but that also
accommodates a nation's realities, This leads to a discovery to the gap in the literature,
suggesting that the liberal democratic model is not capable of fully explaining political
stability in Senegal.
Chapter three adds to. the study by presenting the Democarassie model as the
theoretical framework that explains political stability in Senegal better than the liberal
democratic framework, Following a detailed conceptualizations of the main concerns .
(political stability, democratization/democracy and the Democarassie model), chapter
three highlighted the necessity and made the justification for utilizing an explanatory
qualitative case study. The main justification being, in order to get to the crux of the
Democarassie model and its implication on political stability, a case study analysis
proves to be a useful: method of analysis: In the case study, the first conundrum reveals
itself in the comparative prelude, where despite similarities between Senegal and West
Africa, a different outcome ensued: The case study went at length in showing how
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Senegal arrived at that different outcome; the outcome of remaining democratic and
politically stable while the general sub-region suffers from endemic issues of democracy
and instability. Chapter five illustrates the inner workings of the Democarassie model
that makes Senegal democratic and politically stable. This leads to the overall conclusion
of the study.
The overall conclusion of the study is that Senegal is relatively democratic and
politically stable region, not because of the liberal democratic model as a Western
construct, but because of the Democarassie model: a derivative/offshoot of the liberal
democratic model that considers and accommodates the realities in Senegal.
Why not promote the idea of discovering models of the liberal democratic
model.that accommodates nations,' unique realities? This is a suggestion for future
study: if Senegal is able to discover a model of democracy grounded in the liberal
democratic tradition that considers and therefore accommodates Senegal's unique
realities, therefore fitting Senegal better, why not other countries, especially
countries in the West African sub-region that are plagued with both lack of.
democratic consolidation and political instability.
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